1 00:00:00,099 --> 00:00:15,282 *34C3 preroll music* 2 00:00:15,282 --> 00:00:26,850 Herald: So. The last are the best or something like that. Our next speaker is 3 00:00:26,850 --> 00:00:33,010 here waiting for this massive crowd that will support him to go through his 4 00:00:33,010 --> 00:00:42,739 experience with the FBI. He's gonna share with us the way he informs the FBI about 5 00:00:42,739 --> 00:00:49,089 his behaviors. So it's not just like in cycling or other sports but ... I don't 6 00:00:49,089 --> 00:00:55,690 know what sport you do, Hasan. But these easy sports men in communication with FBI. 7 00:00:55,690 --> 00:01:08,159 Please give a welcome applause ... Yes! Last are the best. Oh sorry ... 8 00:01:08,159 --> 00:01:11,920 Hasan: That's pointing to me. The arrow will start making sense. Really I mean 9 00:01:11,920 --> 00:01:15,710 ... How amazing has it been the last few days here, right? It's been this ... 10 00:01:15,710 --> 00:01:19,250 amazingly intense last few days and it's kind of ... You know it's, it's an honor 11 00:01:19,250 --> 00:01:23,530 to kind of wrap this up and I really appreciate you guys hanging out here till 12 00:01:23,530 --> 00:01:28,479 the very very very last time slot. Thank you, thank you for coming. This is ... it 13 00:01:28,479 --> 00:01:32,149 means a lot. I've been hearing a lot about this Congress for many years and 14 00:01:32,149 --> 00:01:36,400 this is my first time here and it's just ... you know, I was just telling some 15 00:01:36,400 --> 00:01:42,101 friends that I consider myself relatively tech literate and then I come here and I 16 00:01:42,101 --> 00:01:45,102 feel like everyone speaking a completely different foreign language that I have no 17 00:01:45,102 --> 00:01:48,590 idea what's happening. And it's not because some of the talks are in German. 18 00:01:48,590 --> 00:01:53,539 It's like literally like some of the subject matter is so specific that it's 19 00:01:53,539 --> 00:01:58,729 so easy to be completely like: What is being discussed? So I'm gonna tell you, 20 00:01:58,729 --> 00:02:03,859 it's something a little bit more ... you know, a little more of a story and kind of 21 00:02:03,859 --> 00:02:09,199 tell you about what I've been doing. So I'm an artist and I get called all sorts 22 00:02:09,199 --> 00:02:11,920 of different things I get ... You know, sometimes I get lumped in with the media 23 00:02:11,920 --> 00:02:16,380 artists, sometimes with sculptor, sometimes with photographers, sometimes I 24 00:02:16,380 --> 00:02:24,080 get called a con artist. But so ... so it's kind of odd being in this, being in 25 00:02:24,080 --> 00:02:28,300 this gatherings. Particularly after some of the other talks that I've been sitting 26 00:02:28,300 --> 00:02:32,421 in on. But let me tell you a little bit about how this thing came about, this 27 00:02:32,421 --> 00:02:38,420 thing with the arrow. By the way I'm at elahi.org or elahi.umd.edu. I'll show you 28 00:02:38,420 --> 00:02:42,180 some of my works but mainly I'll be focusing on this one project which is 29 00:02:42,180 --> 00:02:47,710 called Tracking Transience which I started shortly after 9/11. So let me just 30 00:02:47,710 --> 00:02:51,070 give you a live feed of what it looks like. So this is, this is it. So you can 31 00:02:51,070 --> 00:02:55,980 go on the web and you could follow me at any given moment. And there's this pixel, 32 00:02:55,980 --> 00:02:58,960 this arrow that comes here, which is actually... These days we're so used to seeing 33 00:02:58,960 --> 00:03:05,050 ourselves as pixels on a map. But this project was started 2002 and back then to 34 00:03:05,050 --> 00:03:09,360 see yourself as a pixel was just such an unusual thing. I mean, these days we ... 35 00:03:09,360 --> 00:03:13,010 You know, these days you're driving down the road and there's that little icon on 36 00:03:13,010 --> 00:03:17,810 the GPS, that tells you exactly where you are. Or you know the ... I mean like, you 37 00:03:17,810 --> 00:03:20,760 know, like when was the last time you bought one of those maps at the gas 38 00:03:20,760 --> 00:03:24,990 station? You opened it up ... Do you remember that? I mean, we don't ... it's 39 00:03:24,990 --> 00:03:28,050 just like we just completely lost that. We can't even know how to fold a map back up 40 00:03:28,050 --> 00:03:31,430 anymore. You know, cuz back in the old days you'd have to take out that map and 41 00:03:31,430 --> 00:03:37,180 you'd go: "We're here!" So you'd have to locate yourself to the geography within 42 00:03:37,180 --> 00:03:41,800 that map. These days, you take out that magic phone, you press that little button, 43 00:03:41,800 --> 00:03:45,650 and you become the center of your own map. And your ... the map resizes to you. 44 00:03:45,650 --> 00:03:49,440 So the space of the ... So looking at yourself as a digital space versus a 45 00:03:49,440 --> 00:03:53,000 physical space. You know it's, it's a totally different concept that we're 46 00:03:53,000 --> 00:03:57,870 running into now and for some reason this looks like this got caught up over here. 47 00:03:57,870 --> 00:04:02,496 So let's give it another kick. And hopefully it'll kick in again. 48 00:04:02,496 --> 00:04:09,061 Okay. So, that's, that's, so this is, this is where I started. So the project starts here. 49 00:04:09,061 --> 00:04:12,510 And you know, then this goes through the cycles of everything that I eat and ... 50 00:04:12,510 --> 00:04:15,760 You know, let's see what comes up after this. You know, you can probably see where 51 00:04:15,760 --> 00:04:18,790 this place is. You probably recognize that. So these are all the meals that 52 00:04:18,790 --> 00:04:22,480 I've been cooking at home. And I photograph all of them. It's just kind of interesting. 53 00:04:22,480 --> 00:04:24,820 As now it's like it's so common on Instagram, it's like, you know, if 54 00:04:24,820 --> 00:04:28,460 people think that you know, well, why else would you be using Instagram other than 55 00:04:28,460 --> 00:04:33,840 posting photos of your food? But I help out the FBI with this. So I sent this ... 56 00:04:33,840 --> 00:04:37,660 So this was on Friday December 4th. This was at the corner of Santa Clara and 11th 57 00:04:37,660 --> 00:04:43,380 in San Jose. I got, I bought gas there. This is at the Gimhae Airport in Busan. 58 00:04:43,380 --> 00:04:47,363 This is some tripe, that I've cooked at home. Because I really like tripe. 59 00:04:47,363 --> 00:04:52,710 This is, this is actually the Barack Hussein Obama School in Jakarta, Indonesia, 60 00:04:52,710 --> 00:04:59,590 1st March. This is, this is, ... Sorry, this is going so fast. So every few moments, what 61 00:04:59,590 --> 00:05:02,790 I do is: I take a photograph and I timestamp my life and I send it to the 62 00:05:02,790 --> 00:05:08,260 FBI. And, well you know, it's ... And it's also kind of interesting. Because 63 00:05:08,260 --> 00:05:11,870 these days, the project means something so different. When I first started this 64 00:05:11,870 --> 00:05:15,710 project, people would be like: "Oh no no, don't show up at my house!" And now it's 65 00:05:15,710 --> 00:05:19,139 like - You know, it's not like if you're don't, if you're not on social media, if 66 00:05:19,139 --> 00:05:23,560 you're not connected, like people think of you are some, some weirdo or something. 67 00:05:23,560 --> 00:05:30,280 So what happens here is that this thing of like continuously, continuously 68 00:05:30,280 --> 00:05:34,300 monitoring myself and continuously checking in ... You know, now a lot of 69 00:05:34,300 --> 00:05:37,131 people are like: "I don't get this. This looks like my Instagram feed. What's the 70 00:05:37,131 --> 00:05:42,850 big deal?" But then this concept of self- surveillance or this, this watching 71 00:05:42,850 --> 00:05:48,980 ourselves or monitoring ourselves for the sake of someone else, whether it be your 72 00:05:48,980 --> 00:05:52,810 Twitter followers or in my case the FBI ... I mean, this is something that's 73 00:05:52,810 --> 00:05:58,125 become so commonplace. And each of us are creating our own archives. So a lot of 74 00:05:58,125 --> 00:06:01,220 the shifts that's taking place culturally - I think it's really important to think 75 00:06:01,220 --> 00:06:04,580 about this, because, you know, it's like, like this bed. I mean, you're not really 76 00:06:04,580 --> 00:06:08,440 sure what happened in that bed. You're not really sure who I was there with. Or 77 00:06:08,440 --> 00:06:11,790 you see these like random train stations. There are always these empty spaces. 78 00:06:11,790 --> 00:06:14,800 There's like ... no one's ever there, and every now and then you might see some 79 00:06:14,800 --> 00:06:18,099 people. But they just, they just tend to be incidental to the image. 80 00:06:18,099 --> 00:06:21,260 Which is kind of interesting when you look at like the "no photography" or the 81 00:06:21,260 --> 00:06:22,260 "ask permission 82 00:06:22,260 --> 00:06:25,692 of people that are in there" Which is really amazing to think about. That like 83 00:06:25,692 --> 00:06:30,790 how many cameras are there in every given moment? Actually in this room, right now, 84 00:06:30,790 --> 00:06:37,090 they're at least twice as many cameras as there are people. Because there's one 85 00:06:37,090 --> 00:06:40,777 camera in the front of your phone and another one in the back of your phone. And 86 00:06:40,777 --> 00:06:45,250 who knows how many other cameras in, in all the other devices and everything else 87 00:06:45,250 --> 00:06:49,480 that we are putting in. So we can't really escape these cameras, regardless of 88 00:06:49,480 --> 00:06:55,093 what we do. And so all of these things, all these bits and pieces that I'm 89 00:06:55,093 --> 00:06:59,669 archiving of my life. So every few moments another photo gets put up and it gets 90 00:06:59,669 --> 00:07:03,480 tagged with the geo tag of where it was. Again this is something that's so common 91 00:07:03,480 --> 00:07:08,340 today but 12, 13, 14 years ago this was completely just like: "What are you doing 92 00:07:08,340 --> 00:07:11,560 and why are you doing this?" 93 00:07:11,560 --> 00:07:16,400 And ... sorry ... So yeah, and then of course 94 00:07:16,400 --> 00:07:20,714 there's all these toilets because, uh, my FBI agent really needs to know. I figure 95 00:07:20,714 --> 00:07:24,550 the FBI, that ... You know, they want to know my business and I'm very open and I'm 96 00:07:24,550 --> 00:07:27,380 very sharing. So I figure, I'm gonna tell them every little bit of detail, 97 00:07:27,380 --> 00:07:32,680 including the toilets that I use and how frequently and where I go. You know, they 98 00:07:32,680 --> 00:07:36,730 need to know, so! Really, what's happening, you know and, and what I'm 99 00:07:36,730 --> 00:07:40,699 really, what I'm really doing is: I'm, it's, it's a matter of telling you 100 00:07:40,699 --> 00:07:44,790 everything and telling you absolutely nothing simultaneously. It's a barrage of 101 00:07:44,790 --> 00:07:50,030 noise. Look, I know that eventually, you know, machine and AI machine readers and 102 00:07:50,030 --> 00:07:55,630 AI is going to get so, so sophisticated, that at a certain point this idea of 103 00:07:55,630 --> 00:08:00,550 overwhelming the system, it's not going to be possible. This is a temporary fix. 104 00:08:00,550 --> 00:08:07,639 And the reason I chose this fix is, you know, obviously the FBI has a file on me. 105 00:08:07,639 --> 00:08:12,630 By the way, the background story of this is: I got reported as a terrorist. 106 00:08:12,630 --> 00:08:18,560 I guess, I should probably explain on that a little bit. So shortly after 9/11, my 107 00:08:18,560 --> 00:08:24,030 landlords, that I rented this storage space from, called the police and said, 108 00:08:24,030 --> 00:08:27,678 that an Arab man had fled on September 12th, who is hoarding explosives. 109 00:08:27,678 --> 00:08:30,611 Never mind. There were no explosives. Never mind, 110 00:08:30,611 --> 00:08:33,230 it wasn't an Arab man. But you know, that Arab man 111 00:08:33,230 --> 00:08:36,369 would be me. Even though I'm Bengali and we're actually not Arabs. 112 00:08:36,369 --> 00:08:39,948 But it doesn't matter because as far as many people ... You know, they're all the 113 00:08:39,948 --> 00:08:43,699 same over there. They're all kind of fun. You know, that's, it's, it's that mentality 114 00:08:43,699 --> 00:08:47,079 So I spent six months of my life with the FBI, convincing them that 115 00:08:47,079 --> 00:08:51,899 I'm not a terrorist. And after all that they said: "Okay, everything's great, 116 00:08:51,899 --> 00:08:53,930 you're fine", and I said: "Okay, wonderful, can I get a letter saying : 117 00:08:53,930 --> 00:08:58,759 I'm fine?" There's a little problem with that, because have you ever tried to get 118 00:08:58,759 --> 00:09:03,779 something that says: "You're not guilty of something you never did"? So you know, 119 00:09:03,779 --> 00:09:07,970 so ever since then I've been with my FBI agent. I said: "Hey, what can I do? I 120 00:09:07,970 --> 00:09:10,689 mean, I travel a lot. All we need is the next guy not to get the next memo and 121 00:09:10,689 --> 00:09:14,490 here we go all over again. How do I avoid this?" So at that moment he gave me a 122 00:09:14,490 --> 00:09:17,490 phone. He says: "Here's some phone numbers. If you get into trouble, give us 123 00:09:17,490 --> 00:09:20,670 a call. We'll take care of it." So ever since then I would call my FBI agent, 124 00:09:20,670 --> 00:09:24,170 tell him where I was going, send him photos to all of these things, and thus 125 00:09:24,170 --> 00:09:27,540 that's what this whole project started. In a ... I mean back then when I started this 126 00:09:27,540 --> 00:09:30,939 project, shortly after 9/11, I mean, my phone was like those old ... Remember 127 00:09:30,939 --> 00:09:34,839 those old Nokia 6600? Those like super chunky ones and you had to hit the buttons 128 00:09:34,839 --> 00:09:38,158 like a whole bunch of times to send like one text message across? And we should 129 00:09:38,158 --> 00:09:41,869 call them smart phones back then. I mean, they're really not that smart, but 130 00:09:41,869 --> 00:09:46,170 they're kind of smart phones. Anyway. So this process of like sending all this 131 00:09:46,170 --> 00:09:50,230 information to the FBI. I started telling them everything. And also at the same 132 00:09:50,230 --> 00:09:53,570 time by telling them everything I'm also telling them absoutely nothing because 133 00:09:53,570 --> 00:09:58,499 it's just a wall of noise. And in that noise there is some signal and the ratio, 134 00:09:58,499 --> 00:10:03,749 the signal-to-noise ratio, is actually pretty skewed. It's pretty, it's pretty 135 00:10:03,749 --> 00:10:07,990 out of sync in that sense. Because it's, it's difficult for the, for the viewer to 136 00:10:07,990 --> 00:10:12,019 know what they're looking at. So if you don't s–. That website, it's a, it's, it 137 00:10:12,019 --> 00:10:16,360 is an archaic website. I mean, it is completely obsolete technologically, but 138 00:10:16,360 --> 00:10:20,899 more importantly, it's also one of these things, it's, it's intentionally user- 139 00:10:20,899 --> 00:10:24,649 unfriendly. It's not, you know, information is not categorized in a way 140 00:10:24,649 --> 00:10:27,830 where, you know, "oh, I want to see this data this time". It's like, it's just, it 141 00:10:27,830 --> 00:10:31,730 just comes in it, whichever way it, the, the algorithm these days feels like 142 00:10:31,730 --> 00:10:34,680 generating the, the info. So sometimes you might see a taco, then you might see 143 00:10:34,680 --> 00:10:38,639 the next one from Mexico City, then Mexico City might go to like this place 144 00:10:38,639 --> 00:10:41,640 because I took a flight from there to Houston. So you might get some images 145 00:10:41,640 --> 00:10:44,649 from Houston next. And then from Houston you might get some things from another 146 00:10:44,649 --> 00:10:49,660 city in the back and forth. So it actually takes all these pathways various through 147 00:10:49,660 --> 00:10:54,069 it. So in this process I'm really, you know, it's, it's, I'm telling you 148 00:10:54,069 --> 00:10:57,889 everything and nothing in this camouflage. In this, you know, thing of, 149 00:10:57,889 --> 00:11:02,720 like, you know, historic camouflage. Now the concept of camouflage particularly in 150 00:11:02,720 --> 00:11:08,149 digital identity is really important. Because historically, when you hear 151 00:11:08,149 --> 00:11:13,431 camouflage, it's usually meant for, you know, warfare, battle, soldiers. And the 152 00:11:13,431 --> 00:11:18,499 reason we have, the reason, camouflage looks at certain ways, because it was 153 00:11:18,499 --> 00:11:23,079 designed to break the silhouette of the body of the soldier in the battlefield, 154 00:11:23,079 --> 00:11:29,699 in the landscape of warfare. So this is why, you know, certain trees look certain 155 00:11:29,699 --> 00:11:33,410 colors and when you look, you know, it's every place you go, there's a different 156 00:11:33,410 --> 00:11:40,220 war. Each, with each war, there's a different pattern, that, that's used. Now 157 00:11:40,220 --> 00:11:43,100 if you look at the new camouflage, that most troops are wearing, particularly in 158 00:11:43,100 --> 00:11:49,240 the US, where I live, it's all pixeled, it's all pixelized, you know, it's all, 159 00:11:49,240 --> 00:11:54,249 and it's all this, like, weirdly grayish, greenish color. I don't know if you've 160 00:11:54,249 --> 00:12:00,220 noticed that color. But there's no trees that color anywhere. It's because it's 161 00:12:00,220 --> 00:12:05,610 not meant for blending into the landscape anymore. It's no longer meant so the 162 00:12:05,610 --> 00:12:11,759 soldier has to blend into the battlefield. The reason it's pixelized and 163 00:12:11,759 --> 00:12:17,639 it's that grayish, greenish color is because we no longer have a need for the 164 00:12:17,639 --> 00:12:22,800 soldier to blend in to the battlefield, the physical battlefield. But what we want 165 00:12:22,800 --> 00:12:30,019 is the soldier to be, so the enemy cannot distinguish the physical body of the 166 00:12:30,019 --> 00:12:35,480 soldier in the noise and the night-vision goggles. That's why it's that color. 167 00:12:35,480 --> 00:12:41,100 That's why it's that grayish green. So this is a huge step. So we no longer, it's no 168 00:12:41,100 --> 00:12:45,939 longer about the physical presence of the body in the, in the war field, in the, in 169 00:12:45,939 --> 00:12:51,949 warfare. But it's now about the, it's now where the, the digital body, that the 170 00:12:51,949 --> 00:12:58,029 physical body is intentionally camouflaged and mistaken for a digital 171 00:12:58,029 --> 00:13:04,029 artifact. It's that pixelization, that we've forced basically in 172 00:13:04,029 --> 00:13:07,120 warfare. And a lot of work, that I do, with a lot of, a lot of the art, that I 173 00:13:07,120 --> 00:13:11,160 come up with, comes out of warfare and such. And I'll show you a little. But this 174 00:13:11,160 --> 00:13:14,370 is a really important piece, that I wanted to talk to you about. Because this 175 00:13:14,370 --> 00:13:20,170 was taken from one of the earliest samples of what the US Army uses. And it was done 176 00:13:20,170 --> 00:13:24,639 at the, at the base, at Natick, which is the, outside of Boston. This is where a 177 00:13:24,639 --> 00:13:27,980 lot of the camouflage in the US is designed. It's the US Army's fashion 178 00:13:27,980 --> 00:13:32,637 design department. Though they would never call it the fashion design department. But 179 00:13:32,637 --> 00:13:36,434 this is where they design all the camouflage and the, and the outfits. And 180 00:13:36,434 --> 00:13:40,589 so this sample was taken ... At first, it just looks like a modernist grid. Various 181 00:13:40,589 --> 00:13:43,019 photographs and such. But what they really are, is ... I took the old sample 182 00:13:43,019 --> 00:13:49,519 and I blew it out and took out each pixel and replaced each pixel with a photograph 183 00:13:49,519 --> 00:13:53,480 of a historic or current point of conflict. So there's these two images 184 00:13:53,480 --> 00:13:58,300 right in the middle. If you look. The two blue images over there, kind of in the 185 00:13:58,300 --> 00:14:05,910 middle to the bottom, those are in North Korea. Those are north the 38th parallel. 186 00:14:05,910 --> 00:14:09,069 That could technically, north the parallel. So you're actually in North 187 00:14:09,069 --> 00:14:13,149 Korean territory, but at Panmunjom. There's actually six buildings and three 188 00:14:13,149 --> 00:14:18,389 ... And all six are built directly across the border. And, you know, it's kind of 189 00:14:18,389 --> 00:14:22,480 unpractical to share half the building with another country. So three of the 190 00:14:22,480 --> 00:14:25,953 buildings belong to South Korea, three of them belong to North Korea. So these were 191 00:14:25,953 --> 00:14:29,585 the South Korean buildings. But physically in North Korean territory. Similar like 192 00:14:29,585 --> 00:14:33,110 that plate of ham that you see right below it, you know, it's a Spanish ham. 193 00:14:33,110 --> 00:14:37,821 And being a good Muslim, I really do enjoy my Spanish ham. But this was, this 194 00:14:37,821 --> 00:14:43,049 was photographed in Guernica, the site of a brutal massacre. Shortly ... you know, 195 00:14:43,049 --> 00:14:45,790 so similarly, so each of the, every single one of these images, they might 196 00:14:45,790 --> 00:14:50,879 seem like these generic or bland images, but they're all historic conflicts or 197 00:14:50,879 --> 00:14:54,380 current conflicts. There's, there's an image in the, in the upper right hand, in 198 00:14:54,380 --> 00:14:58,860 the upper left hand corner, right there, and it's, it's of an office building with 199 00:14:58,860 --> 00:15:05,360 just a flag with three stripes going across. And this is like a quick world 200 00:15:05,360 --> 00:15:10,389 affairs quiz. Which country has, has a flag that goes three horizontal stripes 201 00:15:10,389 --> 00:15:16,936 across, the top and bottom are red, and the middle one is green? Any guesses on 202 00:15:16,936 --> 00:15:30,859 this country? Three stripes, red, green, red. Lots of confused looks,. Huh? ... 203 00:15:30,859 --> 00:15:34,949 It's, it's a trick question. The country doesn't exist. It's a, it's Transnistria 204 00:15:34,949 --> 00:15:39,670 or at least the Russians call it Pridnestrovia. And it's a breakaway 205 00:15:39,670 --> 00:15:43,499 republic of Moldova, it's a tiny little sliver of land between Moldova and 206 00:15:43,499 --> 00:15:49,930 Ukraine. Maybe about 20, 30 kilometers wide and maybe about 200 kilometers long. 207 00:15:49,930 --> 00:15:54,470 This tiny, tiny, tiny sliver ... no one ... They have it, well, by the way, they 208 00:15:54,470 --> 00:15:58,029 have their own military, they have their own passports, they have their own 209 00:15:58,029 --> 00:16:01,820 currency, they have their own judicial system, they've their own everything. Like 210 00:16:01,820 --> 00:16:08,920 a country, except no one recognizes them as a country. But if you need to go buy 20 211 00:16:08,920 --> 00:16:13,829 cases of AK-47s, this is the place to go. So this is, this tiny piece of land, this 212 00:16:13,829 --> 00:16:19,850 tiny piece of land, that no one recognizes, is really where a lot of the 213 00:16:19,850 --> 00:16:24,199 destabilization of the world comes from. So I went over there and then of course I 214 00:16:24,199 --> 00:16:27,139 would tell my FBI agent: "This is where I was going, just loitering." He was like: 215 00:16:27,139 --> 00:16:29,800 "What are you doing over there?" So I said: "I'm just hanging out, just seeing 216 00:16:29,800 --> 00:16:34,309 what's going on." Anyway. So again, all of the, every single one of these images, 217 00:16:34,309 --> 00:16:37,560 there's bits and pieces of these types of source ... But I want to go back at the 218 00:16:37,560 --> 00:16:44,109 state of warfare and talk to you a little bit about that. So, I live in the US. And 219 00:16:44,109 --> 00:16:47,534 you know, it's we're, you know, currently at the war on terror. Actually the, the 220 00:16:47,534 --> 00:16:54,109 real name is the Global War on Terror. And this was a drawing that I did for a 221 00:16:54,109 --> 00:17:00,409 project a few years ago. And there's a, there's a congressional document. So 222 00:17:00,409 --> 00:17:04,939 there's this document, that the US Congress keeps, and it's called the 223 00:17:04,939 --> 00:17:10,572 "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad", this time was 1798 to 224 00:17:10,572 --> 00:17:15,900 2006. This gets updated every year. And interestingly enough, when you look at 225 00:17:15,900 --> 00:17:20,040 this document, it's ... everything is just the facts, everything is, you know, in 226 00:17:20,040 --> 00:17:26,530 1838, you know, Marines chased pirates onto a Caribbean island. Well, when the 227 00:17:26,530 --> 00:17:30,363 Marines landed on that Caribbean island, we invaded that country. Any time you send 228 00:17:30,363 --> 00:17:34,679 your troops on to another country soil without that country's permission, you 229 00:17:34,679 --> 00:17:38,649 have invaded that country. So everything from like, you know, Marines chasing 230 00:17:38,649 --> 00:17:43,750 pirates to a Caribbean island all the way to World War One, it's all just one, 231 00:17:43,750 --> 00:17:47,100 everything's just listed as one instance, just straight down like ... And this, and 232 00:17:47,100 --> 00:17:51,641 it's just, goes on for pages and pages and pages and pages and pages and, you know, 233 00:17:51,641 --> 00:17:56,380 so and then you look at it like: "Wait. When, when did, when did the US invade 234 00:17:56,380 --> 00:18:01,899 Florida?" Well, that was when it was Spanish territory, this is a, you know, before 235 00:18:01,899 --> 00:18:04,920 that became part of United States similarly, you know ... So when you look 236 00:18:04,920 --> 00:18:10,049 at it, all the white X's are all the invasions, that the US has undertaken 237 00:18:10,049 --> 00:18:16,099 between 1776, which was the year of the independence, to World War One. All the 238 00:18:16,099 --> 00:18:22,660 gray X's are World War One to Vietnam. And all the black X's are Vietnam to today. 239 00:18:22,660 --> 00:18:29,860 The number of invasions, that the US troops have undertaken between 1776 and 240 00:18:29,860 --> 00:18:35,755 World War One, roughly equate the same amount as World War One to Vietnam. And 241 00:18:35,755 --> 00:18:42,706 the number of invasions from 1776 to Vietnam roughly equate Vietnam to 242 00:18:42,706 --> 00:18:51,210 today. In the last 100 years, in the last 117 years, since 1900, there's only 243 00:18:51,210 --> 00:18:55,630 been five years, where the US has not been at war. Interestingly enough, we've 244 00:18:55,630 --> 00:19:01,029 only declared war 11 times in history. Since independence of the country, the US 245 00:19:01,029 --> 00:19:08,080 has only formally declared war 11 times. Yet of the all the years, that we've ever 246 00:19:08,080 --> 00:19:13,100 been an independent country, like there's only like 20 or 30 years, that we haven't 247 00:19:13,100 --> 00:19:18,389 been at war. And most of those are pre 1800. And then... So since 248 00:19:18,389 --> 00:19:23,639 1900, there's only been five years. And you can see all of these dots. So one of 249 00:19:23,639 --> 00:19:27,610 the reasons that I wanted to create this document, is that I had this proposal, 250 00:19:27,610 --> 00:19:32,200 that I wanted to do for this, uh, this museum in Spain. And I was talking to 251 00:19:32,200 --> 00:19:36,289 curator and I said: "Hey. You know, it would be really great, what if we set up 252 00:19:36,289 --> 00:19:40,900 a wall of like bulletproof glass in the gallery. So we'll just, it's like, as 253 00:19:40,900 --> 00:19:43,830 people are going around the museum, we just set up a huge bulletproof, huge 254 00:19:43,830 --> 00:19:49,093 sheet of bulletproof glass with a really faint drawing of the world. And we'll 255 00:19:49,093 --> 00:19:52,650 have got, we'll have a guy with a rifle in the back and he'll shoot bullets at the 256 00:19:52,650 --> 00:19:58,797 audience. But the, but because there's bulletproof glass, it'll stop. And I mean, 257 00:19:58,797 --> 00:20:02,370 I knew that there was just no way they would go for it. But to my surprise, they 258 00:20:02,370 --> 00:20:09,406 said: "Let us talk to some security people and we'll get back to you about this." 259 00:20:09,406 --> 00:20:12,850 And I was really surprised. So in the meantime, we did some ballistics tests. 260 00:20:12,850 --> 00:20:16,080 So check this out. Look at, look at, I mean, like, that's what it looks 261 00:20:16,080 --> 00:20:20,450 like. I mean, it's just beautiful when ... I mean, just the way, like, when 262 00:20:20,450 --> 00:20:25,039 basically, when bullets hit bulletproof glass. It's not really glass, it's just 263 00:20:25,039 --> 00:20:31,769 very dense plastic. And the heat of the bullet comes in at such velocity, 264 00:20:31,769 --> 00:20:36,559 that the plastic melts just ever so slightly and then just swallows the bullet 265 00:20:36,559 --> 00:20:42,840 back up and it freezes back up, so slightly liquefies and then solidifies. 266 00:20:42,840 --> 00:20:47,620 This is what happens inside your body, when you get shot. Except your body 267 00:20:47,620 --> 00:20:51,467 doesn't just, you know, absorb the bullet and just refreeze together. It's just 268 00:20:51,467 --> 00:20:55,639 like this really scary looking thing of just looking at that, that blunt trauma, 269 00:20:55,639 --> 00:21:02,169 that immediate point of when that bullet hits. This is what happens. So we 270 00:21:02,169 --> 00:21:05,929 did some ballistics tests and we went through some ideas and then, and then of 271 00:21:05,929 --> 00:21:09,019 course, as I expected, they said: "No, you're crazy, there's no way we're doing 272 00:21:09,019 --> 00:21:16,470 this." But they were willing to send this out to, to off-site. And we built this in 273 00:21:16,470 --> 00:21:21,490 these fabricators built this off-site. And of course then there was these other 274 00:21:21,490 --> 00:21:27,139 problems of, you know, if we build this in the US and send it to the museum, I mean, 275 00:21:27,139 --> 00:21:31,169 you know, when it comes into Europe, does it get imported as artwork or does it get 276 00:21:31,169 --> 00:21:35,472 imported as, well, possibly firearms because there's actual real gunpowder in 277 00:21:35,472 --> 00:21:41,860 it? There's a lot of problems. So in order to deal with the customs issues 278 00:21:41,860 --> 00:21:45,850 of it, we figured, you know, what, let's just ship it, 279 00:21:45,850 --> 00:21:50,630 let's just have it built in Spain. And then, as we were about to build this, we 280 00:21:50,630 --> 00:21:57,009 realized: There was a little pesky Spanish law, that requires you to be at least 25 281 00:21:57,009 --> 00:22:02,330 meters away from the intended target. You can't discharge a weapon in less than 25 282 00:22:02,330 --> 00:22:06,669 meters of its intended target. Now of course I wanted this piece to be gigantic. 283 00:22:06,669 --> 00:22:09,320 And then you could only imagine, that this, the price of the bulletproof glass, 284 00:22:09,320 --> 00:22:14,420 as it gets larger and larger and larger. So we eventually agreed that it'll be 4 285 00:22:14,420 --> 00:22:20,019 meters by 2 meters. Except at that scale, each of these dots, each of these bull–, 286 00:22:20,019 --> 00:22:26,370 each of these targets then become like 3 millimeters or 4 millimeters in diameter. 287 00:22:26,370 --> 00:22:30,330 Now I don't know how many of you do shooting or target practice or any of 288 00:22:30,330 --> 00:22:35,929 that. But try to hit 330 dots that are about 3 to 4 millimeters in 289 00:22:35,929 --> 00:22:40,812 diameter from 25 meters away, one after another, without missing them. That's 290 00:22:40,812 --> 00:22:45,809 actually practically impossible. So I was like: How do we do this? And then the 291 00:22:45,809 --> 00:22:50,347 museum fortunately hired three former Olympians to do this. It was just 292 00:22:50,347 --> 00:22:56,549 unbelievable, watching these guys. And of the 330 bullets, that are there, 326 of 293 00:22:56,549 --> 00:23:01,520 them were exactly on center. The four that were off, were no more than five, five 294 00:23:01,520 --> 00:23:06,600 millimeters, and I'm convinced I just drew them wrong. Those four, I mean, it's 295 00:23:06,600 --> 00:23:09,523 just, it's just unbelievable. But you, but you can see what happens. So in the 296 00:23:09,523 --> 00:23:14,429 middle over here, this is Central America, we have hit, we have invaded 297 00:23:14,429 --> 00:23:18,541 Central America so many times. That as you keep hitting these bullets, these 298 00:23:18,541 --> 00:23:23,010 physical, these bullets, just eventually the bulletproof glass just shatters and 299 00:23:23,010 --> 00:23:27,712 gives away, I mean, it so, it causes a literal wreck. So it's kind of 300 00:23:27,712 --> 00:23:32,820 interesting, looking at this, this very abstract concept of, of these invasions, 301 00:23:32,820 --> 00:23:38,200 these political, these types of political policies, that we have, and what the 302 00:23:38,200 --> 00:23:43,230 physical manifestation of that, what that does in a map. But what does that do to 303 00:23:43,230 --> 00:23:46,940 the physical geography? So I'm really interested in this idea of geography body, 304 00:23:46,940 --> 00:23:50,529 data body, this physicality and the virtuality and how these two come 305 00:23:50,529 --> 00:23:54,740 together. And this. So similarly, uh, I've been, I've been doing a lot of these 306 00:23:54,740 --> 00:23:58,659 things about warfare and such. And I want to show you this project. This is a 307 00:23:58,659 --> 00:24:02,583 project that I've been working on in, in Hawaii recently. And you know, Hawaii, I 308 00:24:02,583 --> 00:24:07,820 mean, who's gonna turn down a job in Hawaii? It was pretty unbelievable, 309 00:24:07,820 --> 00:24:15,920 getting a chance to do this project. And so, when you go to, when you 310 00:24:15,920 --> 00:24:20,149 in... Hawaii is a really interesting, at least in American policy 311 00:24:20,149 --> 00:24:25,759 and American political and cultural perspectives, Hawaii is a very unique 312 00:24:25,759 --> 00:24:32,190 place. Because Hawaii is the ultimate manifestation or the ultimate, like,... 313 00:24:32,190 --> 00:24:37,320 embodiment of what we in, in the, in the US we have this term called "manifest 314 00:24:37,320 --> 00:24:43,070 destiny", which was a term from the early 1700, actually the late 1700s, in the 315 00:24:43,070 --> 00:24:47,580 early history of America, where we decided to start in the East and the 316 00:24:47,580 --> 00:24:52,149 Atlantic and expand all the way across the ... That we will manifest the 317 00:24:52,149 --> 00:24:57,593 country and the whole land will become ours. This is the birth of the US. This 318 00:24:57,593 --> 00:25:02,830 is the idea of how the country was, was given birth to. Now, Hawaii is a really 319 00:25:02,830 --> 00:25:09,090 interesting situation in this perspective because now, you know, we've started on 320 00:25:09,090 --> 00:25:11,769 the Atlantic coast, we've conquered, conquered, conquered, 321 00:25:11,769 --> 00:25:16,549 conquered, conquered, got, went all there over to the end. We've gone to the Pacific 322 00:25:16,549 --> 00:25:21,030 Ocean. And now we've crossed the Pacific Ocean. And now we've gone to this middle 323 00:25:21,030 --> 00:25:25,740 of this, this rock in the middle of the, of the ocean. And now we're at the top of 324 00:25:25,740 --> 00:25:29,160 the mountain. So we've actually, like, you know, then all that, then ... The 325 00:25:29,160 --> 00:25:31,780 interesting thing is: Hawaiian culture, when you go to the peaks of each of the 326 00:25:31,780 --> 00:25:37,049 mountains, every, every of the mountain peaks are sacred. Interestingly enough, 327 00:25:37,049 --> 00:25:41,880 when you go to each of these mountaintops, they're all, well, there are almost always 328 00:25:41,880 --> 00:25:46,389 US military or some sort of government or some sort of science. But, of course, for 329 00:25:46,389 --> 00:25:50,360 many ... And now, granted, I know, there is some amazing stuff being done. But 330 00:25:50,360 --> 00:25:54,919 there's a lot of also very shady, you know, like it's military stuff being 331 00:25:54,919 --> 00:25:58,370 done. And it's also this thing of like going up and then now with these 332 00:25:58,370 --> 00:26:04,379 surveillance devices, these telescopes at the top of each of these monitoring and 333 00:26:04,379 --> 00:26:10,899 surveying and measuring everything out in the West and out in the sky. And you 334 00:26:10,899 --> 00:26:13,320 know, so we've gone through the West, which is also a really interesting thing 335 00:26:13,320 --> 00:26:17,241 about the history of landscape in America. Let me show you, let me show you 336 00:26:17,241 --> 00:26:21,590 a couple of these images of the top of this place, which is just, it's just 337 00:26:21,590 --> 00:26:25,399 beautiful going up there. I mean, it looks like Mars. And a lot of the Mars 338 00:26:25,399 --> 00:26:29,950 tests were actually done up there because ... I mean, it's just amazing. 339 00:26:29,950 --> 00:26:33,899 Like you're looking down at the sky and there's these like satellites everywhere. 340 00:26:33,899 --> 00:26:38,769 I mean, it really does look like a Martian landscape. I'm really interested in this. 341 00:26:38,769 --> 00:26:41,320 Okay, so let me show you these projects. I've been really interested in watching 342 00:26:41,320 --> 00:26:47,389 the watchers of this thing of ... like ... And what happens when you aestheticize 343 00:26:47,389 --> 00:26:51,394 surveillance. I mean, obviously, this is a major issue for a lot of us. And a lot 344 00:26:51,394 --> 00:26:55,360 of the conference topics here, talks about privacy and what to do and how to 345 00:26:55,360 --> 00:27:01,330 stop mass surveillance and things of that type. But when you hear the word 346 00:27:01,330 --> 00:27:07,179 "surveillance imagery", what do you think of? What are you thinking? Just imagine: 347 00:27:07,179 --> 00:27:11,179 a picture, "surveillance imagery". What does it look like to you? And for most of 348 00:27:11,179 --> 00:27:14,370 us, we generally probably think of like, you know, like, what CCTV or surveillance 349 00:27:14,370 --> 00:27:20,558 camera images look like. Usually grainy, pixely, no, gritty, sometimes black and 350 00:27:20,558 --> 00:27:25,740 white. You know, with this audience, we already know data storage is cheap. I mean, this data 351 00:27:25,740 --> 00:27:30,779 storage, I mean, you could buy a terabyte drive for like 30 bucks. So data, you 352 00:27:30,779 --> 00:27:33,519 know, it's, and it gets cheaper and cheaper every day. And the capacity gets 353 00:27:33,519 --> 00:27:37,790 larger and larger. So it's not necessarily an economic issue. But it's actually more 354 00:27:37,790 --> 00:27:42,350 of a cultural issue. And, and I'm proposing the fact that when you hyper- 355 00:27:42,350 --> 00:27:51,220 aestheticize a surveillance image, your brain no longer reads it as surveillance. 356 00:27:51,220 --> 00:27:57,056 Your brain rejects the image when it's too aesthetically pleasing. You read it as 357 00:27:57,056 --> 00:28:01,883 landscape or you read it as, read it as landscape photography. And, and many of 358 00:28:01,883 --> 00:28:04,919 the, in the case of landscape photography and many of it is, the history of it is 359 00:28:04,919 --> 00:28:10,580 based on landscape painting. So it's really that, that gritty graininess that 360 00:28:10,580 --> 00:28:15,860 actually gives us the, the emotional attachment that this is a surveillance 361 00:28:15,860 --> 00:28:21,080 image. Because when it becomes, when it doesn't have those characteristics, when 362 00:28:21,080 --> 00:28:27,248 it doesn't have those qualities, it becomes a photo or a video. So in this 363 00:28:27,248 --> 00:28:30,139 case, I just, I was really interested in what happens when, when you hyper- 364 00:28:30,139 --> 00:28:34,150 aestheticize that. And imagine if you had x-ray vision. Imagine you had x-ray 365 00:28:34,150 --> 00:28:37,150 vision. You could see right through this wall. What would you see on the other of 366 00:28:37,150 --> 00:28:41,959 this wall? Well, this image, which actually looks like a window pane. They're 367 00:28:41,959 --> 00:28:47,320 actually six very large monitors and this is, this functions as a see- 368 00:28:47,320 --> 00:28:51,175 through wall. So you could actually see through this wall. And just so, it just 369 00:28:51,175 --> 00:28:55,970 so happened that on the other side of the, of the wall from this exhibition space 370 00:28:55,970 --> 00:29:00,259 was the Baltimore Police Department. So I loved the idea of being able to watch the 371 00:29:00,259 --> 00:29:04,649 police watching me watching them. And when you notice that there's that, next in 372 00:29:04,649 --> 00:29:06,600 the blue light there's a little surveillance camera on top of their 373 00:29:06,600 --> 00:29:10,710 dumpster which really doesn't make any sense to me why they would need a 374 00:29:10,710 --> 00:29:13,980 surveillance camera over their dumpster. But I just love this image of just this 375 00:29:13,980 --> 00:29:17,299 constant reflecting back and forth and watching and watching and watching back. 376 00:29:17,299 --> 00:29:20,350 And in the image you couldn't tell, you know, whether it was, whether you're 377 00:29:20,350 --> 00:29:23,940 looking at a photograph or whether you're looking at a video or whether you're, you 378 00:29:23,940 --> 00:29:27,570 know, it's just every now that you see some blurry lights move by or some of 379 00:29:27,570 --> 00:29:31,899 these figures. But really, you know, if you look at a lot of what machine vision, 380 00:29:31,899 --> 00:29:34,289 a lot of the software, I mean, you know, like, you know, you see those things on 381 00:29:34,289 --> 00:29:38,600 the TV with all those people looking at those monitors. And that's, no, that's, 382 00:29:38,600 --> 00:29:42,899 that's like the movies or that's like they used for like fundraising. The real stuff 383 00:29:42,899 --> 00:29:47,390 is all machines looking at this stuff. And it doesn't actually look that sexy at all. 384 00:29:47,390 --> 00:29:51,937 So I love this idea of actually taking this image and, you know, seeing 385 00:29:51,937 --> 00:29:56,299 what can happen when it's aestheticized. Now similarly, you know, 386 00:29:56,299 --> 00:29:59,720 what happens when the form is aestheticized? This is the very 387 00:29:59,720 --> 00:30:03,230 similar project at another location. But this is what you would see through the 388 00:30:03,230 --> 00:30:11,049 wall. And when you see this, I mean, your brain completely rejects this as a 389 00:30:11,049 --> 00:30:17,370 surveillance image. But this is exactly what happens right on the other side over 390 00:30:17,370 --> 00:30:22,309 there. So thinking about the idea of aesthetics and what surveillance looks 391 00:30:22,309 --> 00:30:28,919 like and at least, you know, growing up in an American context, you know, so 392 00:30:28,919 --> 00:30:33,809 a lot of the history of American photography comes from American painting 393 00:30:33,809 --> 00:30:38,530 or landscape painting. And the history of a lot of our landscape painting comes from 394 00:30:38,530 --> 00:30:42,450 the Hudson River School, which is the Northeast and, you know, up north of New 395 00:30:42,450 --> 00:30:47,970 York City and up the Hudson River. These gorgeous grand vistas, often of these 396 00:30:47,970 --> 00:30:54,210 really large, you know, wide viewpoints, of these very like subliminal, very like 397 00:30:54,210 --> 00:30:59,190 spiritual type of imagery. This very godlike imagery. Which is kind of 398 00:30:59,190 --> 00:31:04,358 interesting because in the way it is like trying to replicate this eye of God. Or if 399 00:31:04,358 --> 00:31:06,700 you want to look at it from the perspective of surveillance, in which we 400 00:31:06,700 --> 00:31:12,659 generally tend to think of surveillance as a very post 9/11 or a very 21st century 401 00:31:12,659 --> 00:31:17,889 concept. I mean, most of us did not use the word surveillance, say, you know, 20 402 00:31:17,889 --> 00:31:22,330 years ago, 30 years ago. That word was not as common. It certainly has become 403 00:31:22,330 --> 00:31:27,330 incredibly common in our vocabulary very recently. But even though we tend to 404 00:31:27,330 --> 00:31:32,429 think of surveillance as a very post–, a very 21st century concept, this is 405 00:31:32,429 --> 00:31:36,510 something that's been embedded in our history, in our brains for thousands of 406 00:31:36,510 --> 00:31:41,570 years. Particularly when you look at those early paintings. And then God as the 407 00:31:41,570 --> 00:31:49,179 original surveillance camera. You behaved because God was watching. So it was very 408 00:31:49,179 --> 00:31:55,220 easy to replace this being above with a camera above. And that becomes so 409 00:31:55,220 --> 00:31:59,620 normalized in our daily lives. I mean, think about it. How does Santa Claus know 410 00:31:59,620 --> 00:32:04,519 everything about you? I mean, we were taught this since we were at such an 411 00:32:04,519 --> 00:32:09,780 early point in life. We've ... So this normalization of surveillance, this 412 00:32:09,780 --> 00:32:13,640 normalization. And also this, you know, and ... You know, we don't think, we 413 00:32:13,640 --> 00:32:18,610 never use the word surveillance when we're talking about God. Again you know, this 414 00:32:18,610 --> 00:32:21,940 aesthetics, the hyper- aestheticization or maybe, if you want to 415 00:32:21,940 --> 00:32:26,269 call, I mean, this is not exactly a statusization. But, you know, in 416 00:32:26,269 --> 00:32:31,500 the idea of thinking about it. So, again, this relationship between the watched and 417 00:32:31,500 --> 00:32:35,580 watcher. And, you know, another similar project and one that looks like when 418 00:32:35,580 --> 00:32:40,360 you break that frame of looking at ... of the format of surveillance and when you 419 00:32:40,360 --> 00:32:43,809 aestheticize the format, not only the imagery of surveillance, but also the 420 00:32:43,809 --> 00:32:48,169 format and how the surveillance is presented. I mean, we rarely, we would 421 00:32:48,169 --> 00:32:52,181 never, we wouldn't even think of this as a surveillance camera image. But that is 422 00:32:52,181 --> 00:32:56,389 exactly what this is. That's another similar piece. I just want to show you 423 00:32:56,389 --> 00:32:59,200 the context of this one. Because I want to show you, but talk a little bit about 424 00:32:59,200 --> 00:33:04,350 the project that's going on on the right. And this image is ... So they look like 425 00:33:04,350 --> 00:33:08,090 these landmines. But they also look like satellites. I'm really interested in this 426 00:33:08,090 --> 00:33:12,015 idea of like circumnavigation. I'm really interested in these things of, you know, 427 00:33:12,015 --> 00:33:16,320 conceptually this project is telling you earlier about. This is about telling you 428 00:33:16,320 --> 00:33:21,119 everything and nothing simultaneously. But in a similar way, I'm also really 429 00:33:21,119 --> 00:33:25,330 interested in this concept of Magellan and circumnavigation, where you go far enough 430 00:33:25,330 --> 00:33:29,710 to this side, you end up in the other. You circle around the whole thing. Does 431 00:33:29,710 --> 00:33:32,389 that make sense, a little bit? So in the, you know, sometimes some people are so far 432 00:33:32,389 --> 00:33:36,908 to the left, that they're actually very much to the right and vice versa. So 433 00:33:36,908 --> 00:33:40,388 there's this, the circular reasoning that keeps coming back and forth. And I'm 434 00:33:40,388 --> 00:33:43,390 really interested in this thing and ... This could be a landmine, but 435 00:33:43,390 --> 00:33:47,320 this could also be a satellite. It's, there's these types. And then also at the 436 00:33:47,320 --> 00:33:50,940 same time, like, this was, this is an earlier project. But they also look like 437 00:33:50,940 --> 00:33:54,779 selfie sticks. But then there's these, like, all these things coming out with 438 00:33:54,779 --> 00:33:58,120 these, like, these monitors sticking out of each of ... This is pretty iPad. Well, 439 00:33:58,120 --> 00:34:01,889 actually this installation was done later. But I mean, now it's like these 440 00:34:01,889 --> 00:34:05,620 tablets are like so common. And they're so everywhere. But what ... These are 72 441 00:34:05,620 --> 00:34:09,139 monitors and all the images that I've shared with the FBI and said to my FBI 442 00:34:09,139 --> 00:34:13,480 agent, these are all being shown on all these monitors simultaneously. And you 443 00:34:13,480 --> 00:34:19,350 could get an idea of what you're looking at. So in the same sense this project was 444 00:34:19,350 --> 00:34:23,530 ... This is only a part of ... This one's... This one's about, 445 00:34:23,530 --> 00:34:32,090 it's about 28 feet. So that's just about 8 meters, 8 and a half meters tall, this 446 00:34:32,090 --> 00:34:37,350 piece. And it's basically every photo that I photographed and shared. 447 00:34:37,350 --> 00:34:41,669 But they're all printed in these huge pieces, in these huge, vinyl banners. And 448 00:34:41,669 --> 00:34:45,870 the actual photos, each photo is about this little. But, you know, there's like 449 00:34:45,870 --> 00:34:48,962 thousands and thousands and thousands and thousands of them. So when you look from 450 00:34:48,962 --> 00:34:53,897 the back, all you see is these vertical color stripes. Interestly enough, well, 451 00:34:53,897 --> 00:34:57,080 what they, the other thing that ... I don't necessarily disclose this in public 452 00:34:57,080 --> 00:35:00,140 and I put the *[unclear]* but you're really looking at all the images shot on Sunday, all the 453 00:35:00,140 --> 00:35:05,570 ones on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and so on with the seven days. 454 00:35:05,570 --> 00:35:09,850 But what's also happening is, you know, the color bars, the test bars for 455 00:35:09,850 --> 00:35:13,937 color calibration of monitors, you know, it's like ... So, one of the things that 456 00:35:13,937 --> 00:35:17,762 happend, I'm sure you must have had, I'm sure, you must have had this in 457 00:35:17,762 --> 00:35:21,100 Germany. But in the US we used to have a thing called the Emergency 458 00:35:21,100 --> 00:35:27,090 Broadcast System. And the television show would stop and would go *peeep* This tone 459 00:35:27,090 --> 00:35:30,360 would come out and these color bars would come on the screen and it would say "This 460 00:35:30,360 --> 00:35:33,780 is a test of the Emergency Broadcast System. Had this been a real emergency, 461 00:35:33,780 --> 00:35:37,380 you would have been instructed on what to do." So this thing of impending doom, 462 00:35:37,380 --> 00:35:42,010 this thing, if something is, something bad is about to happen or something bad could 463 00:35:42,010 --> 00:35:45,420 happen. And because something like that could happen, we need to be ready and we 464 00:35:45,420 --> 00:35:49,545 need to be prepared. This thing of like, you know, being ready for these things. So 465 00:35:49,545 --> 00:35:53,300 I'm really interested in that, in this idea of, like, what happens when 466 00:35:53,300 --> 00:35:57,073 you use that tone or when you use that color and you borrow that thing? But at 467 00:35:57,073 --> 00:36:01,670 the same time, it's the very same system that broadcasters use to calibrate 468 00:36:01,670 --> 00:36:06,620 signal. So this thing of signal, you know, and if you think about it. On a 469 00:36:06,620 --> 00:36:10,740 daily basis, we generate so much digital information. How much of it can be, how do 470 00:36:10,740 --> 00:36:14,530 we calibrate that? So in a way of giving a nod to that, that's where this 471 00:36:14,530 --> 00:36:20,520 piece comes out of. So and then this one led to the next one, which ... This has 472 00:36:20,520 --> 00:36:25,151 been making the rounds throughout the place. So this was at ZKM a couple of 473 00:36:25,151 --> 00:36:29,401 years ago here. And then, now this has been floating around Eastern Europe. And 474 00:36:29,401 --> 00:36:32,270 these are, you know, they look really small on the, in the photograph. But this 475 00:36:32,270 --> 00:36:36,060 is the same piece, but lit up from the back. I'll show you another photo of it 476 00:36:36,060 --> 00:36:39,650 so you can get a better idea of this piece. So you're seeing every little bits 477 00:36:39,650 --> 00:36:43,730 and pieces and all of these things coming together. So they're about three meters 478 00:36:43,730 --> 00:36:49,280 tall, each of these slabs. And and they're lit up from the back. So 479 00:36:49,280 --> 00:36:52,450 and then this is a body of work that I'm dealing with. So this thing of, like, 480 00:36:52,450 --> 00:36:56,300 you know, libraries or archives. And we all have them. We all create personal 481 00:36:56,300 --> 00:36:59,250 archives. I mean, if you look at every single photo you've ever shot, I mean, 482 00:36:59,250 --> 00:37:03,170 which you probably have a record of. You know, so when you have all of these, so 483 00:37:03,170 --> 00:37:06,530 what, you know, so we're all keeping our own private archives, you know, I have my 484 00:37:06,530 --> 00:37:11,130 own private archive that I'm doing as a parallel archive to the FBI. But, you 485 00:37:11,130 --> 00:37:14,950 know, it doesn't have to be for the FBI. I mean, we all ... maybe in this room, I'm 486 00:37:14,950 --> 00:37:18,030 sure everybody here has been watched by the government. And there's 487 00:37:18,030 --> 00:37:21,620 probably a few people from the shady organizations in this room right here 488 00:37:21,620 --> 00:37:26,000 anyway or certainly at the conference. But what you're looking at here is every, 489 00:37:26,000 --> 00:37:30,380 maybe one of those images. And then there's this pretty grainy black-and-white 490 00:37:30,380 --> 00:37:34,590 image on top. And it looks like every other industrial rooftop. It looks like 491 00:37:34,590 --> 00:37:38,560 it's a roof top of a building. And you can see the, the fans and the exhaust and 492 00:37:38,560 --> 00:37:42,200 the vents. And then at the lower right there's these like golf ball looking 493 00:37:42,200 --> 00:37:48,800 things. And most buildings don't have those. This happens to be the rooftop of 494 00:37:48,800 --> 00:37:53,910 the NSA. This is... So really you know, and I kind of look at 495 00:37:53,910 --> 00:37:58,200 it like the NSA and you know - us, we're kind of in the same business. We're 496 00:37:58,200 --> 00:38:00,580 kind of on the information business. Except, you know, they like to keep 497 00:38:00,580 --> 00:38:04,976 theirs to themselves and I like to give it out to everybody. So, you know, 498 00:38:04,976 --> 00:38:08,200 we operate a little differently in our business. But we're kind of in the same 499 00:38:08,200 --> 00:38:12,510 business. So I decided to put this piece out. And really, this thing of like, you 500 00:38:12,510 --> 00:38:15,586 know, so, you know, in a lot of ways they're kind of like selfies. But they're 501 00:38:15,586 --> 00:38:19,230 not really selfies, because when I photographed these things ... So let's go 502 00:38:19,230 --> 00:38:23,150 back to this for now. So, you know, when I'm photographing this, I mean, I could 503 00:38:23,150 --> 00:38:26,680 have taken the camera and I could have photographed you right now. But 504 00:38:26,680 --> 00:38:29,680 instead there's this very anonymous looking thing. I mean, like, you know, if 505 00:38:29,680 --> 00:38:32,730 you've been in this room, you know, that this could, we 506 00:38:32,730 --> 00:38:36,790 know where that is. But in the same way, there's these like really like, you know, 507 00:38:36,790 --> 00:38:41,010 so the camera is not pointing towards me. But the camera is pointing outward. And 508 00:38:41,010 --> 00:38:43,010 that's what's really important here. And there's thousands and thousands and 509 00:38:43,010 --> 00:38:47,687 thousands of these. I know. So the selfies, it's become a common thing. And 510 00:38:47,687 --> 00:38:53,220 it's no shame in, you know, saying you like the selfies. I mean, here's 511 00:38:53,220 --> 00:38:57,150 President Obama trying to make the look at selfie stick and selfies look pretty 512 00:38:57,150 --> 00:39:02,425 respectable. I can't use the new guy. I can't just bear to see him. So I 513 00:39:02,425 --> 00:39:05,716 have to go with this guy. I have to go with Obama. Because, you know, it's 514 00:39:05,716 --> 00:39:09,850 important. But, you know, he's making that, so when he's taken that image, what 515 00:39:09,850 --> 00:39:13,721 happens? Now when you look at the image, this is what, this is the image 516 00:39:13,721 --> 00:39:16,950 that we're seeing. That's, that's up on my website right now. And as soon as I leave 517 00:39:16,950 --> 00:39:20,020 this room, there'll be a new image that'll pop up and then when I get to my hotel, 518 00:39:20,020 --> 00:39:23,860 you'll see another image. And then when I get to, you know, wherever I go eat 519 00:39:23,860 --> 00:39:27,540 tonight, you'll see another image. But anyway, so, you know, every few moments I 520 00:39:27,540 --> 00:39:31,600 timestamp to change it. So when we're seeing this image, but really this is what 521 00:39:31,600 --> 00:39:34,740 the, this is what the computer is seeing. And this ... Some of you, and I'm sure 522 00:39:34,740 --> 00:39:38,480 you know about this, but for those that are not aware of it, I mean, you know, 523 00:39:38,480 --> 00:39:42,930 when you look at the Exif data – I use *[unclear]* which is an Exif reader to extract what 524 00:39:42,930 --> 00:39:46,780 my images are or what the data that's behind it – so you can see what the image 525 00:39:46,780 --> 00:39:51,220 is. That was shot right there, in that location. I mean, we know that because 526 00:39:51,220 --> 00:39:55,880 that's how our apps know. Would you like to check in from here? That's how it knows 527 00:39:55,880 --> 00:39:59,240 the location. So location services, that's pretty simple. And that's all the, 528 00:39:59,240 --> 00:40:01,620 the metadata that's going ... But the here it's where it gets really 529 00:40:01,620 --> 00:40:06,620 interesting. The fact that when you look at the altitude of this image, 530 00:40:06,620 --> 00:40:14,010 the altitude is 186.061643, sounds about right for Leipzig? For this area, 186 531 00:40:14,010 --> 00:40:19,530 meters of altitude? Yes? No? I mean, I'm assuming it's correct because that's what 532 00:40:19,530 --> 00:40:22,431 the phone is telling me. But similarly, what's really interesting is, when you 533 00:40:22,431 --> 00:40:27,500 look at the image direction. So, I mean, we know the latitude, longitude, that's a 534 00:40:27,500 --> 00:40:31,270 given. The altitude, that's a new one. Because an image taken on the ground, sea 535 00:40:31,270 --> 00:40:36,000 level, on the ground level will look very different than an image shot on the 20th 536 00:40:36,000 --> 00:40:40,760 or 30th floor of a building. Because the barometric sensor inside the phone will 537 00:40:40,760 --> 00:40:44,580 put a different altitude number in there. So we know, that this image can also, 538 00:40:44,580 --> 00:40:49,620 if I were to shoot this image from the roof looking down, that image probably 539 00:40:49,620 --> 00:40:57,760 will be about a 188, 189, 190 meters. Because of the distance of this. The other 540 00:40:57,760 --> 00:41:03,000 part, that's really interesting, is the image direction. The camera was tilted at 541 00:41:03,000 --> 00:41:12,390 a 163 degrees from North. 0 being North, 90 East, 180 South, 270 West. So slightly 542 00:41:12,390 --> 00:41:16,680 south. The camera was pointed slightly south-ish. Which is exactly what that 543 00:41:16,680 --> 00:41:23,120 camera's pointed. Now, why does this matter? It was only a few years ago that 544 00:41:23,120 --> 00:41:27,470 we were thinking: "You mean, Google is going to drive up and down every single 545 00:41:27,470 --> 00:41:34,780 road and record every single street?" Yes, basically the only thing, that's 546 00:41:34,780 --> 00:41:39,000 holding them back in certain places, is the country's laws or the local things. 547 00:41:39,000 --> 00:41:43,470 Aside from that, not only they drive up and down every single road in every single 548 00:41:43,470 --> 00:41:47,620 city in every single country that they can. They do this repeatedly, year after 549 00:41:47,620 --> 00:41:51,540 year, after year, after year, after year. Some places they'll put, you know, like 550 00:41:51,540 --> 00:41:55,101 in Venice, they'll have like someone on a boat that goes through. On certain 551 00:41:55,101 --> 00:41:58,450 pedestrian-only islands, there'll be someone carrying a backpack of those 552 00:41:58,450 --> 00:42:03,040 Google cameras around. So it wasn't that long ago that this concept, that Google 553 00:42:03,040 --> 00:42:11,120 would catalog every possible outdoor space was seemed so far-fetched. It's only 554 00:42:11,120 --> 00:42:18,090 a matter of time before we collectively photograph every indoor space and we 555 00:42:18,090 --> 00:42:23,350 catalog every single indoor space and we photograph all of it. And sooner or 556 00:42:23,350 --> 00:42:28,190 later, this database, we, through this database of every indoor image with all 557 00:42:28,190 --> 00:42:32,800 the metadata, we can restitch every interior space. We could recreate every 558 00:42:32,800 --> 00:42:35,850 interior space. Similarly, you know, then, you know, when you look at your frequent 559 00:42:35,850 --> 00:42:38,390 locations. I mean, you know, do you look at me that's like, you know, exactly what 560 00:42:38,390 --> 00:42:42,360 moment you've come on, what minute you walked into a place, what minute you've 561 00:42:42,360 --> 00:42:47,860 walked out of a place. I mean, you know, how does your phone know that you've 562 00:42:47,860 --> 00:42:53,650 taken, you know, 8934 steps today? I mean, it's counting every single one of 563 00:42:53,650 --> 00:42:57,050 them. It knows, you went three, you know it, you've done five flights 564 00:42:57,050 --> 00:43:01,039 today, because it knows that your altitude changed from here to here to here. And it 565 00:43:01,039 --> 00:43:06,050 knows every second you've done all this. I mean, this is kind of crazy. So, 566 00:43:06,050 --> 00:43:09,390 you cross-reference all of this data. I mean, and short of basically 567 00:43:09,390 --> 00:43:13,878 giving up our phones. I mean, this data is being collected and it's gonna happen. 568 00:43:13,878 --> 00:43:19,570 It's going to get archived. I mean, you know, there's plenty of, you 569 00:43:19,570 --> 00:43:24,350 know, but at these... that these phones are just like, it's inevitable. And we're 570 00:43:24,350 --> 00:43:27,970 not going to give up our lives without them. So you cross-reference all of 571 00:43:27,970 --> 00:43:33,390 these. And very quickly it creates a complete picture of the owner of that 572 00:43:33,390 --> 00:43:38,470 device. Now back in the old days, you know, you'd have to, you know, the 573 00:43:38,470 --> 00:43:41,955 intelligence agencies would waste all of this energy or follow people around. I 574 00:43:41,955 --> 00:43:46,140 mean, you know, it wasn't that long ago. It happened right here. I mean, you'd have 575 00:43:46,140 --> 00:43:49,092 people following other people around. You'd have databases. And you have 576 00:43:49,092 --> 00:43:54,310 archives on other archives. This record- keeping, this massive amount of analog 577 00:43:54,310 --> 00:43:58,930 record-keeping, was not, this is not far-fetched. This happened very 578 00:43:58,930 --> 00:44:04,180 recently. Now, why should they go around, do that today, when they can 579 00:44:04,180 --> 00:44:07,030 just go to one of the companies and say: "Hey. You don't want you give it to us?" 580 00:44:07,030 --> 00:44:11,020 Now we know, you know, of course here's, you know, Tim Cook saying: "No, no, we 581 00:44:11,020 --> 00:44:15,257 don't, we don't give our information to the NSA, we don't do that." We know a 582 00:44:15,257 --> 00:44:18,800 little differently, you know, I mean, remember these? These are from Snowden. I 583 00:44:18,800 --> 00:44:23,520 mean, this is obvious. Look, it doesn't say, when we ... well, it does not say, 584 00:44:23,520 --> 00:44:28,060 when the NSA intercepted each of these dates, when prism collection began for 585 00:44:28,060 --> 00:44:32,660 each provider. They're being called providers here. The reason they're being 586 00:44:32,660 --> 00:44:36,450 called providers is, because these are the companies, that are providing the 587 00:44:36,450 --> 00:44:42,760 information to the NSA. So while Tim Cook can say that he doesn't, you know, well, 588 00:44:42,760 --> 00:44:47,680 while he can say, well, he can say all he wants about he doesn't, you know, that 589 00:44:47,680 --> 00:44:52,330 they don't involve themselves, we know otherwise. This is proof. So, you 590 00:44:52,330 --> 00:44:57,270 know, so my whole thing is like, hey, you know, if the tech companies, if these 591 00:44:57,270 --> 00:45:01,020 organisa..., if these large multinational tech companies can provide this 592 00:45:01,020 --> 00:45:03,820 information, why can't we do this for ourselves? Why can't we just put this out 593 00:45:03,820 --> 00:45:07,510 there? And what and why not just put everything out there, whether it's 594 00:45:07,510 --> 00:45:13,080 relevant or not? And why not just mud up the whole system? So, you know, I'm 595 00:45:13,080 --> 00:45:16,520 really interested in this idea of like creating our own archives. Do you know 596 00:45:16,520 --> 00:45:20,110 this building? This is the AT&T data center in San Francisco at the corner of 597 00:45:20,110 --> 00:45:23,481 2nd and Folsom. This is a project that they call Hawkeye, which is actually 598 00:45:23,481 --> 00:45:30,310 AT&T's internal code name for this data center. And shortly before 2007, about a 599 00:45:30,310 --> 00:45:35,200 little over 10 years ago, there were, there was a whistleblower though, that 600 00:45:35,200 --> 00:45:41,970 came forward. It was in room 641a of this building, which... Basically, what 601 00:45:41,970 --> 00:45:46,050 happened is: The NSA approached 16 telecom companies in the US and said: "We'd like 602 00:45:46,050 --> 00:45:51,820 to copy your data stream." And 15 of the 16 said: "Sure, help yourself, you know, 603 00:45:51,820 --> 00:45:55,265 make yourself at home." There's only one company, that said: "You know. We're not 604 00:45:55,265 --> 00:45:59,220 really sure the legalities of this. Can you come back with a warrant and tell us 605 00:45:59,220 --> 00:46:03,070 what you're looking for? And we will provide it to you, if you can tell 606 00:46:03,070 --> 00:46:08,810 us what you want." But you know, you had, you had 15 of the 16 just say: 607 00:46:08,810 --> 00:46:14,221 "Yeah, go ahead." So what basically, what happened in, in 2007, not like, who 608 00:46:14,221 --> 00:46:21,710 knows, what it is now. But in 2007 it was estimated, that there was 213 terabytes 609 00:46:21,710 --> 00:46:29,830 of phone records in this building. Every phone record of every domestic call in the 610 00:46:29,830 --> 00:46:35,070 US was archived. And then of course there's multiple data centers. This is 611 00:46:35,070 --> 00:46:39,330 just one of many. Now who does that phone call belong to? You know, when you're 612 00:46:39,330 --> 00:46:42,740 calling grandma. Does that phone call, does that information and that phone 613 00:46:42,740 --> 00:46:47,090 call, does that belong to you? Does that belong to Grandma? Or does that belong to 614 00:46:47,090 --> 00:46:51,839 the phone company and they're licensing you a one-time use of it? We don't, I 615 00:46:51,839 --> 00:46:55,650 mean again with this... Who actually owns this data? So I was really 616 00:46:55,650 --> 00:46:59,260 interested in this and keeping it record. So, I know, you know, while AT&T's 617 00:46:59,260 --> 00:47:03,450 keeping records, which is my mobile phone provider in the US. 618 00:47:03,450 --> 00:47:07,330 Similarly, I'm keeping my own records. And this is all my, this is my log files 619 00:47:07,330 --> 00:47:11,490 of all the people that come by on my website. And you can see all of the folks. 620 00:47:11,490 --> 00:47:15,480 Let me show you a little bit cleaner version. And you can see all the 621 00:47:15,480 --> 00:47:19,490 lovely happy people, that come by, like, the terrorist screening center of the 622 00:47:19,490 --> 00:47:24,510 Central Intelligence Agency or the, you know, the National Geospatial- 623 00:47:24,510 --> 00:47:29,300 Intelligence Agency. I don't know why they come by. I mean, I, I'm glad that they 624 00:47:29,300 --> 00:47:35,720 like art. I'm glad we have patrons of the arts in, in these organizations. Because, 625 00:47:35,720 --> 00:47:38,570 you know, I mean, like, they come by frequently enough. I'm not really sure 626 00:47:38,570 --> 00:47:42,370 what they're doing. But I'm glad, I'm glad they like what I do. But, so, I 627 00:47:42,370 --> 00:47:47,180 really have to thank one particular person for making my art career possible. 628 00:47:47,180 --> 00:47:51,390 And that would be Dick Cheney. Because if it was not for Dick Cheney, I would not 629 00:47:51,390 --> 00:47:54,620 be here talking to you. None of this would be possible without Dick Cheney. I mean, 630 00:47:54,620 --> 00:47:57,660 really, I mean, you know, he's really responsible for a lot of things that have 631 00:47:57,660 --> 00:48:01,710 happened recently. So thank you, Dick Cheney. If you're, if you're listening, 632 00:48:01,710 --> 00:48:05,210 which you probably are, because you know everything and you are, you know, you have 633 00:48:05,210 --> 00:48:12,020 your people. Anyway. So a few years ago, I said, well, about 2010 I moved to the, I 634 00:48:12,020 --> 00:48:15,490 start–, I took a job at the University of Maryland, which is in College Park. When I 635 00:48:15,490 --> 00:48:18,140 say Maryland, most people assume we're in Baltimore. Because that's the main city 636 00:48:18,140 --> 00:48:22,610 in Maryland. But we're actually closer to Washington DC. So you can see, so there's 637 00:48:22,610 --> 00:48:28,025 College Park, that's, that's where I work. This is the FBI headquarters. This is the 638 00:48:28,025 --> 00:48:34,740 CIA. This is the NSA. You triangulate the three, it ends up on my campus. So it's 639 00:48:34,740 --> 00:48:37,170 only appropriate, you know, it's, and plus, you know, we have this budget 640 00:48:37,170 --> 00:48:40,585 problem in the US right now. So I'm, like, helping them out. It's like, you 641 00:48:40,585 --> 00:48:43,340 know: "Guys, can I help you, guys? Can I help you out by moving in like right next 642 00:48:43,340 --> 00:48:47,360 to you, so you don't have to waste your resources?" By the way, vice.com ranked 643 00:48:47,360 --> 00:48:51,376 us "The Most Militarized University In America". We're number one. And then 644 00:48:51,376 --> 00:48:53,745 we're not number one at football or anything. It takes a while for that sort 645 00:48:53,745 --> 00:48:57,483 of stuff. But most militarized, that's pretty easy. We can do that. Let me show 646 00:48:57,483 --> 00:49:00,490 you a little bit about ... So it's an amazing place. DC is, Washington DC is a 647 00:49:00,490 --> 00:49:05,669 great place to be. Problem is, real estate is really, really, really expensive. Like 648 00:49:05,669 --> 00:49:08,830 housing is really, you know, it's a company town. I mean, like, why else would 649 00:49:08,830 --> 00:49:12,537 you need to live there unless, you know, you're working in government? So while, 650 00:49:12,537 --> 00:49:15,550 you know, real estate prices in other parts of the country go up and down, 651 00:49:15,550 --> 00:49:19,080 Washington just keeps going up and up and up and up and up. So, you know, it's been 652 00:49:19,080 --> 00:49:23,360 good. But then I found this piece of land in St. Michael's. Now if you look over 653 00:49:23,360 --> 00:49:27,620 here, it says, the average listing price in the zip code, which is the, the postal 654 00:49:27,620 --> 00:49:33,970 code in that area, is 797303 dollars. This was back in 2010. You know, 800000 655 00:49:33,970 --> 00:49:38,840 dollars at that time average. And then I found this piece of land for only 74000 656 00:49:38,840 --> 00:49:43,040 bucks. I was like: "I want this. I want this. I want this. I'm gonna ..." I know, 657 00:49:43,040 --> 00:49:45,920 it's like I need to do something. And it's about an hour and a half away from 658 00:49:45,920 --> 00:49:49,320 work, which is a bit ... But, you know, it's possible. Anyway, so this is where 659 00:49:49,320 --> 00:49:53,200 the house is over there. It goes further up. So it's a piece of land, it's a 660 00:49:53,200 --> 00:49:56,210 beautiful place. I mean, you see the nature and all that. It's that weird 661 00:49:56,210 --> 00:50:00,280 oblong shape over there. You see that little driveway with the nice trees and 662 00:50:00,280 --> 00:50:03,410 that house in the water? That belongs to this guy. 663 00:50:03,410 --> 00:50:06,550 *slight laughter in the audience* So, and let me take you around the 664 00:50:06,550 --> 00:50:11,768 neighborhood for a little bit. So this is, this is his gate. This is his 665 00:50:11,768 --> 00:50:17,450 driveway. He drives up this way. He has a five car garage. Two of those 666 00:50:17,450 --> 00:50:21,700 garages go back pretty deep. This is swimming pool. We're gonna hang out here 667 00:50:21,700 --> 00:50:25,925 over the summers, hang out, you know, we'd gonna throw some parties. This is his 668 00:50:25,925 --> 00:50:33,882 front room. This is his kitchen. This is where he sleeps. And this is where we're 669 00:50:33,882 --> 00:50:39,610 gonna plot world domination. We're gonna hang out and eat yellowcake up there. So 670 00:50:39,610 --> 00:50:43,330 this is the place. I'm hoping to build this. This is what I was trying to 671 00:50:43,330 --> 00:50:46,541 build. But the listing just kind of disappeared. It literally just 672 00:50:46,541 --> 00:50:50,351 disappeared. And I'm convinced it's, so, you know, it's like he kind of does that 673 00:50:50,351 --> 00:50:54,140 to people, too. I'm glad he just did it to the listening and not to me. But, you 674 00:50:54,140 --> 00:50:57,640 know, it wasn't withdrawn, it wasn't sold, it just like disappeared. So these 675 00:50:57,640 --> 00:51:00,230 days, it has become like this really conceptual project, where I'm actually 676 00:51:00,230 --> 00:51:03,672 painting them. And then I'm photographing the paintings. So this is what I'm 677 00:51:03,672 --> 00:51:07,436 actually showing. So, you know, it's... So, okay. Here's my thing. So, 678 00:51:07,436 --> 00:51:11,204 look, here's a man, Dick Cheney, with not only are you dealing with the former vice 679 00:51:11,204 --> 00:51:15,650 president. You're dealing with the former, you deal with the former CEO of 680 00:51:15,650 --> 00:51:22,130 Halliburton. Like every ... This man has every motivation to be secret. This man, 681 00:51:22,130 --> 00:51:29,760 money is no object. And yet, if I can show you, where he sleeps and where he eats 682 00:51:29,760 --> 00:51:33,980 and where he swims, I mean, what can he know about us? I mean, I'm completely 683 00:51:33,980 --> 00:51:37,930 self-trained in this. I'm not even, I'm not even like, you know, I'm not even like 684 00:51:37,930 --> 00:51:42,020 that, that tech-savvy in this. I mean, I just kind of, just like duct-tape things 685 00:51:42,020 --> 00:51:47,610 together to find things, whatever I needed. But what do entire companies and 686 00:51:47,610 --> 00:51:53,110 corporations and countries, that really have the motivation to dig through our 687 00:51:53,110 --> 00:51:57,690 information, what can they get about us? So I'd like to leave you with this, that, 688 00:51:57,690 --> 00:52:01,220 you know, we really need to come up with a different idea and a different 689 00:52:01,220 --> 00:52:06,450 interpretation and a different meaning of what privacy in the 21st century means. 690 00:52:06,450 --> 00:52:11,540 This is no longer, we can no longer afford to use the same definitions 691 00:52:11,540 --> 00:52:16,592 of privacy that we used 50 years ago. Or a hundred years ago. Or 200 years ago. Or 692 00:52:16,592 --> 00:52:20,620 even just five years ago or even just last week. We need to have a much more 693 00:52:20,620 --> 00:52:24,760 adaptive and open idea what this means to us. And for each of us, this will mean, 694 00:52:24,760 --> 00:52:28,392 mean something differently. So I want to leave you with that. And thank you very 695 00:52:28,392 --> 00:52:32,170 much and I'm happy to take some questions. 696 00:52:32,170 --> 00:52:38,260 *applause* Herald: Thank you, Hasan. 697 00:52:38,260 --> 00:52:43,400 Hasan: Thank you! Welcome! Herald: It's a fantastic adventure to be 698 00:52:43,400 --> 00:52:51,450 always on the run and at the same time, actually, yeah, they're running for you 699 00:52:51,450 --> 00:52:54,010 now. Hasan: A little bit. They come by. You 700 00:52:54,010 --> 00:52:56,177 know, I try to be friends with them. Herald: Yeah, that's good. 701 00:52:56,177 --> 00:52:58,740 Hasan: You know, they're not, they're actually not that, they're not very, they 702 00:52:58,740 --> 00:53:02,230 don't like, they don't want to be friends. They just like, they just like to watch 703 00:53:02,230 --> 00:53:06,150 from a distance. Herald: You think that Dick Cheney will 704 00:53:06,150 --> 00:53:10,040 allow parties at your house? Hasan: I'm trying. Yeah. We're gonna have 705 00:53:10,040 --> 00:53:11,726 a shooting range in the back Herald: Like it's good. 706 00:53:11,726 --> 00:53:13,940 Hasan: Yeah, it'll be a lot of fun. 707 00:53:13,940 --> 00:53:16,320 Herald: I'm looking forward. Hasan: Do you have a question? 708 00:53:16,320 --> 00:53:23,090 Q: Yeah, thanks for the talk. You mentioned ways that you are ... kind of 709 00:53:23,090 --> 00:53:27,660 anticipated things that now we kind of take very common. Is there any way in 710 00:53:27,660 --> 00:53:34,160 which your art practice has evolved or responded to having a newer, younger 711 00:53:34,160 --> 00:53:38,890 generation of students year over year in your classes, for whom Instagram or selfie 712 00:53:38,890 --> 00:53:41,520 sticks might be just second nature to them? 713 00:53:41,520 --> 00:53:45,950 Hasan: Yeah. You know, I think it's really interesting watching how people of 714 00:53:45,950 --> 00:53:49,710 different generations react to this. Because, you know, I think a lot of it 715 00:53:49,710 --> 00:53:53,010 also has to do with the way we communicate. I mean, there was a very 716 00:53:53,010 --> 00:53:56,580 specific generation that would write a letter. And then you had a generation 717 00:53:56,580 --> 00:54:00,960 that would write, you know, that would call. And then you have text. And then 718 00:54:00,960 --> 00:54:04,010 you have people that write you over email. And you have people that will only text 719 00:54:04,010 --> 00:54:06,820 you. I mean, we were seeing that and we're, and, and we're actually living in 720 00:54:06,820 --> 00:54:09,800 that right now. Because we actually deal with certain different types of people 721 00:54:09,800 --> 00:54:13,780 that only deal with different modes of communication. So I really think in, that 722 00:54:13,780 --> 00:54:17,300 it's ... The interesting thing is though that time is compressed. Because we've 723 00:54:17,300 --> 00:54:21,310 only had people that communicate over writing for hundreds of years. Then we 724 00:54:21,310 --> 00:54:26,381 would have people that only communicated and phoned for maybe 30 to 50, maybe a 725 00:54:26,381 --> 00:54:30,120 little longer. And then, now we only have that like in the last 5 years we've had 726 00:54:30,120 --> 00:54:33,590 this. And then now, down to like one year. So who knows what the next method will 727 00:54:33,590 --> 00:54:38,890 be? But I really think a lot of it has to do with this adaptation. I think a lot of 728 00:54:38,890 --> 00:54:43,180 the things really interesting is this idea of like, like migration and, you 729 00:54:43,180 --> 00:54:47,570 know, the whole immigration topics are some real hot topic politically right now. 730 00:54:47,570 --> 00:54:50,820 But I think we also need to think about this from a digital perspective. 731 00:54:50,820 --> 00:54:55,240 Because, you know, we turn, we tend to use the word digital native a lot. But we 732 00:54:55,240 --> 00:54:59,430 never actually use the word digital immigrant. But yet that's all of us in 733 00:54:59,430 --> 00:55:03,000 some way. I mean, very few of us... I mean there, yes, there are 734 00:55:03,000 --> 00:55:06,950 certain, there is a certain generation that is 100% digital from day one. But 735 00:55:06,950 --> 00:55:11,360 for most of us, at least of a certain age, we are all digital immigrants. And I 736 00:55:11,360 --> 00:55:15,520 think that, that type of shift, I think that type of understanding of it, I think 737 00:55:15,520 --> 00:55:21,140 it has an impact and particularly in terms of dealing with 738 00:55:21,140 --> 00:55:25,730 learning and dealing with education, you know. At what point is it a natively 739 00:55:25,730 --> 00:55:37,580 learned skill versus a naturalised, a migratory type of an action. So. Hopefully 740 00:55:37,580 --> 00:55:41,490 that answers that you're talking about, yeah. Do you have another question? ... 741 00:55:41,490 --> 00:55:48,810 Yeah? Q: Just ... have they ever asked 742 00:55:48,810 --> 00:55:51,070 you to stop? Hasan: No, no there's no law against 743 00:55:51,070 --> 00:55:54,330 talking too much. Because if there was a law against talking too much, we'd all be 744 00:55:54,330 --> 00:55:57,710 in trouble. But you know, but this is interesting. Because they're very much 745 00:55:57,710 --> 00:56:04,780 about, there ... It's very much a one-way direction. They're not about, 746 00:56:04,780 --> 00:56:08,730 they don't editorialize, they don't provide opinion. They only take 747 00:56:08,730 --> 00:56:14,700 information. They ask you questions and they take information. So you could answer 748 00:56:14,700 --> 00:56:20,280 them with one word or you could answer them with millions. And I've just decided 749 00:56:20,280 --> 00:56:24,690 that I'm gonna keep talking, keep talking to them. I'm a relatively, you 750 00:56:24,690 --> 00:56:30,190 know, I think cooperative person. I'd like to be helpful, you know. But really, what 751 00:56:30,190 --> 00:56:34,710 it is, it's really, it's, defiance through compliance. It's 752 00:56:34,710 --> 00:56:38,557 this level of aggressive compliance. And at a certain point, I try to be so 753 00:56:38,557 --> 00:56:41,300 helpful, that I'm completely not helpful at all. 754 00:56:41,300 --> 00:56:45,330 *slight laughter in the audience* So thank you, thank you for the question. 755 00:56:45,330 --> 00:56:51,490 *applause* Herald: Thank you very much. Is there, is 756 00:56:51,490 --> 00:56:53,450 there ... Oh, there's a question from the internet! 757 00:56:53,450 --> 00:56:55,940 Hasan: No, oh, okay. Nobody else? Okay, great. 758 00:56:55,940 --> 00:56:58,380 Herald: Is there an FBI agent in there to have a drink, maybe? 759 00:56:58,380 --> 00:57:04,240 Hasan: Yeah that'd be great. Yeah yeah. Herald: Why not? Yeah. 760 00:57:04,240 --> 00:57:07,500 Hasan: I'm sure, I'm sure there's people from some government organization at this 761 00:57:07,500 --> 00:57:09,680 place. So, you know, let's get a drink later together. 762 00:57:09,680 --> 00:57:12,030 Herald: Okay, let's have one. Thank you very much! 763 00:57:12,030 --> 00:57:14,590 Hasan: See you guys. Thank you so much, thanks. 764 00:57:14,590 --> 00:57:17,682 Herald: Don't forget to help us all to clean this all up. 765 00:57:17,682 --> 00:57:29,960 *34C3 Music* 766 00:57:29,960 --> 00:57:40,292 subtitles created by c3subtitles.de in the year 2020. Join, and help us!