0 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:30,000 Dear viewer, these subtitles were generated by a machine via the service Trint and therefore are (very) buggy. If you are capable, please help us to create good quality subtitles: https://c3subtitles.de/talk/161 Thanks! 1 00:00:09,120 --> 00:00:10,109 Please enjoy. 2 00:00:10,110 --> 00:00:12,089 Maria Xenos, talk about in your 3 00:00:12,090 --> 00:00:13,140 surveillance 4 00:00:14,910 --> 00:00:15,910 state. 5 00:00:22,760 --> 00:00:24,899 Hello. Thank you very much for being 6 00:00:24,900 --> 00:00:26,599 on a Sunday morning, I'm so terrible, I'm 7 00:00:26,600 --> 00:00:27,529 so sorry for being late. 8 00:00:27,530 --> 00:00:29,749 I have no sense of time whatsoever, which 9 00:00:29,750 --> 00:00:31,429 is probably something I should work on. 10 00:00:31,430 --> 00:00:33,499 So my name is Maria. 11 00:00:33,500 --> 00:00:35,239 I work at the Center for Internet Society 12 00:00:35,240 --> 00:00:37,309 in Bangalore, India in particular. 13 00:00:37,310 --> 00:00:39,409 I'm working on the Privacy Project and 14 00:00:39,410 --> 00:00:40,909 I'm specializing on surveillance in the 15 00:00:40,910 --> 00:00:43,279 country, and we are funded by Privacy 16 00:00:43,280 --> 00:00:44,539 International. 17 00:00:44,540 --> 00:00:47,329 So about a year ago, I moved to India 18 00:00:47,330 --> 00:00:48,709 to explore surveillance. 19 00:00:48,710 --> 00:00:50,089 But the first thing that we probably 20 00:00:50,090 --> 00:00:52,189 think of when we think of India is 21 00:00:52,190 --> 00:00:54,049 something like this, right? 22 00:00:54,050 --> 00:00:56,179 So one of the main problems in India 23 00:00:56,180 --> 00:00:58,579 is poverty, corruption and so on. 24 00:00:58,580 --> 00:01:00,529 So when you first think of India, we 25 00:01:00,530 --> 00:01:03,049 think of images like this 26 00:01:03,050 --> 00:01:05,599 or this are slums. 27 00:01:05,600 --> 00:01:07,909 So many argue, hey, so 28 00:01:07,910 --> 00:01:09,649 is not even an issue in India. 29 00:01:09,650 --> 00:01:11,869 Surveillance is a western elitist issue. 30 00:01:11,870 --> 00:01:12,819 How dare you claim? 31 00:01:12,820 --> 00:01:14,359 And that's an issue to an India. 32 00:01:14,360 --> 00:01:15,679 What's surveillance? Most people don't 33 00:01:15,680 --> 00:01:17,449 even have access to the internet. 34 00:01:17,450 --> 00:01:19,159 What the hell are you talking about? 35 00:01:19,160 --> 00:01:21,349 Well, that's actually a good point. 36 00:01:21,350 --> 00:01:23,299 Until I went walking around in slums and 37 00:01:23,300 --> 00:01:26,089 noticed this, hey, 38 00:01:26,090 --> 00:01:27,979 there are satellites in slums. 39 00:01:27,980 --> 00:01:29,749 Sure, they may not have access to clean 40 00:01:29,750 --> 00:01:31,819 water, but they do have a satellite 41 00:01:31,820 --> 00:01:33,259 and they do have cable TV. 42 00:01:33,260 --> 00:01:35,059 And that's to say the least because they 43 00:01:35,060 --> 00:01:37,639 also have cell phones, 44 00:01:37,640 --> 00:01:39,229 as you can see. 45 00:01:39,230 --> 00:01:41,509 So although Joshua, poverty 46 00:01:41,510 --> 00:01:43,879 and corruption and diseases and so on 47 00:01:43,880 --> 00:01:45,949 are major issues in India, at 48 00:01:45,950 --> 00:01:48,229 the same time, most people in India do 49 00:01:48,230 --> 00:01:50,449 have cell phones and 50 00:01:50,450 --> 00:01:52,009 in particular, according to We Are 51 00:01:52,010 --> 00:01:53,059 Social. 52 00:01:53,060 --> 00:01:55,339 They have this pretty cool graph here. 53 00:01:55,340 --> 00:01:57,829 Well, this data, which shows that roughly 54 00:01:57,830 --> 00:01:59,919 78 percent of population 55 00:01:59,920 --> 00:02:02,149 in India use mobile phones. 56 00:02:02,150 --> 00:02:03,769 So that's pretty much the majority 57 00:02:03,770 --> 00:02:05,299 population who have mobile phones. 58 00:02:05,300 --> 00:02:06,619 And this is an important bit of 59 00:02:06,620 --> 00:02:08,719 information because most surveillance in 60 00:02:08,720 --> 00:02:10,909 India is carried out through mobile 61 00:02:10,910 --> 00:02:11,910 networks. 62 00:02:13,700 --> 00:02:15,349 So when trying to understand surveillance 63 00:02:15,350 --> 00:02:17,239 in the country, we need to first look at 64 00:02:17,240 --> 00:02:19,009 the laws. We need to understand which 65 00:02:19,010 --> 00:02:21,769 laws allow for surveillance, then which 66 00:02:21,770 --> 00:02:23,329 which schemes and projects are being 67 00:02:23,330 --> 00:02:25,399 carried out based on these laws in 68 00:02:25,400 --> 00:02:26,719 order to implement surveillance. 69 00:02:26,720 --> 00:02:27,979 And then, of course, we have to look at 70 00:02:27,980 --> 00:02:30,109 the surveillance industry, basically who 71 00:02:30,110 --> 00:02:31,819 is providing the technology to aid law 72 00:02:31,820 --> 00:02:33,829 enforcement agencies so they can spy in 73 00:02:33,830 --> 00:02:35,239 India to begin with. 74 00:02:35,240 --> 00:02:37,399 So in India, there are five 75 00:02:37,400 --> 00:02:39,349 laws which mandates targeted 76 00:02:39,350 --> 00:02:41,449 surveillance, namely the Indian 77 00:02:41,450 --> 00:02:43,129 Telegraph Act, the Indian Wireless 78 00:02:43,130 --> 00:02:44,989 Telegraphy Act, the Indian Post Office 79 00:02:44,990 --> 00:02:47,059 Act, section 91 of the 80 00:02:47,060 --> 00:02:48,739 Code of Criminal Procedure and the very 81 00:02:48,740 --> 00:02:51,229 controversial Information Technology Act. 82 00:02:51,230 --> 00:02:52,399 Now, I'm not going to focus on the 83 00:02:52,400 --> 00:02:54,769 previous four, but later on maybe, 84 00:02:54,770 --> 00:02:56,209 but are mainly going to focus on 85 00:02:56,210 --> 00:02:57,709 Information Technology Act. 86 00:02:57,710 --> 00:02:59,869 And the reason for this is because 87 00:02:59,870 --> 00:03:00,949 it's a bizarre law. 88 00:03:00,950 --> 00:03:02,899 It makes no sense as absolutely crazy or, 89 00:03:02,900 --> 00:03:05,029 well, India's even start to describe it. 90 00:03:05,030 --> 00:03:06,289 So first of all, I'm going to draw your 91 00:03:06,290 --> 00:03:08,929 attention to section 44 of this law. 92 00:03:08,930 --> 00:03:11,179 Basically, what it says is that anyone 93 00:03:11,180 --> 00:03:12,859 who fails to provide access information 94 00:03:12,860 --> 00:03:15,469 to authorities will be punished. 95 00:03:15,470 --> 00:03:17,149 Oh my God, what the hell is this about? 96 00:03:17,150 --> 00:03:18,979 It's like we're in 1994 for something, 97 00:03:18,980 --> 00:03:20,149 right? 98 00:03:20,150 --> 00:03:22,819 Then there's Section 66 A. 99 00:03:22,820 --> 00:03:24,169 Now this has drawn a lot of media 100 00:03:24,170 --> 00:03:25,849 attention because they actually have been 101 00:03:25,850 --> 00:03:27,649 lots of cases where people have been 102 00:03:27,650 --> 00:03:29,839 arrested and prosecuted as a result 103 00:03:29,840 --> 00:03:30,799 of this law. 104 00:03:30,800 --> 00:03:32,959 In particular, the section states that 105 00:03:32,960 --> 00:03:35,419 anybody who sends an offensive message, 106 00:03:35,420 --> 00:03:37,369 whatever the hell that means through any 107 00:03:37,370 --> 00:03:39,109 type of communication service, whether 108 00:03:39,110 --> 00:03:41,179 that's a cell phone or the internet, 109 00:03:41,180 --> 00:03:42,619 will be punished. 110 00:03:42,620 --> 00:03:44,539 And the reason why I've used this image 111 00:03:44,540 --> 00:03:46,399 is to enjoy attention to one particular 112 00:03:46,400 --> 00:03:48,379 case, which occurred last November in 113 00:03:48,380 --> 00:03:50,479 2012, where 114 00:03:50,480 --> 00:03:52,849 a politician, Bell Thackeray, died. 115 00:03:52,850 --> 00:03:54,559 And as a result of that, they shut down 116 00:03:54,560 --> 00:03:55,489 Mumbai. 117 00:03:55,490 --> 00:03:57,379 And so one woman in Mumbai posted on 118 00:03:57,380 --> 00:03:59,659 Facebook something like, Oh my god, 119 00:03:59,660 --> 00:04:01,099 I can't believe this attack, Mumbai, just 120 00:04:01,100 --> 00:04:02,869 because this politician died. 121 00:04:02,870 --> 00:04:05,179 And then the other girl next to her like 122 00:04:05,180 --> 00:04:07,339 the post because they dared to 123 00:04:07,340 --> 00:04:09,679 do so. They were arrested. 124 00:04:09,680 --> 00:04:11,899 They were literally arrested because 125 00:04:11,900 --> 00:04:13,879 they posted, I can't believe I'm buying 126 00:04:13,880 --> 00:04:15,649 them because it's politicians death and 127 00:04:15,650 --> 00:04:17,539 because the girl liked it. 128 00:04:17,540 --> 00:04:19,639 So this just shows that a very 129 00:04:19,640 --> 00:04:22,249 small extent, what kind of abuse 130 00:04:22,250 --> 00:04:24,709 and power the government is capable 131 00:04:24,710 --> 00:04:27,169 of as result of this law? 132 00:04:27,170 --> 00:04:29,689 Then there's the famous Section 69 133 00:04:29,690 --> 00:04:31,309 of this law, and of course, it's famous 134 00:04:31,310 --> 00:04:33,889 for completely the wrong reasons. 135 00:04:33,890 --> 00:04:35,569 This section allows for the interception 136 00:04:35,570 --> 00:04:37,849 of any information transmitted through 137 00:04:37,850 --> 00:04:39,529 a computer resource, meaning that 138 00:04:39,530 --> 00:04:41,599 literally anything you do online or 139 00:04:41,600 --> 00:04:43,519 through your computer anyhow, especially 140 00:04:43,520 --> 00:04:45,589 if your computer is targeted remotely, 141 00:04:45,590 --> 00:04:47,689 can be essentially intercepted and once 142 00:04:47,690 --> 00:04:48,619 it's intercepted. 143 00:04:48,620 --> 00:04:50,509 Law enforcement agencies can gain access 144 00:04:50,510 --> 00:04:52,969 to that data and judge you based on that. 145 00:04:52,970 --> 00:04:54,679 And this section goes beyond that. 146 00:04:56,000 --> 00:04:57,949 It requires users to disclose their 147 00:04:57,950 --> 00:05:00,019 private encryption keys or 148 00:05:00,020 --> 00:05:02,239 fail jail sentence of up to seven 149 00:05:02,240 --> 00:05:03,499 years. 150 00:05:03,500 --> 00:05:05,359 This is bizarre, to say the least, 151 00:05:05,360 --> 00:05:07,069 because the only hope we really have to 152 00:05:07,070 --> 00:05:09,139 keep our private data private is 153 00:05:09,140 --> 00:05:10,459 to use encryption, right? 154 00:05:10,460 --> 00:05:12,529 And so when the government through this 155 00:05:12,530 --> 00:05:14,479 law requires you to disclose your private 156 00:05:14,480 --> 00:05:16,489 encryption key, then that is extremely 157 00:05:16,490 --> 00:05:18,289 problematic, to say the least. 158 00:05:18,290 --> 00:05:20,029 And not only does it say that, but 159 00:05:20,030 --> 00:05:22,609 generally the slots generally states that 160 00:05:22,610 --> 00:05:24,109 if the government, for whatever reason, 161 00:05:24,110 --> 00:05:26,829 is intercepting your communications and 162 00:05:26,830 --> 00:05:29,059 using encryption, they can 163 00:05:29,060 --> 00:05:30,619 call you up and say, Hey, why are you 164 00:05:30,620 --> 00:05:31,899 using crypto? 165 00:05:31,900 --> 00:05:33,259 Decode this for me now? 166 00:05:33,260 --> 00:05:35,449 And if you don't, you're sent to prison. 167 00:05:35,450 --> 00:05:37,639 That's up to you to judge and decide 168 00:05:37,640 --> 00:05:38,640 how fair that is. 169 00:05:39,410 --> 00:05:41,419 Then there's Section 80, which basically 170 00:05:41,420 --> 00:05:43,399 allows the police to seize suspects in 171 00:05:43,400 --> 00:05:46,729 public places without a warrant. 172 00:05:46,730 --> 00:05:48,649 Now we're talking about India, the 173 00:05:48,650 --> 00:05:51,169 world's largest democracy population, 174 00:05:51,170 --> 00:05:53,749 speaking when we can see that in 2013, 175 00:05:53,750 --> 00:05:55,369 the world's largest democracy has 176 00:05:55,370 --> 00:05:57,529 sections as these ones, which allow 177 00:05:57,530 --> 00:05:59,779 people to be to be 178 00:05:59,780 --> 00:06:01,879 arrested in public with no 179 00:06:01,880 --> 00:06:03,559 real grounds without a warrant. 180 00:06:03,560 --> 00:06:05,059 And that is fundamental problematic for 181 00:06:05,060 --> 00:06:06,410 all democracies of the world, I think. 182 00:06:09,530 --> 00:06:11,089 Then under this law, the Information 183 00:06:11,090 --> 00:06:13,099 Technology Act, there are the notorious 184 00:06:13,100 --> 00:06:14,599 cyber cafe rules. 185 00:06:14,600 --> 00:06:16,189 Now the reason why the government went 186 00:06:16,190 --> 00:06:17,659 the extra mile and actually implementing 187 00:06:17,660 --> 00:06:19,939 these rules is because, hey, most people 188 00:06:19,940 --> 00:06:22,079 in India don't have computers. 189 00:06:22,080 --> 00:06:23,689 Most people in India use the internet 190 00:06:23,690 --> 00:06:24,949 through cyber cafes. 191 00:06:24,950 --> 00:06:26,609 So what the fuck are you going to do? 192 00:06:26,610 --> 00:06:28,669 You have to obviously monitor 193 00:06:28,670 --> 00:06:29,869 cyber cafes. 194 00:06:29,870 --> 00:06:31,729 And to do that, they've implemented these 195 00:06:31,730 --> 00:06:33,649 rules, which basically require cyber 196 00:06:33,650 --> 00:06:35,929 cafes to maintain backup logs 197 00:06:35,930 --> 00:06:38,059 for each login by each user 198 00:06:38,060 --> 00:06:39,919 and to retain such records for a year. 199 00:06:39,920 --> 00:06:41,239 And not only to do that, but also to 200 00:06:41,240 --> 00:06:43,579 ensure that such logs are not tampered 201 00:06:43,580 --> 00:06:46,129 with. And then upon request, 202 00:06:46,130 --> 00:06:47,569 they can give it to governments. 203 00:06:47,570 --> 00:06:50,089 So literally, if you use 204 00:06:50,090 --> 00:06:52,239 the internet or you know and it's Typekit 205 00:06:52,240 --> 00:06:54,679 in India, be very, very careful 206 00:06:54,680 --> 00:06:56,269 what you do because be sure that the 207 00:06:56,270 --> 00:06:57,709 government will access that sooner or 208 00:06:57,710 --> 00:06:58,710 later. 209 00:07:00,770 --> 00:07:02,899 So these laws mainly, you 210 00:07:02,900 --> 00:07:05,329 know, mandates targeted surveillance, 211 00:07:05,330 --> 00:07:06,949 so mass surveillance in India kind of 212 00:07:06,950 --> 00:07:08,989 falls in the gray area because it's not 213 00:07:08,990 --> 00:07:10,939 technically legally mandated, but is not 214 00:07:10,940 --> 00:07:12,139 prohibited either. 215 00:07:12,140 --> 00:07:14,029 However, they are the license agreements 216 00:07:14,030 --> 00:07:15,079 which do so. 217 00:07:15,080 --> 00:07:17,029 The thing is that ISP's and tribes in 218 00:07:17,030 --> 00:07:18,769 India and in most of the world, in order 219 00:07:18,770 --> 00:07:20,809 for them to operate, they have to comply 220 00:07:20,810 --> 00:07:22,579 with some license agreements, right? 221 00:07:22,580 --> 00:07:23,869 And if they don't, well, they just can't 222 00:07:23,870 --> 00:07:24,769 operate. 223 00:07:24,770 --> 00:07:27,529 So in India, the ISP license agreement 224 00:07:27,530 --> 00:07:29,989 basically requires all ISP providers 225 00:07:29,990 --> 00:07:31,609 to conduct blanket mass surveillance on 226 00:07:31,610 --> 00:07:32,689 their communications. 227 00:07:32,690 --> 00:07:34,339 And if they don't, well, they just can't 228 00:07:34,340 --> 00:07:35,359 operate. 229 00:07:35,360 --> 00:07:37,429 So, so essentially what they have to 230 00:07:37,430 --> 00:07:38,929 do that they have to purchase the 231 00:07:38,930 --> 00:07:40,789 hardware and the software required to 232 00:07:40,790 --> 00:07:42,199 monitor the communications at their own 233 00:07:42,200 --> 00:07:44,419 cost in order to do this. 234 00:07:44,420 --> 00:07:46,489 Now anyone can argue like what 235 00:07:46,490 --> 00:07:48,559 kind of incentive do they even have to 236 00:07:48,560 --> 00:07:49,969 purchase? This hard was offered to begin 237 00:07:49,970 --> 00:07:51,589 with. It's not like they have a revenue 238 00:07:51,590 --> 00:07:52,879 per se from doing it. 239 00:07:52,880 --> 00:07:54,259 Well, like I said, they just can operate 240 00:07:54,260 --> 00:07:56,269 if they don't. So they have to. 241 00:07:56,270 --> 00:07:57,709 And the craziest part about this license 242 00:07:57,710 --> 00:07:59,479 agreement, I think, is that bulk 243 00:07:59,480 --> 00:08:01,159 encryption is prohibited. 244 00:08:01,160 --> 00:08:03,109 And in general, if you use encryption 245 00:08:03,110 --> 00:08:05,359 that exceeds a 40 but key 246 00:08:05,360 --> 00:08:07,369 length and special algorithms, then 247 00:08:07,370 --> 00:08:08,599 again, you have a problem. 248 00:08:08,600 --> 00:08:10,189 The only cases we can actually do this, 249 00:08:10,190 --> 00:08:12,259 we can actually use crypto more 250 00:08:12,260 --> 00:08:13,249 than 40 bits. 251 00:08:13,250 --> 00:08:15,409 It's if you get specific permission by 252 00:08:15,410 --> 00:08:17,629 the ISP written permission, right? 253 00:08:17,630 --> 00:08:19,909 And so I'm guessing that 254 00:08:19,910 --> 00:08:20,989 in order to get this permission, they're 255 00:08:20,990 --> 00:08:22,399 going to be like, Oh, why do you need it 256 00:08:22,400 --> 00:08:23,689 for who you communicate with? 257 00:08:23,690 --> 00:08:25,609 What? How exactly going to use this for? 258 00:08:25,610 --> 00:08:27,649 So again, that kind of beats the purpose 259 00:08:27,650 --> 00:08:29,449 of using encryption to begin with, right? 260 00:08:29,450 --> 00:08:31,699 So technically, India does 261 00:08:31,700 --> 00:08:33,979 everything it can to prohibit encryption 262 00:08:33,980 --> 00:08:35,749 and to make sure that your data is out 263 00:08:35,750 --> 00:08:37,339 there and vulnerable. 264 00:08:37,340 --> 00:08:39,739 And now this ISP license agreements 265 00:08:39,740 --> 00:08:41,449 kind of falls under the umbrella of the 266 00:08:41,450 --> 00:08:43,579 U.S. license agreements, the Unified 267 00:08:43,580 --> 00:08:45,469 Access Services License Agreements. 268 00:08:45,470 --> 00:08:47,559 This applies to both ISP's NTSB 269 00:08:47,560 --> 00:08:49,249 is in India. And so now they're pretty 270 00:08:49,250 --> 00:08:51,329 much all required to conduct BlackAnd 271 00:08:51,330 --> 00:08:52,759 surveillance under it. 272 00:08:52,760 --> 00:08:54,139 In particular, there's a section under 273 00:08:54,140 --> 00:08:56,449 this license agreement which mandates 274 00:08:56,450 --> 00:08:58,069 the implementation of the central 275 00:08:58,070 --> 00:08:59,629 monitoring system, which I'll refer to 276 00:08:59,630 --> 00:09:00,589 later on. 277 00:09:00,590 --> 00:09:02,719 And this is scary, to say the 278 00:09:02,720 --> 00:09:04,879 least. So like I said, so events in India 279 00:09:04,880 --> 00:09:07,249 over mass surveillance, although is not 280 00:09:07,250 --> 00:09:09,469 legally mandated, it is required 281 00:09:09,470 --> 00:09:11,449 for these fucking license agreements. 282 00:09:11,450 --> 00:09:12,799 So they still have to do it anyway. 283 00:09:14,450 --> 00:09:16,129 And then, of course, there are the mutual 284 00:09:16,130 --> 00:09:17,509 legal assistance treaties. 285 00:09:17,510 --> 00:09:19,819 Now the Amplats are basically agreements 286 00:09:19,820 --> 00:09:21,259 between countries so that they can share 287 00:09:21,260 --> 00:09:22,579 intelligence data. 288 00:09:22,580 --> 00:09:24,349 India has such and blessed with another 289 00:09:24,350 --> 00:09:26,659 thirty five countries, including the US, 290 00:09:26,660 --> 00:09:27,709 as you can see. 291 00:09:27,710 --> 00:09:29,989 Oh, how happy Singh is with Obama, right? 292 00:09:33,100 --> 00:09:34,599 Now that's what we got to the legal 293 00:09:34,600 --> 00:09:36,219 aspects. So now let's look at the schemes 294 00:09:36,220 --> 00:09:38,109 being implemented based on these laws so 295 00:09:38,110 --> 00:09:39,399 they can actually carry out surveillance 296 00:09:39,400 --> 00:09:40,299 and practice. 297 00:09:40,300 --> 00:09:42,129 So first, we have some data sharing 298 00:09:42,130 --> 00:09:43,959 projects, and it's kind of unfortunate 299 00:09:43,960 --> 00:09:45,999 that to say that data sharing budgets are 300 00:09:46,000 --> 00:09:48,069 so bad as surveillance schemes because 301 00:09:48,070 --> 00:09:49,359 because they're actually better as well. 302 00:09:49,360 --> 00:09:51,429 But imagine how bad the situation is that 303 00:09:51,430 --> 00:09:53,349 I have to call these not so bad. 304 00:09:53,350 --> 00:09:55,029 So first of all, there's the national 305 00:09:55,030 --> 00:09:57,159 intelligence grid, which is basically 306 00:09:57,160 --> 00:09:59,139 an intelligent grid which links the 307 00:09:59,140 --> 00:10:01,119 databases of all departments and 308 00:10:01,120 --> 00:10:03,279 ministries of the government in order to 309 00:10:03,280 --> 00:10:04,509 create comprehensive patterns of 310 00:10:04,510 --> 00:10:05,739 intelligence. 311 00:10:05,740 --> 00:10:07,329 So what that means, basically, is that 312 00:10:07,330 --> 00:10:09,369 every single ministry in the government 313 00:10:09,370 --> 00:10:11,619 has a whole bunch of data that collects 314 00:10:11,620 --> 00:10:12,849 these are all linked together. 315 00:10:12,850 --> 00:10:14,499 So when the government wants to access 316 00:10:14,500 --> 00:10:16,329 like specific data about a specific 317 00:10:16,330 --> 00:10:18,459 person instead of going to, 318 00:10:18,460 --> 00:10:19,899 I don't know, 10 different ministries and 319 00:10:19,900 --> 00:10:21,489 creating one by one, they had this 320 00:10:21,490 --> 00:10:23,019 central database where it's all stored 321 00:10:23,020 --> 00:10:24,969 and collected the views, the data mining 322 00:10:24,970 --> 00:10:26,529 software to analyze it and to profile 323 00:10:26,530 --> 00:10:28,299 that individual. And that way they have a 324 00:10:28,300 --> 00:10:30,459 clear idea of who that person is and how 325 00:10:30,460 --> 00:10:32,019 exactly they want to talk to that person 326 00:10:32,020 --> 00:10:33,309 or not. 327 00:10:33,310 --> 00:10:35,409 Then this this is a tennis, which 328 00:10:35,410 --> 00:10:36,699 is quite similar. 329 00:10:36,700 --> 00:10:38,019 Essentially, what this does is that it 330 00:10:38,020 --> 00:10:40,179 links the databases of 14000 331 00:10:40,180 --> 00:10:42,219 police departments across the country 332 00:10:42,220 --> 00:10:43,999 again to create a comprehensive personal 333 00:10:44,000 --> 00:10:46,089 intelligence. And what does that mean? 334 00:10:46,090 --> 00:10:47,949 That means that, hey, they want to tell a 335 00:10:47,950 --> 00:10:48,939 story about you. 336 00:10:48,940 --> 00:10:50,499 It doesn't matter if that story is right 337 00:10:50,500 --> 00:10:51,819 or wrong. It doesn't matter if it's true 338 00:10:51,820 --> 00:10:53,649 or not. They can tell a story about you 339 00:10:53,650 --> 00:10:54,909 and that. And based on that story, 340 00:10:54,910 --> 00:10:56,499 they're going to probably arrest you or 341 00:10:56,500 --> 00:10:58,869 not. And maybe even worse, who knows? 342 00:10:58,870 --> 00:11:00,369 The worst part is that all of us lacks 343 00:11:00,370 --> 00:11:01,779 legal backing. 344 00:11:01,780 --> 00:11:03,969 Now, on top of that, 345 00:11:03,970 --> 00:11:05,769 we have other schemes like the law for 346 00:11:05,770 --> 00:11:07,389 errors of the monitoring program. 347 00:11:07,390 --> 00:11:08,739 Now we're proceeding to the surveillance 348 00:11:08,740 --> 00:11:11,079 schemes. This one basically operates 349 00:11:11,080 --> 00:11:13,179 on two levels for telecommunications and 350 00:11:13,180 --> 00:11:15,069 internet communications with regards to 351 00:11:15,070 --> 00:11:16,299 telecommunications. 352 00:11:16,300 --> 00:11:18,309 Essentially, all mobile operators in 353 00:11:18,310 --> 00:11:20,409 India are required to sell their own 354 00:11:20,410 --> 00:11:22,419 lawful intercept a monitoring system at 355 00:11:22,420 --> 00:11:24,549 their premises, and to intercept all 356 00:11:24,550 --> 00:11:26,919 communications with regards to internet 357 00:11:26,920 --> 00:11:27,939 communications. 358 00:11:27,940 --> 00:11:29,649 Well, the government has installed this 359 00:11:29,650 --> 00:11:32,019 type of system at the international 360 00:11:32,020 --> 00:11:34,089 gateways of all ISP's, and that 361 00:11:34,090 --> 00:11:36,189 way all traffic or internet traffic 362 00:11:36,190 --> 00:11:37,479 is essentially intercepted by the 363 00:11:37,480 --> 00:11:38,480 government. 364 00:11:40,050 --> 00:11:41,699 And because of course, that's not enough. 365 00:11:41,700 --> 00:11:42,929 They also have the NSA monitoring 366 00:11:42,930 --> 00:11:45,119 systems, so we know as a fact 367 00:11:45,120 --> 00:11:46,559 that internet monitoring systems are 368 00:11:46,560 --> 00:11:48,989 using two states and Delhi and Assam, 369 00:11:48,990 --> 00:11:51,149 by the way, Assam is this is a state 370 00:11:51,150 --> 00:11:52,799 up in the Northeast. 371 00:11:52,800 --> 00:11:55,049 It's a very politically sensitive area. 372 00:11:55,050 --> 00:11:56,789 It's really creepy that they're using it, 373 00:11:56,790 --> 00:11:59,909 that using this there in particular. 374 00:11:59,910 --> 00:12:01,299 There are many allegations that the 375 00:12:01,300 --> 00:12:03,539 system is also used in other states, 376 00:12:03,540 --> 00:12:05,519 like in Maharashtra and Karnataka. 377 00:12:05,520 --> 00:12:07,859 However, we don't have proof of that. 378 00:12:07,860 --> 00:12:08,879 And the reason why I to have proof of 379 00:12:08,880 --> 00:12:10,589 that is because we only have tenders for 380 00:12:10,590 --> 00:12:12,449 these two states for some. 381 00:12:12,450 --> 00:12:13,919 And the reason why we don't have tenders 382 00:12:13,920 --> 00:12:15,239 for the rest of the state is because, 383 00:12:15,240 --> 00:12:17,369 well, most of it in India is carried 384 00:12:17,370 --> 00:12:18,959 out in secret. 385 00:12:18,960 --> 00:12:20,669 So in most cases, they don't even care 386 00:12:20,670 --> 00:12:22,049 about legalism what they do. 387 00:12:22,050 --> 00:12:23,759 So we don't even know what's going on. 388 00:12:23,760 --> 00:12:25,139 But what we do know for this is very 389 00:12:25,140 --> 00:12:27,209 limited. And I said, basically some of 390 00:12:27,210 --> 00:12:28,949 are used to be able to, you know, detect 391 00:12:28,950 --> 00:12:30,720 cures and some communications 392 00:12:31,830 --> 00:12:33,689 and then even worse than all the previous 393 00:12:33,690 --> 00:12:35,629 because obviously the rest wasn't enough. 394 00:12:35,630 --> 00:12:36,779 But there's also the central, the 395 00:12:36,780 --> 00:12:38,999 centralized monitoring system. 396 00:12:39,000 --> 00:12:41,249 Now the centralized monitoring system 397 00:12:41,250 --> 00:12:43,529 has been carried out since 2009. 398 00:12:43,530 --> 00:12:45,599 That's four years didn't when we 399 00:12:45,600 --> 00:12:47,669 really started to know about it 400 00:12:47,670 --> 00:12:49,259 when those actually any media coverage 401 00:12:49,260 --> 00:12:50,309 about it. 402 00:12:50,310 --> 00:12:52,049 This April this year. 403 00:12:52,050 --> 00:12:54,749 So four years later, this dam 404 00:12:54,750 --> 00:12:56,339 scheme has been carried out for four 405 00:12:56,340 --> 00:12:58,409 years in secret, and now we know about 406 00:12:58,410 --> 00:13:00,269 it. So essentially what it does is that 407 00:13:00,270 --> 00:13:02,459 it intercepts all telecommunications 408 00:13:02,460 --> 00:13:04,499 in the country, everything. 409 00:13:05,820 --> 00:13:07,409 This is basically a project carried out 410 00:13:07,410 --> 00:13:09,119 by the Center for Communications Security 411 00:13:09,120 --> 00:13:11,369 Research and Monitoring and implemented 412 00:13:11,370 --> 00:13:13,739 by the Department of Telematics, which is 413 00:13:13,740 --> 00:13:15,569 a Department of the Ministry of 414 00:13:15,570 --> 00:13:16,619 Telecommunications. 415 00:13:16,620 --> 00:13:18,119 Go figure. 416 00:13:18,120 --> 00:13:20,309 And since its implementation, we know 417 00:13:20,310 --> 00:13:22,739 that seventy two million dollars 418 00:13:22,740 --> 00:13:24,719 have been allocated to this project, and 419 00:13:24,720 --> 00:13:27,599 that is that is as of June 2013, 420 00:13:27,600 --> 00:13:28,859 as of six months ago. 421 00:13:28,860 --> 00:13:30,119 And this is based on what the government 422 00:13:30,120 --> 00:13:32,219 says. So this may not actually be 423 00:13:32,220 --> 00:13:33,839 the right figure. It was probably more 424 00:13:33,840 --> 00:13:35,459 than this, as we can imagine. 425 00:13:35,460 --> 00:13:38,069 Now this itself is extremely problematic 426 00:13:38,070 --> 00:13:39,599 because we're talking about India. 427 00:13:39,600 --> 00:13:41,159 We're talking about a country which has 428 00:13:41,160 --> 00:13:43,379 huge problems of poverty 429 00:13:43,380 --> 00:13:45,479 and the ills of investing this money 430 00:13:45,480 --> 00:13:47,639 in education and health and so 431 00:13:47,640 --> 00:13:49,889 on. They're investing it and intercepting 432 00:13:49,890 --> 00:13:51,509 telecommunications. 433 00:13:51,510 --> 00:13:54,179 The question is why is it about control? 434 00:13:54,180 --> 00:13:56,250 Who knows the very secretive about it? 435 00:13:57,810 --> 00:13:59,909 So how does the CMAs even work? 436 00:13:59,910 --> 00:14:02,309 Well, I mentioned the lawful interception 437 00:14:02,310 --> 00:14:03,779 monitoring system before. 438 00:14:03,780 --> 00:14:05,999 So based on that, all taxpayers in India 439 00:14:06,000 --> 00:14:08,339 had to install 440 00:14:08,340 --> 00:14:09,689 lawful interception systems in their 441 00:14:09,690 --> 00:14:10,649 premises. 442 00:14:10,650 --> 00:14:12,239 Now what they're doing with the special 443 00:14:12,240 --> 00:14:14,819 monitoring system is that they are 444 00:14:14,820 --> 00:14:16,529 installing integrating lawful 445 00:14:16,530 --> 00:14:18,719 interception systems with ISF 446 00:14:18,720 --> 00:14:20,879 servers. ISF servers are intercept, 447 00:14:20,880 --> 00:14:22,559 store and forward servers. 448 00:14:22,560 --> 00:14:24,749 So now that they've integrated these 449 00:14:24,750 --> 00:14:27,209 two systems, the law for it is up systems 450 00:14:27,210 --> 00:14:28,649 and ISF servers. 451 00:14:28,650 --> 00:14:30,779 These then basically 452 00:14:30,780 --> 00:14:32,489 transfer data to the regional monitoring 453 00:14:32,490 --> 00:14:34,769 centers. So every state in India 454 00:14:34,770 --> 00:14:36,809 has a regional monitoring center and then 455 00:14:36,810 --> 00:14:38,369 all of these regional monitoring sensors 456 00:14:38,370 --> 00:14:39,989 are linked to the central monitoring 457 00:14:39,990 --> 00:14:42,239 system. So the main place for data 458 00:14:42,240 --> 00:14:43,889 stored and that's in Delhi. 459 00:14:43,890 --> 00:14:46,049 And this data, basically 460 00:14:46,050 --> 00:14:48,149 from the TSB, it goes directly 461 00:14:48,150 --> 00:14:50,159 to the regional monitoring system, 462 00:14:50,160 --> 00:14:51,419 regional monitoring center. 463 00:14:51,420 --> 00:14:52,829 And then from there it goes directly to 464 00:14:52,830 --> 00:14:54,299 the central monitoring system. 465 00:14:54,300 --> 00:14:56,489 And this is all carried out through 466 00:14:56,490 --> 00:14:57,600 dark fiber optic cables. 467 00:14:58,890 --> 00:14:59,890 The way is transmitted. 468 00:15:00,870 --> 00:15:03,139 So what has already been done with regard 469 00:15:03,140 --> 00:15:04,619 central monitoring system? 470 00:15:04,620 --> 00:15:06,629 So we have a few governmental documents 471 00:15:06,630 --> 00:15:08,849 which verified these facts, one of which 472 00:15:08,850 --> 00:15:10,979 is that as of six months ago, 80 473 00:15:10,980 --> 00:15:12,869 percent of the physical data center had 474 00:15:12,870 --> 00:15:14,309 already been built. 475 00:15:14,310 --> 00:15:16,589 So it might even be ready right now. 476 00:15:16,590 --> 00:15:18,659 So it's safe to assume that 477 00:15:18,660 --> 00:15:21,269 this project is way ahead 478 00:15:21,270 --> 00:15:22,709 in general has been carried out in three 479 00:15:22,710 --> 00:15:24,959 phases. Each one lost around 13 480 00:15:24,960 --> 00:15:25,919 to 14 months. 481 00:15:25,920 --> 00:15:27,059 So it's probably safe to assume that 482 00:15:27,060 --> 00:15:28,919 right now, most of it has been carried 483 00:15:28,920 --> 00:15:30,869 out. And we know that for a fact, 484 00:15:30,870 --> 00:15:33,419 especially because most of these services 485 00:15:33,420 --> 00:15:35,639 have been fully integrated and tested for 486 00:15:35,640 --> 00:15:37,379 two of the largest CSP providers in 487 00:15:37,380 --> 00:15:39,359 India, and that is MTNL and 488 00:15:39,360 --> 00:15:40,709 telecommunications. 489 00:15:40,710 --> 00:15:43,379 So most people in India use MTNL 490 00:15:43,380 --> 00:15:45,479 and telecommunications, in some cases, 491 00:15:45,480 --> 00:15:47,069 even me, unfortunately. 492 00:15:47,070 --> 00:15:48,969 And we know the fact that if you're using 493 00:15:48,970 --> 00:15:51,299 these two tier IP providers, all data 494 00:15:51,300 --> 00:15:53,619 essentially intercepted and stored in a 495 00:15:53,620 --> 00:15:55,199 central monitoring system. 496 00:15:55,200 --> 00:15:57,239 Well, we also know is that about eight 497 00:15:57,240 --> 00:15:59,339 million dollars have been given to a 498 00:15:59,340 --> 00:16:01,619 snel, which is another large test 499 00:16:01,620 --> 00:16:03,689 you provide in India for interconnecting 500 00:16:03,690 --> 00:16:05,789 eight one central monitoring system 501 00:16:05,790 --> 00:16:06,899 locations. 502 00:16:06,900 --> 00:16:08,699 Well, we also know in addition to that is 503 00:16:08,700 --> 00:16:10,049 that the government has signed a 504 00:16:10,050 --> 00:16:12,809 memorandum of understanding with BSNL 505 00:16:12,810 --> 00:16:15,569 so that they can use multilevel 506 00:16:15,570 --> 00:16:17,369 model protocols of switch. 507 00:16:17,370 --> 00:16:20,189 What's it called? Nebulous connectivity 508 00:16:20,190 --> 00:16:21,190 addition to this? 509 00:16:23,620 --> 00:16:24,549 So when I was looking through 510 00:16:24,550 --> 00:16:26,379 governmental documents, what is very 511 00:16:26,380 --> 00:16:27,699 interesting is that the government 512 00:16:27,700 --> 00:16:30,159 actually made an attempt to say no 513 00:16:30,160 --> 00:16:31,609 commerce is not a problem. 514 00:16:31,610 --> 00:16:34,359 Health care is good for your privacy. 515 00:16:34,360 --> 00:16:36,159 And so what they were arguing their 516 00:16:36,160 --> 00:16:37,989 documents was like, Oh damn. 517 00:16:37,990 --> 00:16:39,369 Over the last months, we've received so 518 00:16:39,370 --> 00:16:41,079 much criticism from the media and from 519 00:16:41,080 --> 00:16:43,029 organizations that we're infringing on 520 00:16:43,030 --> 00:16:44,889 people's privacy and human rights. 521 00:16:44,890 --> 00:16:46,119 Well, we've got to do something about 522 00:16:46,120 --> 00:16:47,979 that. So that actually came down with a 523 00:16:47,980 --> 00:16:50,409 list of why this seems as privacy 524 00:16:50,410 --> 00:16:51,309 friendly. 525 00:16:51,310 --> 00:16:53,469 And I think the reasons are hilarious, 526 00:16:53,470 --> 00:16:55,509 but that's up to you to decide, I guess. 527 00:16:55,510 --> 00:16:58,149 So the first reason is that, hey, 528 00:16:58,150 --> 00:17:00,489 the A will just automate 529 00:17:00,490 --> 00:17:02,079 the existing process of interception and 530 00:17:02,080 --> 00:17:03,849 monitoring. No worries. 531 00:17:03,850 --> 00:17:05,049 I mean, we were interested you 532 00:17:05,050 --> 00:17:06,338 communications anyway. 533 00:17:06,339 --> 00:17:07,689 We're just automating it now. 534 00:17:07,690 --> 00:17:08,799 So what's the big deal? 535 00:17:08,800 --> 00:17:10,029 We're protecting your privacy. 536 00:17:10,030 --> 00:17:11,318 Yay. 537 00:17:11,319 --> 00:17:13,509 The second one is that the deception 538 00:17:13,510 --> 00:17:15,399 and monitoring will be a quote in 539 00:17:15,400 --> 00:17:17,499 accordance with Section five, paragraph 540 00:17:17,500 --> 00:17:19,659 two of the Indian Telegraph Act. 541 00:17:19,660 --> 00:17:20,889 Do you know what the section says? 542 00:17:20,890 --> 00:17:22,959 Basically, it says that the disruption of 543 00:17:22,960 --> 00:17:25,389 communications can be carried out 544 00:17:25,390 --> 00:17:27,338 in the occurrence of a public emergency 545 00:17:27,339 --> 00:17:30,039 over public safety when it is necessary 546 00:17:30,040 --> 00:17:32,439 or expedient to do so. 547 00:17:32,440 --> 00:17:33,789 OK, then. 548 00:17:33,790 --> 00:17:36,159 So basically, we have this very 549 00:17:36,160 --> 00:17:38,319 this very broad terms of public 550 00:17:38,320 --> 00:17:40,359 emergency public safety. 551 00:17:40,360 --> 00:17:42,279 If it's necessary to expand to do so, 552 00:17:42,280 --> 00:17:44,409 intercept communications and therefore, 553 00:17:44,410 --> 00:17:47,079 of course, this is privacy friendly. 554 00:17:47,080 --> 00:17:49,209 Then there are other arguments that, 555 00:17:49,210 --> 00:17:51,729 hey, we will bypass ISPs. 556 00:17:51,730 --> 00:17:53,859 We no longer need to, you know, 557 00:17:53,860 --> 00:17:55,869 ask to speak, to give us the data. 558 00:17:55,870 --> 00:17:57,099 Because what will happen now, 559 00:17:57,100 --> 00:17:58,779 essentially, is that, as I mentioned 560 00:17:58,780 --> 00:18:00,879 before on how it works, is 561 00:18:00,880 --> 00:18:02,889 that all data from TSB will go directly 562 00:18:02,890 --> 00:18:05,409 into the CMS database, 563 00:18:05,410 --> 00:18:06,519 which means that they don't have to ask 564 00:18:06,520 --> 00:18:08,589 for it. So they're like, OK, so TSB 565 00:18:08,590 --> 00:18:10,269 providers, they won't access your data 566 00:18:10,270 --> 00:18:12,009 only we are accessing your data, 567 00:18:12,010 --> 00:18:14,259 therefore your data safe with us. 568 00:18:14,260 --> 00:18:15,260 Sure. 569 00:18:18,980 --> 00:18:19,980 The next point 570 00:18:21,920 --> 00:18:23,479 is that the commerce authority and, by 571 00:18:23,480 --> 00:18:24,949 the way, by serious authority, what we 572 00:18:24,950 --> 00:18:27,289 really mean as the intelligence bureau, 573 00:18:27,290 --> 00:18:28,909 they will provision that section requests 574 00:18:28,910 --> 00:18:30,289 from law enforcement agencies. 575 00:18:30,290 --> 00:18:31,789 So what that means is that law 576 00:18:31,790 --> 00:18:34,099 enforcement agencies will be like, Hey, 577 00:18:34,100 --> 00:18:36,409 CMS, I want access to this person's 578 00:18:36,410 --> 00:18:38,179 data and they will give it to them. 579 00:18:38,180 --> 00:18:39,439 And they're arguing that the system's 580 00:18:39,440 --> 00:18:40,759 authority won't have access to the 581 00:18:40,760 --> 00:18:41,689 content data. 582 00:18:41,690 --> 00:18:42,949 I'm not sure how that's actually even 583 00:18:42,950 --> 00:18:44,629 possible. Like, how can they give the 584 00:18:44,630 --> 00:18:46,759 data if they don't even access it? 585 00:18:46,760 --> 00:18:48,349 I don't know. That's a mystery, which 586 00:18:48,350 --> 00:18:49,759 they should. I don't know. 587 00:18:49,760 --> 00:18:51,589 Enlighten us about the SEC. 588 00:18:51,590 --> 00:18:53,689 And the last point is that the 589 00:18:53,690 --> 00:18:55,909 CMS will include a non erasable 590 00:18:55,910 --> 00:18:57,289 command log for all provisioned 591 00:18:57,290 --> 00:18:58,939 activities. And the reason why this 592 00:18:58,940 --> 00:19:00,769 privacy friendly is because that way you 593 00:19:00,770 --> 00:19:01,770 can check to see 594 00:19:02,840 --> 00:19:04,669 what type of data has been provision to 595 00:19:04,670 --> 00:19:06,079 law enforcement agencies in every given 596 00:19:06,080 --> 00:19:08,269 time. And that way, it can be transparent 597 00:19:08,270 --> 00:19:09,259 and so on. 598 00:19:09,260 --> 00:19:11,389 However, the don't don't mention 599 00:19:11,390 --> 00:19:13,099 like who is going to maintain this 600 00:19:13,100 --> 00:19:14,749 fucking command log, who is going to have 601 00:19:14,750 --> 00:19:16,609 access to it, who can control it, and who 602 00:19:16,610 --> 00:19:18,709 can check it to ensure that 603 00:19:18,710 --> 00:19:20,419 the right type of data or whatever or 604 00:19:20,420 --> 00:19:22,219 under the right legal procedure, the date 605 00:19:22,220 --> 00:19:23,479 has actually been handed over to law 606 00:19:23,480 --> 00:19:24,409 enforcement agencies. 607 00:19:24,410 --> 00:19:25,819 There is no checks and balances 608 00:19:25,820 --> 00:19:28,579 whatsoever. So of course, if you're, 609 00:19:28,580 --> 00:19:30,109 you know, the CMS is good for our 610 00:19:30,110 --> 00:19:31,609 privacy, supposedly. 611 00:19:31,610 --> 00:19:32,719 I don't know. 612 00:19:32,720 --> 00:19:34,759 I'm just presenting the other side, their 613 00:19:34,760 --> 00:19:35,969 side. It's up to you. 614 00:19:35,970 --> 00:19:38,239 Decide how privacy finally, this is 615 00:19:38,240 --> 00:19:39,240 or isn't. 616 00:19:41,040 --> 00:19:43,139 So does anyone have an idea 617 00:19:43,140 --> 00:19:44,609 why have some cell phones in front of the 618 00:19:44,610 --> 00:19:45,610 Taj Mahal? 619 00:19:48,110 --> 00:19:50,179 OK, so this is BlackBerry. 620 00:19:50,180 --> 00:19:51,439 So the reason why I had this, because a 621 00:19:51,440 --> 00:19:53,839 few months ago, the Indian government 622 00:19:53,840 --> 00:19:55,969 signed this agreement with 623 00:19:55,970 --> 00:19:58,069 with BlackBerry, essentially 624 00:19:58,070 --> 00:19:59,479 for the interception of solutions. 625 00:19:59,480 --> 00:20:01,639 So the agreement was the thought 626 00:20:01,640 --> 00:20:04,219 that all BlackBerry, BlackBerry Messenger 627 00:20:04,220 --> 00:20:06,409 and BlackBerry Internet services 628 00:20:06,410 --> 00:20:08,449 can be intercepted. 629 00:20:08,450 --> 00:20:10,429 However, it remains unclear. 630 00:20:10,430 --> 00:20:12,259 You know, if this falls under the central 631 00:20:12,260 --> 00:20:14,329 monitoring system or the lawful 632 00:20:14,330 --> 00:20:15,769 interception monitoring system, how 633 00:20:15,770 --> 00:20:17,689 there's so many systems, it's not even 634 00:20:17,690 --> 00:20:19,189 clear what this has been carried out 635 00:20:19,190 --> 00:20:21,349 under. And they obviously, you know and 636 00:20:21,350 --> 00:20:23,509 open about it, so it remains a mystery. 637 00:20:23,510 --> 00:20:25,099 But we do know that BlackBerry has 638 00:20:25,100 --> 00:20:26,119 definitely been intercepted. 639 00:20:26,120 --> 00:20:27,200 Hello in the country. 640 00:20:29,160 --> 00:20:30,869 No, you idiot. 641 00:20:30,870 --> 00:20:33,149 The reason why I'm including this random 642 00:20:33,150 --> 00:20:34,709 biometric thing. 643 00:20:34,710 --> 00:20:36,959 Yeah, those woman scamming her fingers. 644 00:20:36,960 --> 00:20:38,459 It's because this is probably integral to 645 00:20:38,460 --> 00:20:40,109 everything else that I mentioned. 646 00:20:40,110 --> 00:20:42,239 So the u8e scheme is the largest 647 00:20:42,240 --> 00:20:44,279 biometric data collection scheme in the 648 00:20:44,280 --> 00:20:45,399 world right now. 649 00:20:45,400 --> 00:20:47,399 And essentially, what it does is that it 650 00:20:47,400 --> 00:20:49,259 requires Indians to give up their iris 651 00:20:49,260 --> 00:20:50,999 and their fingerprints, so to give up 652 00:20:51,000 --> 00:20:52,439 their biometric and also some other 653 00:20:52,440 --> 00:20:53,440 demographic data. 654 00:20:55,110 --> 00:20:57,269 Now, in theory, this is voluntary. 655 00:20:57,270 --> 00:20:58,809 You can choose to use it. 656 00:20:58,810 --> 00:21:01,109 However, that voluntary because 657 00:21:01,110 --> 00:21:03,089 there's this other program called the 658 00:21:03,090 --> 00:21:05,549 NPR. And under that, 659 00:21:05,550 --> 00:21:07,409 well, you have to register with NPR and 660 00:21:07,410 --> 00:21:09,389 then the NPR requires you to have a UID, 661 00:21:09,390 --> 00:21:11,039 so you have to register with the UID. 662 00:21:11,040 --> 00:21:12,509 But it's voluntary. 663 00:21:12,510 --> 00:21:14,609 And then on top of that, in order to 664 00:21:14,610 --> 00:21:16,679 have access to almost all, if not 665 00:21:16,680 --> 00:21:17,969 all, governmental services in the 666 00:21:17,970 --> 00:21:20,429 country, you have to have a UIDAI. 667 00:21:20,430 --> 00:21:22,829 So for example, if you're an Indian 668 00:21:22,830 --> 00:21:24,749 and you want to get access and you, like, 669 00:21:24,750 --> 00:21:26,969 belong in the below poverty line 670 00:21:26,970 --> 00:21:28,260 and you want to get access to 671 00:21:29,400 --> 00:21:31,949 food programs or cash transfer programs, 672 00:21:31,950 --> 00:21:33,329 you have to have your I.D. 673 00:21:33,330 --> 00:21:34,709 number, you have to be registered with 674 00:21:34,710 --> 00:21:35,699 us. 675 00:21:35,700 --> 00:21:38,039 So also, if you want 676 00:21:38,040 --> 00:21:39,929 your kids to school, your kids can't go 677 00:21:39,930 --> 00:21:41,369 to school in many cases unless they 678 00:21:41,370 --> 00:21:43,619 register with the idea and this goes on 679 00:21:43,620 --> 00:21:45,839 and on and on. So there are like loads of 680 00:21:45,840 --> 00:21:47,279 government services, which you just can't 681 00:21:47,280 --> 00:21:49,709 access unless you have a 12 682 00:21:49,710 --> 00:21:51,389 digit number called Aadhaar. 683 00:21:51,390 --> 00:21:53,189 And unless you are registered with this 684 00:21:53,190 --> 00:21:55,319 scheme. So although it's voluntary, it's 685 00:21:55,320 --> 00:21:56,849 actually a pretty mandatory, I think. 686 00:21:58,200 --> 00:21:59,639 And the reason why this is really, really 687 00:21:59,640 --> 00:22:01,799 concerning is because the UID pretty 688 00:22:01,800 --> 00:22:04,169 much serves as a unique identifier, 689 00:22:04,170 --> 00:22:06,299 so all other surveillance pretty makes 690 00:22:06,300 --> 00:22:08,609 sense in light of this, 691 00:22:08,610 --> 00:22:10,799 in which sense the government has 692 00:22:10,800 --> 00:22:13,199 to intercept the communications of 1.2 693 00:22:13,200 --> 00:22:14,639 billion people. 694 00:22:14,640 --> 00:22:16,469 Now, when it's doing that, it's likely 695 00:22:16,470 --> 00:22:18,299 that there will be error in matching 696 00:22:18,300 --> 00:22:20,429 patterns and creating profiles and so on. 697 00:22:20,430 --> 00:22:22,139 So how do you make how do you make sure 698 00:22:22,140 --> 00:22:23,729 that there's data that you have access 699 00:22:23,730 --> 00:22:25,319 to? Actually, it belongs to the person 700 00:22:25,320 --> 00:22:26,459 you think it does? 701 00:22:26,460 --> 00:22:28,679 Well, that's where the UIDAI comes 702 00:22:28,680 --> 00:22:30,959 in. The UIDAI verifies 703 00:22:30,960 --> 00:22:33,149 that well, supposedly verifies 704 00:22:33,150 --> 00:22:35,249 that its data belongs to an X 705 00:22:35,250 --> 00:22:36,299 person. 706 00:22:36,300 --> 00:22:38,219 So, for example, if they have your data, 707 00:22:38,220 --> 00:22:39,599 which they've got to find a section of 708 00:22:39,600 --> 00:22:40,929 your telecommunications or your internal 709 00:22:40,930 --> 00:22:42,659 communications, they link that to this 710 00:22:42,660 --> 00:22:44,429 number. And that way, then that way they 711 00:22:44,430 --> 00:22:46,739 know that, hey, it's you, it's your 712 00:22:46,740 --> 00:22:48,779 data, and I'm prosecuting you for sure. 713 00:22:48,780 --> 00:22:50,759 But then that itself is very problematic 714 00:22:50,760 --> 00:22:52,689 because, you know, the larger the sample 715 00:22:52,690 --> 00:22:53,789 of data you have, the larger the 716 00:22:53,790 --> 00:22:55,259 probability for error. 717 00:22:55,260 --> 00:22:56,699 There have been loads of cases of 718 00:22:56,700 --> 00:22:58,529 corruption which have been reported. 719 00:22:58,530 --> 00:23:00,809 Many of the contractors of the UIDAI 720 00:23:00,810 --> 00:23:02,939 have links with intelligence agencies 721 00:23:02,940 --> 00:23:05,429 and in particular with US intelligence 722 00:23:05,430 --> 00:23:06,659 agencies. 723 00:23:06,660 --> 00:23:08,099 There have been many cases where data has 724 00:23:08,100 --> 00:23:09,719 just been lost as just disappeared 725 00:23:09,720 --> 00:23:10,739 mysteriously. 726 00:23:10,740 --> 00:23:12,119 That kind of shit happens in India all 727 00:23:12,120 --> 00:23:13,559 the time, I guess. 728 00:23:13,560 --> 00:23:15,539 So this itself is a very vulnerable 729 00:23:15,540 --> 00:23:17,549 system, so it's very questionable, you 730 00:23:17,550 --> 00:23:19,829 know, with regards to how effective 731 00:23:19,830 --> 00:23:20,909 it is in everything. 732 00:23:20,910 --> 00:23:23,249 And end of the day, fingerprints, really. 733 00:23:23,250 --> 00:23:25,079 I mean, it's so easy to fake your 734 00:23:25,080 --> 00:23:26,069 fingerprints, right? 735 00:23:26,070 --> 00:23:27,719 If you just go to Google and you say, 736 00:23:27,720 --> 00:23:29,609 help make my fingerprints, that six tips 737 00:23:29,610 --> 00:23:30,569 of how to do it. 738 00:23:30,570 --> 00:23:32,759 So using the system to 739 00:23:32,760 --> 00:23:34,949 verify people and to judge them and to 740 00:23:34,950 --> 00:23:37,199 arrest them and so on based on that 741 00:23:37,200 --> 00:23:40,079 is fundamentally flawed, in my opinion. 742 00:23:40,080 --> 00:23:41,080 Now. 743 00:23:42,350 --> 00:23:44,449 This is the actual 744 00:23:44,450 --> 00:23:46,519 scanner that is used for the 745 00:23:46,520 --> 00:23:47,869 system. 746 00:23:47,870 --> 00:23:49,429 This is what they. This is a fingerprint 747 00:23:49,430 --> 00:23:51,619 scanner. They use this to 748 00:23:51,620 --> 00:23:53,029 collect Indians fingerprints. 749 00:23:54,200 --> 00:23:56,359 And anyway, so 750 00:23:56,360 --> 00:23:58,339 this the small scanner. 751 00:23:58,340 --> 00:23:59,340 The small box 752 00:24:00,590 --> 00:24:03,139 basically is really important because 753 00:24:03,140 --> 00:24:04,819 all other surveillance that I mentioned 754 00:24:04,820 --> 00:24:07,219 in India only really makes sense if 755 00:24:07,220 --> 00:24:08,719 this damn thing exists. 756 00:24:08,720 --> 00:24:10,459 So feel free to come later on and check 757 00:24:10,460 --> 00:24:11,989 it out and maybe play with it if you feel 758 00:24:11,990 --> 00:24:13,490 like if you like doing so. 759 00:24:18,830 --> 00:24:21,109 So there's there's a honeypot, 760 00:24:21,110 --> 00:24:22,879 the reason why I have it is because all 761 00:24:22,880 --> 00:24:25,129 these schemes, especially the UID, 762 00:24:25,130 --> 00:24:27,229 the CMS, they basically are like a 763 00:24:27,230 --> 00:24:28,969 type of honeypot because when you 764 00:24:28,970 --> 00:24:30,739 centralized data, essentially what you're 765 00:24:30,740 --> 00:24:31,849 doing is that you're creating a 766 00:24:31,850 --> 00:24:34,159 centralized point for cyber attacks. 767 00:24:34,160 --> 00:24:36,379 So although they argue that, hey, 768 00:24:36,380 --> 00:24:37,999 all these systems are to increase your 769 00:24:38,000 --> 00:24:39,889 security or they're actually doing is 770 00:24:39,890 --> 00:24:42,319 providing fake security because 771 00:24:42,320 --> 00:24:44,119 based on this whole honeypot premise that 772 00:24:44,120 --> 00:24:45,229 the more centralized the data is, the 773 00:24:45,230 --> 00:24:46,249 more vulnerable it is. 774 00:24:46,250 --> 00:24:47,630 It doesn't make any sense. 775 00:24:48,990 --> 00:24:49,990 So sorry. 776 00:24:57,280 --> 00:24:59,339 So that's with regards to the schemes and 777 00:24:59,340 --> 00:25:01,689 to the laws. Now notice that all of this 778 00:25:01,690 --> 00:25:03,549 we need to see which companies are 779 00:25:03,550 --> 00:25:05,619 actually providing the technology to be 780 00:25:05,620 --> 00:25:08,379 able to make these schemes even possible. 781 00:25:08,380 --> 00:25:09,849 So I started investigating the 782 00:25:09,850 --> 00:25:11,679 surveillance industry in India a few 783 00:25:11,680 --> 00:25:14,049 months ago. Initially, I had a random 784 00:25:14,050 --> 00:25:15,579 sample of 76 companies. 785 00:25:15,580 --> 00:25:17,859 Then I narrowed it down to 50 companies. 786 00:25:17,860 --> 00:25:20,199 So I repeat, this is a random sample 787 00:25:20,200 --> 00:25:21,729 of surveys, larger companies. 788 00:25:21,730 --> 00:25:23,799 And what I did essentially was 789 00:25:23,800 --> 00:25:25,239 that I looked at their technologies and 790 00:25:25,240 --> 00:25:27,369 what they do and everything 791 00:25:27,370 --> 00:25:29,109 where they comply with lawful regulations 792 00:25:29,110 --> 00:25:32,259 and so on. And so I rank the companies. 793 00:25:32,260 --> 00:25:34,209 So shall you have the list of the 50 794 00:25:34,210 --> 00:25:35,210 companies? 795 00:25:38,160 --> 00:25:40,439 And the other ones from most harmful 796 00:25:40,440 --> 00:25:41,939 to least harmful. 797 00:25:41,940 --> 00:25:44,189 So the least harmful company is 798 00:25:44,190 --> 00:25:46,409 legend. systems and by the way, this is 799 00:25:46,410 --> 00:25:47,819 Bob Biljon systems. 800 00:25:47,820 --> 00:25:50,039 So if you think that a device 801 00:25:50,040 --> 00:25:52,109 which can make all solvents possible is 802 00:25:52,110 --> 00:25:54,269 sold by the least harmful company, then 803 00:25:54,270 --> 00:25:55,409 you don't want to know what the most 804 00:25:55,410 --> 00:25:56,410 harmful ones do. 805 00:25:59,750 --> 00:26:02,059 Now, the criteria that I use to rank 806 00:26:02,060 --> 00:26:04,339 these companies were basically to, first 807 00:26:04,340 --> 00:26:05,839 of all, the types of solutions that they 808 00:26:05,840 --> 00:26:07,069 produce and they sell. 809 00:26:07,070 --> 00:26:08,509 And who they sell them to. 810 00:26:08,510 --> 00:26:10,609 So solutions and clients. 811 00:26:10,610 --> 00:26:12,529 The reason why I looked at so the 812 00:26:12,530 --> 00:26:14,239 solutions, I ranked them based on another 813 00:26:14,240 --> 00:26:16,729 two subcategories outreach and harm. 814 00:26:16,730 --> 00:26:19,099 So basically, if 815 00:26:19,100 --> 00:26:21,319 the solutions do mass surveillance or 816 00:26:21,320 --> 00:26:23,299 targeted surveillance and how harmful 817 00:26:23,300 --> 00:26:25,369 they are in the sense, like how much data 818 00:26:25,370 --> 00:26:26,599 do they actually capture? 819 00:26:26,600 --> 00:26:28,819 For example, it might be more harmful, 820 00:26:28,820 --> 00:26:30,919 like an intimate phone monitoring 821 00:26:30,920 --> 00:26:33,139 solution. It's potentially more harmful 822 00:26:33,140 --> 00:26:35,269 than biometrics because a 823 00:26:35,270 --> 00:26:37,369 phone monitoring solution can potentially 824 00:26:37,370 --> 00:26:38,659 conduct mass surveillance. 825 00:26:38,660 --> 00:26:40,489 It catches much more data than a 826 00:26:40,490 --> 00:26:42,169 biometric device, and it goes more 827 00:26:42,170 --> 00:26:43,849 harmful. And then, of course, the 828 00:26:43,850 --> 00:26:46,129 clients. I had four kinds of clients, 829 00:26:46,130 --> 00:26:48,319 or ISP's TSP, said 830 00:26:48,320 --> 00:26:50,749 law enforcement agencies and so on 831 00:26:50,750 --> 00:26:52,339 corporations, organizations and the 832 00:26:52,340 --> 00:26:54,469 public. And I ranked, I 833 00:26:54,470 --> 00:26:56,149 suppose, into ISPs as the most harmful 834 00:26:56,150 --> 00:26:58,339 category, and the public has the least 835 00:26:58,340 --> 00:27:00,319 harmful ISP's in tests because the most 836 00:27:00,320 --> 00:27:01,789 harmful because of direct access to all 837 00:27:01,790 --> 00:27:02,929 the data. 838 00:27:02,930 --> 00:27:05,299 So from the 839 00:27:05,300 --> 00:27:07,489 from this essentially to some interesting 840 00:27:07,490 --> 00:27:09,349 points or not so interesting, that's up 841 00:27:09,350 --> 00:27:10,350 to you to decide. 842 00:27:17,390 --> 00:27:19,639 So out of this random sample of 50 843 00:27:19,640 --> 00:27:22,219 surveillance technology companies, 18 844 00:27:22,220 --> 00:27:24,649 of them cell phone monitoring solutions 845 00:27:24,650 --> 00:27:26,839 and repeats, it's a random sample. 846 00:27:26,840 --> 00:27:29,209 So even a random sample, a huge, 847 00:27:29,210 --> 00:27:31,589 huge a big amount of these companies 848 00:27:31,590 --> 00:27:33,379 sell for munching solutions that solves 849 00:27:33,380 --> 00:27:34,399 very problematic. 850 00:27:34,400 --> 00:27:36,139 And the reason why I'm focusing on phone 851 00:27:36,140 --> 00:27:37,429 munching solutions because like I 852 00:27:37,430 --> 00:27:39,349 mentioned, roughly 80 percent of our 853 00:27:39,350 --> 00:27:41,479 population, India have cell phones, so 854 00:27:41,480 --> 00:27:43,369 this directly affects them. 855 00:27:43,370 --> 00:27:45,619 Then, out of the 50 companies, 30 856 00:27:45,620 --> 00:27:47,869 of them sell two solutions to law 857 00:27:47,870 --> 00:27:49,039 enforcement agencies. 858 00:27:49,040 --> 00:27:51,379 And I repeat, this is a random sample. 859 00:27:51,380 --> 00:27:53,390 So that itself is very problematic. 860 00:27:54,550 --> 00:27:56,409 And what's very interesting is that out 861 00:27:56,410 --> 00:27:58,659 of the 50 companies, only six 862 00:27:58,660 --> 00:28:01,059 of them comply with lawful interception 863 00:28:01,060 --> 00:28:03,459 standards and regulations when they refer 864 00:28:03,460 --> 00:28:04,839 to lawful signs of regulations. 865 00:28:04,840 --> 00:28:07,569 I'm referring to Ed Sinclair and these 866 00:28:07,570 --> 00:28:09,879 very interesting regulations. 867 00:28:09,880 --> 00:28:12,189 So these companies, actually 868 00:28:12,190 --> 00:28:14,379 three of them are not even Indian rights. 869 00:28:14,380 --> 00:28:16,449 Three of them. So as a comparison, 870 00:28:16,450 --> 00:28:18,309 you to makeover, they're not Indian. 871 00:28:18,310 --> 00:28:20,379 The other three are so out of my 872 00:28:20,380 --> 00:28:22,389 sample of 50 companies, 40 of them are 873 00:28:22,390 --> 00:28:24,369 Indian. 10 of them were from other 874 00:28:24,370 --> 00:28:25,299 countries in the world. 875 00:28:25,300 --> 00:28:26,949 And it's very interesting to see that out 876 00:28:26,950 --> 00:28:29,229 of my 40 Indian companies, only three 877 00:28:29,230 --> 00:28:31,489 of them bother to comply with 878 00:28:31,490 --> 00:28:33,009 lawful interception standards. 879 00:28:33,010 --> 00:28:34,749 This itself is very problematic because, 880 00:28:34,750 --> 00:28:36,639 you know, if you're doing surveillance, 881 00:28:36,640 --> 00:28:38,289 you might as well put a front if you're 882 00:28:38,290 --> 00:28:39,249 smart enough, right? 883 00:28:39,250 --> 00:28:40,359 You might as well put a front and say, 884 00:28:40,360 --> 00:28:42,069 Hey, at least I comply with lawful 885 00:28:42,070 --> 00:28:43,869 regulations. You can't judge my 886 00:28:43,870 --> 00:28:45,879 technologies or anything, but only three 887 00:28:45,880 --> 00:28:47,739 of them have bothered. Which is quite 888 00:28:47,740 --> 00:28:48,740 sad, actually. 889 00:28:49,510 --> 00:28:51,609 Then again, are these companies only 890 00:28:51,610 --> 00:28:53,799 19 of them are certified, and only 891 00:28:53,800 --> 00:28:55,359 seven of them are ISO twenty seven 892 00:28:55,360 --> 00:28:56,649 thousand and one certified. 893 00:28:56,650 --> 00:28:58,549 Now the reason why I'm focusing on the 894 00:28:58,550 --> 00:29:00,009 ISO twenty seven thousand one 895 00:29:00,010 --> 00:29:01,629 certification is because this 896 00:29:01,630 --> 00:29:03,219 certification is with regard to data 897 00:29:03,220 --> 00:29:05,199 protection. And so all these companies 898 00:29:05,200 --> 00:29:07,089 are handling sensitive personal data. 899 00:29:07,090 --> 00:29:09,039 And so they have to comply with some type 900 00:29:09,040 --> 00:29:11,139 of standard or certification with regard 901 00:29:11,140 --> 00:29:12,309 to data protection. 902 00:29:12,310 --> 00:29:14,409 Now, only seven of them are ISO 903 00:29:14,410 --> 00:29:16,449 twenty seven thousand one certified, 904 00:29:16,450 --> 00:29:18,279 which means that it's likely that most of 905 00:29:18,280 --> 00:29:19,239 them aren't. 906 00:29:19,240 --> 00:29:21,189 And while they are using your personal 907 00:29:21,190 --> 00:29:23,289 data or Indians personal data 908 00:29:23,290 --> 00:29:25,239 that anyone care about putting a fence to 909 00:29:25,240 --> 00:29:26,889 show that they even care about it, or 910 00:29:26,890 --> 00:29:28,659 that they're making an effort to protect 911 00:29:28,660 --> 00:29:30,759 the data for a server, 912 00:29:30,760 --> 00:29:32,289 then only 19 of these companies have 913 00:29:32,290 --> 00:29:34,659 privacy policies, which isn't 914 00:29:34,660 --> 00:29:36,429 isn't a surprise. It just goes to show 915 00:29:36,430 --> 00:29:38,619 that, you know, countries are going 916 00:29:38,620 --> 00:29:40,659 ahead with saying these crazy solutions, 917 00:29:40,660 --> 00:29:42,939 and they even bothered to pretend 918 00:29:42,940 --> 00:29:44,709 that they care about your data. 919 00:29:44,710 --> 00:29:45,699 What's interesting, though, is that when 920 00:29:45,700 --> 00:29:47,109 I was going through these companies, what 921 00:29:47,110 --> 00:29:49,089 I notice is that 922 00:29:50,140 --> 00:29:52,179 the more controversial or the more scary 923 00:29:52,180 --> 00:29:54,279 the products of a company is, the more 924 00:29:54,280 --> 00:29:56,139 likely it is to comply with lawful 925 00:29:56,140 --> 00:29:58,239 regulations and to be certified, 926 00:29:58,240 --> 00:30:00,399 which is very ironic itself, you know. 927 00:30:00,400 --> 00:30:02,259 But it also kind of makes sense because I 928 00:30:02,260 --> 00:30:04,389 guess if you're selling, you know, 929 00:30:04,390 --> 00:30:05,919 very scary products, you want to put a 930 00:30:05,920 --> 00:30:08,169 front that, Hey, I am certified, 931 00:30:08,170 --> 00:30:10,479 I care about the law, I care about 932 00:30:10,480 --> 00:30:11,469 your data. 933 00:30:11,470 --> 00:30:13,329 It's probably not true, but that's 934 00:30:13,330 --> 00:30:14,330 usually the case. 935 00:30:15,840 --> 00:30:17,669 With regards to the least harmful 936 00:30:17,670 --> 00:30:18,899 technology companies like I mentioned 937 00:30:18,900 --> 00:30:21,359 before, precision biometric systems 938 00:30:21,360 --> 00:30:23,729 is supposedly the least harmful, 939 00:30:23,730 --> 00:30:25,259 and that's where I got this biometric 940 00:30:25,260 --> 00:30:26,759 device from. 941 00:30:26,760 --> 00:30:29,069 It's very funny that mobile spy is 942 00:30:29,070 --> 00:30:30,449 ranked as the second least harmful 943 00:30:30,450 --> 00:30:33,269 company, and that's really tragic because 944 00:30:33,270 --> 00:30:35,009 essentially what it does is it sells 945 00:30:35,010 --> 00:30:36,089 mobile spyware. 946 00:30:36,090 --> 00:30:38,069 And like I said, most people in India use 947 00:30:38,070 --> 00:30:40,139 mobile phones and cell 948 00:30:40,140 --> 00:30:42,869 phone surveillance really affects them. 949 00:30:42,870 --> 00:30:45,149 Ravi Raj Technologies, although it only 950 00:30:45,150 --> 00:30:47,269 sells biometrics itself, is 951 00:30:47,270 --> 00:30:49,229 but worrisome because actually what they 952 00:30:49,230 --> 00:30:51,059 do is that they sell biometrics to 953 00:30:51,060 --> 00:30:53,399 governments like Tunisia and Zimbabwe 954 00:30:53,400 --> 00:30:55,169 and Saudi Arabia. 955 00:30:55,170 --> 00:30:57,269 So when you have a company selling 956 00:30:57,270 --> 00:30:59,819 biometrics to non-democratic regimes 957 00:30:59,820 --> 00:31:01,949 or to transitioning to democracy 958 00:31:01,950 --> 00:31:03,779 countries, you are saying that stuff can 959 00:31:03,780 --> 00:31:05,519 be very problematic because they can use 960 00:31:05,520 --> 00:31:07,169 such biometrics to target political 961 00:31:07,170 --> 00:31:08,819 dissidents or anyone who doesn't agree 962 00:31:08,820 --> 00:31:09,820 with them. 963 00:31:10,680 --> 00:31:12,929 So with regards to the most harmful 964 00:31:12,930 --> 00:31:14,729 surveys of larger companies, my data. 965 00:31:14,730 --> 00:31:16,859 First of all, there's comm labs you might 966 00:31:16,860 --> 00:31:18,719 have heard of combat I was before because 967 00:31:18,720 --> 00:31:20,819 WikiLeaks actually have released a whole 968 00:31:20,820 --> 00:31:23,009 bunch of documents brochures with 969 00:31:23,010 --> 00:31:24,629 regards to their products. 970 00:31:24,630 --> 00:31:26,939 So they have a whole wide range 971 00:31:26,940 --> 00:31:29,099 of internet monitoring and phone 972 00:31:29,100 --> 00:31:30,509 monitoring solutions. 973 00:31:30,510 --> 00:31:32,279 I've only picked out two, which I thought 974 00:31:32,280 --> 00:31:34,299 was quite interesting and can look them 975 00:31:34,300 --> 00:31:36,459 up further. The first one is verband 976 00:31:36,460 --> 00:31:38,849 this, which is for it, which is basically 977 00:31:38,850 --> 00:31:40,919 an internet interception solution. 978 00:31:40,920 --> 00:31:43,169 And then there's a sensor which 979 00:31:43,170 --> 00:31:45,749 essentially in a unified way 980 00:31:45,750 --> 00:31:47,519 intercepts telecommunications. 981 00:31:47,520 --> 00:31:48,929 And the interesting thing of the way it 982 00:31:48,930 --> 00:31:51,119 does that is even able to detect 983 00:31:51,120 --> 00:31:53,669 cognitive and emotional stress and voice 984 00:31:53,670 --> 00:31:55,379 calls and flag them. 985 00:31:55,380 --> 00:31:57,809 So the message from here is beware 986 00:31:57,810 --> 00:31:59,219 of how you speak on the phone. 987 00:31:59,220 --> 00:32:00,959 Make sure you have no stress in your 988 00:32:00,960 --> 00:32:02,669 voice. Don't be stressful. 989 00:32:02,670 --> 00:32:04,169 You will think you're a target and will 990 00:32:04,170 --> 00:32:05,460 come arrest you or something. 991 00:32:06,580 --> 00:32:07,580 Crazy. 992 00:32:08,910 --> 00:32:10,979 Second, one day points out and another 993 00:32:10,980 --> 00:32:12,749 like, very like harmful company as 994 00:32:12,750 --> 00:32:14,429 Behera. So these are all Indian 995 00:32:14,430 --> 00:32:15,629 companies, right? 996 00:32:15,630 --> 00:32:17,729 So Barra as a whole wide range of 997 00:32:17,730 --> 00:32:20,219 products, including the crimes 998 00:32:20,220 --> 00:32:22,709 as the Sidr analysis system essentially 999 00:32:22,710 --> 00:32:25,289 was able to do, is gather intelligence 1000 00:32:25,290 --> 00:32:27,029 and, you know, unveil hidden 1001 00:32:27,030 --> 00:32:29,279 relationships and patterns and so 1002 00:32:29,280 --> 00:32:31,379 on. And it's able to do this by using 1003 00:32:31,380 --> 00:32:34,169 an advanced to school tool and 1004 00:32:34,170 --> 00:32:36,599 even able to detect sleeper cells. 1005 00:32:36,600 --> 00:32:38,789 And on top of that, it can even analyze 1006 00:32:38,790 --> 00:32:41,189 more than 40 billion records 1007 00:32:41,190 --> 00:32:43,379 and less than three seconds, or at 1008 00:32:43,380 --> 00:32:44,759 least according to their brochures. 1009 00:32:44,760 --> 00:32:46,529 And I repeat, this is an Indian company. 1010 00:32:46,530 --> 00:32:47,769 And the reason why I'm pointing this out 1011 00:32:47,770 --> 00:32:49,589 is because there's been so much talk 1012 00:32:49,590 --> 00:32:51,269 about Finfish and Gama Group. 1013 00:32:51,270 --> 00:32:52,709 And yes, I completely agree. 1014 00:32:52,710 --> 00:32:54,299 That's some scary shit out there. 1015 00:32:54,300 --> 00:32:56,189 But what I'm trying to emphasize here is 1016 00:32:56,190 --> 00:32:58,529 that a lot of equally harmful 1017 00:32:58,530 --> 00:33:00,709 companies exist in India as well. 1018 00:33:00,710 --> 00:33:03,030 Some case they're even more scary. 1019 00:33:04,440 --> 00:33:06,749 Bellator networks or political 1020 00:33:06,750 --> 00:33:08,819 networks, they sell solutions 1021 00:33:08,820 --> 00:33:10,439 for the disruption of the internet, for 1022 00:33:10,440 --> 00:33:12,839 the intersection of telecommunications. 1023 00:33:12,840 --> 00:33:15,089 They sell and it's a cell interception 1024 00:33:15,090 --> 00:33:17,429 and decryption system and cyber 1025 00:33:17,430 --> 00:33:18,599 cafe monitoring systems. 1026 00:33:18,600 --> 00:33:20,489 Because like I mentioned before, you have 1027 00:33:20,490 --> 00:33:21,809 to monitor cyber cafes. 1028 00:33:21,810 --> 00:33:23,909 Most people in India use cyber cafes. 1029 00:33:23,910 --> 00:33:25,139 How else would you do that? 1030 00:33:25,140 --> 00:33:26,129 What's very interesting about this 1031 00:33:26,130 --> 00:33:28,679 company is that and their websites, 1032 00:33:28,680 --> 00:33:30,689 the openly states of the supplies of 1033 00:33:30,690 --> 00:33:32,969 solutions to the Ministry of it. 1034 00:33:32,970 --> 00:33:34,589 And that's very interesting because most 1035 00:33:34,590 --> 00:33:36,269 companies don't. They're very secretive 1036 00:33:36,270 --> 00:33:37,649 about who they sell them to. 1037 00:33:37,650 --> 00:33:39,959 So I kind of feel that the more open 1038 00:33:39,960 --> 00:33:42,089 a company is about what they do, the more 1039 00:33:42,090 --> 00:33:44,189 dodgy they are in a way because 1040 00:33:44,190 --> 00:33:45,549 that because they have the balls to say, 1041 00:33:45,550 --> 00:33:47,519 you know, yes, we supply this industry 1042 00:33:47,520 --> 00:33:48,789 out of it and we're telling you about 1043 00:33:48,790 --> 00:33:50,909 that and we're untouchable, like, 1044 00:33:50,910 --> 00:33:52,110 that's some scary stuff, I think. 1045 00:33:54,010 --> 00:33:55,719 And then Clear Trail Petrol is another 1046 00:33:55,720 --> 00:33:57,849 company you may have heard of again, some 1047 00:33:57,850 --> 00:33:59,769 of their brochures are in WikiLeaks as 1048 00:33:59,770 --> 00:34:01,809 well, so they have a whole wide range of 1049 00:34:01,810 --> 00:34:03,969 products, including 1050 00:34:03,970 --> 00:34:06,099 control and X-Trail, which are for 1051 00:34:06,100 --> 00:34:07,839 monitoring IP and voice networks, the 1052 00:34:07,840 --> 00:34:09,158 ones for mass monitoring. 1053 00:34:09,159 --> 00:34:10,599 The others were targeted. 1054 00:34:10,600 --> 00:34:12,549 Now quick trial, I think, is particularly 1055 00:34:12,550 --> 00:34:14,499 interesting because this essentially what 1056 00:34:14,500 --> 00:34:17,079 it does is a tactical wi fi monitoring. 1057 00:34:17,080 --> 00:34:19,329 So what it does is that in real 1058 00:34:19,330 --> 00:34:21,669 time, it's able to monitor Ethernet 1059 00:34:21,670 --> 00:34:23,859 LANs in India as even 1060 00:34:23,860 --> 00:34:26,049 able to deploy spyware into 1061 00:34:26,050 --> 00:34:27,759 a target's computer. 1062 00:34:27,760 --> 00:34:30,218 So if you think in India 1063 00:34:30,219 --> 00:34:31,539 that you know you're safe because you're 1064 00:34:31,540 --> 00:34:33,819 using Wi-Fi or because you're using 1065 00:34:33,820 --> 00:34:35,138 the internet, you know, through a cyber 1066 00:34:35,139 --> 00:34:37,149 cafe or through a hotel or another public 1067 00:34:37,150 --> 00:34:39,999 place, think again, you're 1068 00:34:40,000 --> 00:34:42,189 it's very likely that you may be 1069 00:34:42,190 --> 00:34:43,539 your communications may be intercepted. 1070 00:34:43,540 --> 00:34:45,959 If you're a target, then there's 1071 00:34:45,960 --> 00:34:48,129 trail, which is a bit worrisome 1072 00:34:48,130 --> 00:34:49,839 because what it does is off the 1073 00:34:49,840 --> 00:34:52,388 interception of GSM phone calls. 1074 00:34:52,389 --> 00:34:54,638 And the reason why this is problematic is 1075 00:34:54,639 --> 00:34:57,189 because well of the interception 1076 00:34:57,190 --> 00:34:59,529 in India is technically illegal, 1077 00:34:59,530 --> 00:35:00,549 for starters. 1078 00:35:00,550 --> 00:35:03,039 So in 2011, there were these allegations 1079 00:35:03,040 --> 00:35:04,959 that the National Technical Research 1080 00:35:04,960 --> 00:35:06,489 Organization was snooping on. 1081 00:35:06,490 --> 00:35:09,369 Politicians threw off the interception, 1082 00:35:09,370 --> 00:35:11,469 and following this, the Ministry 1083 00:35:11,470 --> 00:35:13,779 of Home Affairs issued a directive 1084 00:35:13,780 --> 00:35:16,119 to ban all of the interception 1085 00:35:16,120 --> 00:35:17,049 in India. 1086 00:35:17,050 --> 00:35:18,999 So since then, the Department of 1087 00:35:19,000 --> 00:35:20,439 Telecommunications has really been 1088 00:35:20,440 --> 00:35:22,119 busting. Everyone is trying to produce 1089 00:35:22,120 --> 00:35:23,049 this and sell this. 1090 00:35:23,050 --> 00:35:24,519 But yet they're going ahead with this. 1091 00:35:24,520 --> 00:35:25,839 And actually, they're not only selling 1092 00:35:25,840 --> 00:35:27,789 the stuff to India, they've assigned us 1093 00:35:27,790 --> 00:35:28,929 lots in the Middle East. 1094 00:35:28,930 --> 00:35:30,609 So actually, Clear Technologies and 1095 00:35:30,610 --> 00:35:32,949 Palladian are two companies 1096 00:35:32,950 --> 00:35:35,139 which are probably the main suppliers of 1097 00:35:35,140 --> 00:35:36,699 surveillance technologies in the Middle 1098 00:35:36,700 --> 00:35:39,099 East and in other Asian countries, 1099 00:35:39,100 --> 00:35:40,599 which is very concerning because we're 1100 00:35:40,600 --> 00:35:41,889 talking about authoritarian regimes, we 1101 00:35:41,890 --> 00:35:43,149 are talking about democracies. 1102 00:35:43,150 --> 00:35:44,859 But hey, even if we talk about 1103 00:35:44,860 --> 00:35:45,759 democracies. 1104 00:35:45,760 --> 00:35:47,619 Well, it was hard to find democracy. 1105 00:35:47,620 --> 00:35:50,259 But still, you can see that in India, 1106 00:35:50,260 --> 00:35:52,449 even though it's the world's largest 1107 00:35:52,450 --> 00:35:55,089 democracy, the surveillance is crazy. 1108 00:35:55,090 --> 00:35:57,039 And the main reason why it's crazy is 1109 00:35:57,040 --> 00:35:59,469 because there is no privacy law. 1110 00:35:59,470 --> 00:36:01,179 There is no privacy legislation 1111 00:36:01,180 --> 00:36:02,319 whatsoever. 1112 00:36:02,320 --> 00:36:03,549 No data protection. 1113 00:36:03,550 --> 00:36:06,519 Nothing, nothing whatsoever. 1114 00:36:06,520 --> 00:36:08,409 So she has a story. 1115 00:36:08,410 --> 00:36:10,269 So essentially in India, you have all 1116 00:36:10,270 --> 00:36:12,339 these strict surveillance laws which 1117 00:36:12,340 --> 00:36:14,319 require you to hand over your encryption 1118 00:36:14,320 --> 00:36:16,539 key, which mandate that all your 1119 00:36:16,540 --> 00:36:18,009 communications are intercepted. 1120 00:36:18,010 --> 00:36:19,689 You have these massive schemes 1121 00:36:19,690 --> 00:36:20,679 implementing this. 1122 00:36:20,680 --> 00:36:23,229 You have these, these technologies 1123 00:36:23,230 --> 00:36:25,119 and these companies selling spyware. 1124 00:36:25,120 --> 00:36:27,099 And yet there is no privacy law. 1125 00:36:28,240 --> 00:36:29,919 On top of that, prior to the 1126 00:36:29,920 --> 00:36:31,179 implementation of all the schemes I 1127 00:36:31,180 --> 00:36:32,919 mentioned before, there was no 1128 00:36:32,920 --> 00:36:34,989 parliamentary or public debates prior to 1129 00:36:34,990 --> 00:36:36,129 the implementation. 1130 00:36:36,130 --> 00:36:37,719 So essentially, what this shows is that 1131 00:36:37,720 --> 00:36:39,789 the government does whatever whatever 1132 00:36:39,790 --> 00:36:40,809 it wants. 1133 00:36:40,810 --> 00:36:43,299 It doesn't care if you feel that 1134 00:36:43,300 --> 00:36:44,829 its schemes are, you know, violating 1135 00:36:44,830 --> 00:36:46,839 human rights or whatever because it knows 1136 00:36:46,840 --> 00:36:47,919 what's good for you. 1137 00:36:47,920 --> 00:36:49,359 It's going to protect you and you just 1138 00:36:49,360 --> 00:36:51,729 have to blindly trust the government. 1139 00:36:51,730 --> 00:36:53,889 This itself is very concerning because 1140 00:36:53,890 --> 00:36:56,259 when the government doesn't even try, 1141 00:36:56,260 --> 00:36:57,279 you know, it's you put a friend or 1142 00:36:57,280 --> 00:36:59,529 doesn't even try to gain some type 1143 00:36:59,530 --> 00:37:02,229 of public consent that is fundamentally 1144 00:37:02,230 --> 00:37:04,509 problematic for the nature of the regime. 1145 00:37:04,510 --> 00:37:06,639 Even in the most authoritarian regimes, 1146 00:37:06,640 --> 00:37:08,859 you will see governments trying to gain 1147 00:37:08,860 --> 00:37:10,779 some type of public consent from the 1148 00:37:10,780 --> 00:37:12,879 public before going ahead with 1149 00:37:12,880 --> 00:37:14,979 like schemes and 1150 00:37:14,980 --> 00:37:16,569 projects which are invasive to people's 1151 00:37:16,570 --> 00:37:17,499 human rights. 1152 00:37:17,500 --> 00:37:19,929 But in India, that's even the case. 1153 00:37:19,930 --> 00:37:21,369 They don't even care about gaining public 1154 00:37:21,370 --> 00:37:23,619 consent. So that itself is 1155 00:37:23,620 --> 00:37:25,480 extremely problematic, to say the least. 1156 00:37:26,760 --> 00:37:28,919 So in light of all of this in 1157 00:37:28,920 --> 00:37:30,420 India, no privacy law. 1158 00:37:31,800 --> 00:37:33,419 All the surveillance schemes. 1159 00:37:33,420 --> 00:37:35,699 The question comes down to is privacy 1160 00:37:35,700 --> 00:37:38,309 dead or didn't even exist to begin with? 1161 00:37:38,310 --> 00:37:40,319 Well, many could argue that, hey, privacy 1162 00:37:40,320 --> 00:37:41,969 doesn't even exist to begin with because 1163 00:37:41,970 --> 00:37:44,069 this is India, and they don't necessarily 1164 00:37:44,070 --> 00:37:45,689 have the concept of privacy in their 1165 00:37:45,690 --> 00:37:48,209 culture because privacy itself 1166 00:37:48,210 --> 00:37:50,399 is a very individualistic type of human 1167 00:37:50,400 --> 00:37:51,779 rights. So it's something that's more 1168 00:37:51,780 --> 00:37:52,889 western in the way. 1169 00:37:52,890 --> 00:37:54,479 But in the end of the day, I think that 1170 00:37:54,480 --> 00:37:56,609 privacy is very important that everybody 1171 00:37:56,610 --> 00:37:57,779 all over the world should have this 1172 00:37:57,780 --> 00:37:59,159 right, regardless of their culture, 1173 00:37:59,160 --> 00:38:01,349 whatever, because privacy essentially 1174 00:38:01,350 --> 00:38:03,119 protects you from abuse from those in 1175 00:38:03,120 --> 00:38:05,189 power. And that is privacy 1176 00:38:05,190 --> 00:38:07,019 and chose your individual freedom and 1177 00:38:07,020 --> 00:38:08,639 your autonomy as a human being. 1178 00:38:08,640 --> 00:38:10,109 Which and that has nothing to do with 1179 00:38:10,110 --> 00:38:11,999 culture. So regardless of your culture, 1180 00:38:12,000 --> 00:38:13,529 because of everything else, everybody 1181 00:38:13,530 --> 00:38:14,729 should have this rights. 1182 00:38:14,730 --> 00:38:16,409 And in India, they're doing everything 1183 00:38:16,410 --> 00:38:18,029 they can to violate this. 1184 00:38:18,030 --> 00:38:19,589 Which is why with the center, for 1185 00:38:19,590 --> 00:38:21,539 instance, a society that I work with, we 1186 00:38:21,540 --> 00:38:23,669 have drafted a law because, you know, 1187 00:38:23,670 --> 00:38:25,919 a bill, sorry, a privacy bill. 1188 00:38:25,920 --> 00:38:27,899 Because hey, if the government does a one 1189 00:38:27,900 --> 00:38:29,729 to create one, we'll create for them and 1190 00:38:29,730 --> 00:38:31,590 hopefully they'll implement it someday. 1191 00:38:32,790 --> 00:38:34,889 So if you like, you can get in touch 1192 00:38:34,890 --> 00:38:36,719 with me and I can share the bill with 1193 00:38:36,720 --> 00:38:38,219 you. And if you have any feedback, if 1194 00:38:38,220 --> 00:38:39,989 there are any lawyers out there who would 1195 00:38:39,990 --> 00:38:41,879 like to look at us and give us any 1196 00:38:41,880 --> 00:38:43,529 feedback on how to improve it, they'll be 1197 00:38:43,530 --> 00:38:44,459 wonderful. 1198 00:38:44,460 --> 00:38:46,139 And general, if anyone would like to 1199 00:38:46,140 --> 00:38:48,449 cooperate and dealing and tackling 1200 00:38:48,450 --> 00:38:50,999 surveillance in India and restricting it, 1201 00:38:51,000 --> 00:38:53,009 please contact me. That would be amazing 1202 00:38:53,010 --> 00:38:55,079 because, you know, if we don't 1203 00:38:55,080 --> 00:38:57,059 right now, this is still the beginning 1204 00:38:57,060 --> 00:38:59,219 and we have to do something about it now. 1205 00:38:59,220 --> 00:39:01,079 And we don't do something about it now. 1206 00:39:01,080 --> 00:39:02,699 We'll regret in the future because it's 1207 00:39:02,700 --> 00:39:03,959 only getting worse. 1208 00:39:03,960 --> 00:39:05,489 And actually, we'll regret it if we're 1209 00:39:05,490 --> 00:39:07,589 lucky, if we're not lucky, 1210 00:39:07,590 --> 00:39:08,879 we won't regret it. 1211 00:39:08,880 --> 00:39:10,889 And the reason why we won't regret it is 1212 00:39:10,890 --> 00:39:12,689 because we won't even see it. 1213 00:39:12,690 --> 00:39:14,219 We won't even acknowledge it as a 1214 00:39:14,220 --> 00:39:15,359 problem. 1215 00:39:15,360 --> 00:39:16,679 And that is the worst thing that can 1216 00:39:16,680 --> 00:39:18,509 happen if surveillance is socially 1217 00:39:18,510 --> 00:39:20,909 integrated on a global level. 1218 00:39:20,910 --> 00:39:22,229 That's the worst thing that could happen 1219 00:39:22,230 --> 00:39:23,549 because we won't even acknowledge as a 1220 00:39:23,550 --> 00:39:25,769 problem and how we won't 1221 00:39:25,770 --> 00:39:27,899 resist to it and won't try to tackle it. 1222 00:39:27,900 --> 00:39:29,399 And so essentially what we're talking 1223 00:39:29,400 --> 00:39:30,959 about is the ultimate control of our 1224 00:39:30,960 --> 00:39:31,979 lives. 1225 00:39:31,980 --> 00:39:34,019 So if you don't want to ultimately 1226 00:39:34,020 --> 00:39:35,159 control, if you don't want to be totally 1227 00:39:35,160 --> 00:39:36,729 controlled, we have to do something about 1228 00:39:36,730 --> 00:39:38,849 it now. And I think it's very important 1229 00:39:38,850 --> 00:39:40,049 to start with India. 1230 00:39:40,050 --> 00:39:42,509 India, a country of 1.2 billion people 1231 00:39:42,510 --> 00:39:44,459 with an expanding middle class and the 1232 00:39:44,460 --> 00:39:46,499 reason why I'm emphasizing expanding 1233 00:39:46,500 --> 00:39:48,809 middle class is because a lot of people 1234 00:39:48,810 --> 00:39:50,279 are going to have more access to the 1235 00:39:50,280 --> 00:39:51,719 internet over the next two years. 1236 00:39:51,720 --> 00:39:53,039 It means that more people are going to be 1237 00:39:53,040 --> 00:39:55,169 under surveillance and hey, they won't 1238 00:39:55,170 --> 00:39:57,389 even tackle the system because they'll 1239 00:39:57,390 --> 00:39:59,699 want to maintain the new economic status. 1240 00:39:59,700 --> 00:40:01,379 So it's unlikely that they'll tackle the 1241 00:40:01,380 --> 00:40:02,699 government because of surveillance, 1242 00:40:02,700 --> 00:40:04,829 right? So we're talking about a 1243 00:40:04,830 --> 00:40:06,929 much scarier system 1244 00:40:06,930 --> 00:40:08,729 in the future, one which is likely to 1245 00:40:08,730 --> 00:40:10,439 affect every single one of us in the 1246 00:40:10,440 --> 00:40:12,479 future. So it's not just about India. 1247 00:40:12,480 --> 00:40:14,459 This is a global problem, and I really 1248 00:40:14,460 --> 00:40:16,289 recommend that we work together and we 1249 00:40:16,290 --> 00:40:17,819 try to find a solution for it now before 1250 00:40:17,820 --> 00:40:18,899 it's too late. 1251 00:40:18,900 --> 00:40:19,900 Thank you. 1252 00:40:35,200 --> 00:40:37,359 All right. Thank you very much. 1253 00:40:37,360 --> 00:40:39,489 Now we have some time left for Q&A. 1254 00:40:39,490 --> 00:40:40,629 Are there any questions? 1255 00:40:40,630 --> 00:40:42,459 Please go to the microphones over there 1256 00:40:42,460 --> 00:40:44,739 and over there and yeah, 1257 00:40:46,480 --> 00:40:47,480 you 1258 00:40:47,920 --> 00:40:48,920 know, that's a great start. 1259 00:40:49,840 --> 00:40:51,999 You didn't talk about how 1260 00:40:52,000 --> 00:40:53,739 getting a cell phone is so complicated in 1261 00:40:53,740 --> 00:40:56,079 India, you need to register and fill out 1262 00:40:56,080 --> 00:40:57,729 millions of phones. 1263 00:40:57,730 --> 00:40:59,469 Is this information that's collected in 1264 00:40:59,470 --> 00:41:00,939 the process of getting a SIM card 1265 00:41:00,940 --> 00:41:03,249 actually used by the CMS? 1266 00:41:03,250 --> 00:41:04,809 Or is this a completely different branch 1267 00:41:04,810 --> 00:41:06,369 of government? 1268 00:41:06,370 --> 00:41:07,629 I think the information gathered, you 1269 00:41:07,630 --> 00:41:09,099 know, when you register for some card is 1270 00:41:09,100 --> 00:41:10,819 not as clear. 1271 00:41:10,820 --> 00:41:12,129 It was used by the CMS because 1272 00:41:12,130 --> 00:41:14,139 essentially what the CMS does is that it 1273 00:41:14,140 --> 00:41:15,969 intercepts like old telecommunications 1274 00:41:15,970 --> 00:41:17,079 through tubes. 1275 00:41:17,080 --> 00:41:19,119 So that doesn't include data, you know, 1276 00:41:19,120 --> 00:41:20,139 for the SIM card per say. 1277 00:41:21,190 --> 00:41:22,749 However, you are right that actually 1278 00:41:22,750 --> 00:41:24,279 getting a SIM card is quite a complicated 1279 00:41:24,280 --> 00:41:25,539 process, and the reason why is 1280 00:41:25,540 --> 00:41:27,309 complicated. It was because they tried to 1281 00:41:27,310 --> 00:41:28,929 gather as much data as possible. 1282 00:41:28,930 --> 00:41:30,609 So in India, in order to get Go SIM card, 1283 00:41:30,610 --> 00:41:32,889 you have to give them a copy of your ID 1284 00:41:32,890 --> 00:41:33,879 or your passport. 1285 00:41:33,880 --> 00:41:35,529 You have to give them proof of address. 1286 00:41:35,530 --> 00:41:37,779 You have to give them a contract, which 1287 00:41:37,780 --> 00:41:39,459 proves that you actually love what you do 1288 00:41:39,460 --> 00:41:40,809 and so on. So there's a lot of 1289 00:41:40,810 --> 00:41:42,399 bureaucracy involved in actually getting 1290 00:41:42,400 --> 00:41:43,329 a SIM card. 1291 00:41:43,330 --> 00:41:45,249 However, nonetheless, most people you 1292 00:41:45,250 --> 00:41:47,709 know, go with with the bureaucracy and 1293 00:41:47,710 --> 00:41:49,509 they register anyway, and most people use 1294 00:41:49,510 --> 00:41:50,679 cell phones. 1295 00:41:50,680 --> 00:41:52,359 But that type of data, which is gathered 1296 00:41:52,360 --> 00:41:54,699 through that is basically 1297 00:41:54,700 --> 00:41:56,259 this is stored in ministries and like 1298 00:41:56,260 --> 00:41:58,389 mission before the data from different 1299 00:41:58,390 --> 00:42:00,369 ministries are shared, you know, through 1300 00:42:00,370 --> 00:42:02,319 that grid. So in many cases, the 1301 00:42:02,320 --> 00:42:03,639 government does have access to this data 1302 00:42:03,640 --> 00:42:06,129 and it can be used for whatever reason. 1303 00:42:06,130 --> 00:42:07,389 But it doesn't fall under the central 1304 00:42:07,390 --> 00:42:09,039 monitoring system per se, because that 1305 00:42:09,040 --> 00:42:10,749 that's basically involves the data 1306 00:42:10,750 --> 00:42:11,750 through TSP is. 1307 00:42:15,460 --> 00:42:17,859 OK. Over there, though, some questions. 1308 00:42:17,860 --> 00:42:19,419 Yeah, thank you for your great talk, and 1309 00:42:19,420 --> 00:42:20,739 this is really scary. I can't even 1310 00:42:20,740 --> 00:42:22,959 believe we're talking about the NSA 1311 00:42:22,960 --> 00:42:24,339 all the time and this. 1312 00:42:24,340 --> 00:42:26,529 Not at all, although it obviously 1313 00:42:26,530 --> 00:42:28,629 affects a lot more people. 1314 00:42:33,400 --> 00:42:35,259 But, yeah, Western media and all that. 1315 00:42:35,260 --> 00:42:37,659 My question is, what can you talk 1316 00:42:37,660 --> 00:42:39,819 about the political motivation in 1317 00:42:39,820 --> 00:42:41,439 the mass surveillance in India a little 1318 00:42:41,440 --> 00:42:43,509 more? Because, yeah, 1319 00:42:43,510 --> 00:42:45,759 in America, we know it's all 1320 00:42:45,760 --> 00:42:47,769 about terrorism and stuff. 1321 00:42:47,770 --> 00:42:49,869 And in India, I don't know if terrorism 1322 00:42:49,870 --> 00:42:51,819 is a problem or if it's about, I don't 1323 00:42:51,820 --> 00:42:54,309 know, child porn like we had in Germany 1324 00:42:54,310 --> 00:42:56,919 or I don't know what what the 1325 00:42:56,920 --> 00:42:58,329 official motivation is. 1326 00:42:58,330 --> 00:43:00,789 And maybe you can also talk about 1327 00:43:00,790 --> 00:43:02,919 what you think the real motivation might 1328 00:43:02,920 --> 00:43:03,609 be. 1329 00:43:03,610 --> 00:43:05,049 Thank you. Good question. 1330 00:43:05,050 --> 00:43:07,659 So just like in the West, the motivation 1331 00:43:07,660 --> 00:43:09,759 is crime and terrorism. 1332 00:43:09,760 --> 00:43:10,659 Right? 1333 00:43:10,660 --> 00:43:12,639 Actually, terrorism is actually more of a 1334 00:43:12,640 --> 00:43:14,469 problem in India than it is in the US or 1335 00:43:14,470 --> 00:43:15,759 in most countries of states because there 1336 00:43:15,760 --> 00:43:17,079 actually are terrorist attacks from 1337 00:43:17,080 --> 00:43:18,129 Pakistan in India. 1338 00:43:18,130 --> 00:43:20,709 I mean, terrorist activism actually is 1339 00:43:20,710 --> 00:43:22,569 a problem in India, unlike most Western 1340 00:43:22,570 --> 00:43:24,649 countries. So so 1341 00:43:24,650 --> 00:43:26,919 what we can see is that since 2008, 1342 00:43:26,920 --> 00:43:29,259 since the 2008 Mumbai attacks, 1343 00:43:29,260 --> 00:43:31,269 surveillance has just rapidly increased. 1344 00:43:31,270 --> 00:43:33,639 So since the that the Mumbai 1345 00:43:33,640 --> 00:43:35,289 terrorist attacks, we've had the 1346 00:43:35,290 --> 00:43:36,609 implementation of the central monitoring 1347 00:43:36,610 --> 00:43:38,499 system. We've had them permission of the 1348 00:43:38,500 --> 00:43:39,399 UIDAI. 1349 00:43:39,400 --> 00:43:40,689 We've had the limitation of the lawful 1350 00:43:40,690 --> 00:43:42,069 intercept and monitoring system. 1351 00:43:42,070 --> 00:43:44,379 So all these projects and these schemes 1352 00:43:44,380 --> 00:43:46,479 are referred to have been implemented 1353 00:43:46,480 --> 00:43:48,579 after following the 2008 Mumbai 1354 00:43:48,580 --> 00:43:49,539 terrorist attacks. 1355 00:43:49,540 --> 00:43:51,939 So I think it's safe to say that 1356 00:43:51,940 --> 00:43:54,219 the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks are 1357 00:43:54,220 --> 00:43:56,559 equally a landmark as the nine 11 1358 00:43:56,560 --> 00:43:58,359 terror attacks in the US. 1359 00:43:58,360 --> 00:44:00,789 So yeah, they definitely could. 1360 00:44:00,790 --> 00:44:03,369 Crime and terrorism as a reason for this. 1361 00:44:03,370 --> 00:44:04,929 In other cases, like in the case of the 1362 00:44:04,930 --> 00:44:07,119 UAE, which is the biometric data 1363 00:44:07,120 --> 00:44:09,219 collection scheme, what they 1364 00:44:09,220 --> 00:44:10,509 obviously can't close, you know, crime 1365 00:44:10,510 --> 00:44:11,469 and tourism there. 1366 00:44:11,470 --> 00:44:13,479 So what they do say in that case is that 1367 00:44:13,480 --> 00:44:14,889 the reason why they're collecting 1368 00:44:14,890 --> 00:44:17,049 biometric data is that they can provide 1369 00:44:17,050 --> 00:44:19,329 unregistered people in India and identity 1370 00:44:19,330 --> 00:44:20,859 because most people in India live in 1371 00:44:20,860 --> 00:44:21,969 rural communities, right? 1372 00:44:21,970 --> 00:44:23,799 And they're not even registered like 1373 00:44:23,800 --> 00:44:25,239 they're kind of like invisible citizens. 1374 00:44:25,240 --> 00:44:26,799 We don't even know they exist in many 1375 00:44:26,800 --> 00:44:28,539 cases. And this makes it very hard for 1376 00:44:28,540 --> 00:44:29,799 them to have access to governmental 1377 00:44:29,800 --> 00:44:31,699 services. So the government is arguing 1378 00:44:31,700 --> 00:44:33,279 that, hey, in order for us to provide 1379 00:44:33,280 --> 00:44:34,869 them access to governmental services and 1380 00:44:34,870 --> 00:44:36,849 for us to know who actually exist in the 1381 00:44:36,850 --> 00:44:39,039 fucking country, we're enrolling 1382 00:44:39,040 --> 00:44:40,389 their biometric data. 1383 00:44:40,390 --> 00:44:41,469 So that's what they say with regards to 1384 00:44:41,470 --> 00:44:43,239 that. Then with regards to child 1385 00:44:43,240 --> 00:44:44,980 pornography, that that as well is 1386 00:44:46,030 --> 00:44:48,219 something to keep. Citing pornography 1387 00:44:48,220 --> 00:44:50,139 in general is like illegal in India. 1388 00:44:50,140 --> 00:44:52,029 So they obviously want to censor it as 1389 00:44:52,030 --> 00:44:53,030 much as possible. 1390 00:44:53,860 --> 00:44:55,929 And in general, they've over the last 1391 00:44:55,930 --> 00:44:58,059 year, they're really trying to increase 1392 00:44:58,060 --> 00:44:59,499 cybersecurity in general. 1393 00:44:59,500 --> 00:45:01,359 They've even come down with this national 1394 00:45:01,360 --> 00:45:03,219 cybersecurity policy, which they 1395 00:45:03,220 --> 00:45:04,839 implemented a few months ago. 1396 00:45:04,840 --> 00:45:06,639 And essentially, the cyber security 1397 00:45:06,640 --> 00:45:07,899 policy allows for a lot of surveillance 1398 00:45:07,900 --> 00:45:09,819 as well. And that, you know, ISP's and 1399 00:45:09,820 --> 00:45:11,739 TSB implement, you know, install their 1400 00:45:11,740 --> 00:45:13,299 own hardware software to monitor 1401 00:45:13,300 --> 00:45:14,919 communications and so on, and that they 1402 00:45:14,920 --> 00:45:16,479 share intelligence and everything else 1403 00:45:16,480 --> 00:45:17,439 that comes with that. 1404 00:45:17,440 --> 00:45:19,659 So in public, they do argue 1405 00:45:19,660 --> 00:45:21,729 that the main reason for this is security 1406 00:45:21,730 --> 00:45:23,919 is to tackle crime and terrorism 1407 00:45:23,920 --> 00:45:26,019 is to tackle child pornography and 1408 00:45:26,020 --> 00:45:28,209 some case pornography in general to 1409 00:45:28,210 --> 00:45:30,129 provide an identity systems like in the 1410 00:45:30,130 --> 00:45:31,239 case of the UIDAI. 1411 00:45:31,240 --> 00:45:33,549 But in my personal opinion, 1412 00:45:33,550 --> 00:45:35,289 I really don't think a government would 1413 00:45:35,290 --> 00:45:37,479 invest so much money 1414 00:45:37,480 --> 00:45:39,339 in such a risky project in such risky 1415 00:45:39,340 --> 00:45:41,049 projects because in the day, the rescue, 1416 00:45:41,050 --> 00:45:42,129 because what you're doing is that you're 1417 00:45:42,130 --> 00:45:44,559 collecting humungous volumes 1418 00:45:44,560 --> 00:45:46,629 of data from literally a billion 1419 00:45:46,630 --> 00:45:48,459 people, and you're hoping this will make 1420 00:45:48,460 --> 00:45:50,679 sense. You're hoping that when you mine 1421 00:45:50,680 --> 00:45:52,329 the data, you'll be able to find the 1422 00:45:52,330 --> 00:45:53,469 right person. 1423 00:45:53,470 --> 00:45:55,449 So I think they're not really smart about 1424 00:45:55,450 --> 00:45:56,450 it. I think they're just like 1425 00:45:57,640 --> 00:45:58,930 from one sense. I think they just like 1426 00:46:00,100 --> 00:46:01,219 copying the West. 1427 00:46:01,220 --> 00:46:02,679 They're like, Oh, the West, you know, 1428 00:46:02,680 --> 00:46:04,869 carries out surveillance to, you know, 1429 00:46:04,870 --> 00:46:05,829 tackle crime and terrorism. 1430 00:46:05,830 --> 00:46:07,209 Let's do the same. 1431 00:46:07,210 --> 00:46:09,639 Let's just intercept everything, 1432 00:46:09,640 --> 00:46:12,129 monitor everyone and hope that, 1433 00:46:12,130 --> 00:46:13,569 you know, somehow this data will be 1434 00:46:13,570 --> 00:46:15,369 useful. We don't know why we're gathering 1435 00:46:15,370 --> 00:46:16,329 that to begin with. 1436 00:46:16,330 --> 00:46:18,249 But, you know, and hopefully later on, 1437 00:46:18,250 --> 00:46:19,859 we'll figure out why. 1438 00:46:19,860 --> 00:46:22,689 So I think that partly 1439 00:46:22,690 --> 00:46:24,969 they're just blindly copying the West. 1440 00:46:24,970 --> 00:46:26,529 And on the other hand, I think it comes 1441 00:46:26,530 --> 00:46:28,899 down to control because every government 1442 00:46:28,900 --> 00:46:31,419 knows that if you're able to 1443 00:46:31,420 --> 00:46:33,609 know everything about everyone, 1444 00:46:33,610 --> 00:46:35,150 you're a super powerful nerd. 1445 00:46:36,220 --> 00:46:38,149 There's nothing more empowering than 1446 00:46:38,150 --> 00:46:40,329 knowing everything a person has done, 1447 00:46:40,330 --> 00:46:41,829 everything they're doing and everything 1448 00:46:41,830 --> 00:46:42,969 they're likely to do. 1449 00:46:42,970 --> 00:46:44,289 Because even though something able to 1450 00:46:44,290 --> 00:46:45,729 predict, because once you have all this 1451 00:46:45,730 --> 00:46:47,229 data and your minus and use behavior 1452 00:46:47,230 --> 00:46:49,209 statistics on it, you're able to predict 1453 00:46:49,210 --> 00:46:50,889 with some type of probability how this 1454 00:46:50,890 --> 00:46:52,389 individual is likely to behave in the 1455 00:46:52,390 --> 00:46:54,459 future. And if you apply this on a mass 1456 00:46:54,460 --> 00:46:56,979 level, you're probably likely to predict 1457 00:46:56,980 --> 00:46:58,749 how the masses are likely to be in the 1458 00:46:58,750 --> 00:47:00,459 future. So this really comes down to 1459 00:47:00,460 --> 00:47:01,659 public control. 1460 00:47:01,660 --> 00:47:03,849 And I think that anyone who's in power, 1461 00:47:03,850 --> 00:47:05,769 like all they care about, is guaranteeing 1462 00:47:05,770 --> 00:47:07,479 and ensuring that they're still in power. 1463 00:47:07,480 --> 00:47:08,649 So it really comes down to public 1464 00:47:08,650 --> 00:47:09,939 control, in my opinion. 1465 00:47:09,940 --> 00:47:10,940 Thank you. 1466 00:47:16,200 --> 00:47:18,449 OK. I think we have time for 1467 00:47:18,450 --> 00:47:20,849 one question, and we have some questions 1468 00:47:20,850 --> 00:47:22,860 from the internet, so have a go. 1469 00:47:24,910 --> 00:47:26,679 Yes, we have a question from the 1470 00:47:26,680 --> 00:47:28,869 internets about the 1471 00:47:28,870 --> 00:47:30,729 referring to the privacy bill that the 1472 00:47:30,730 --> 00:47:31,870 CIA has drafted. 1473 00:47:33,730 --> 00:47:35,949 So someone's asking, does 1474 00:47:35,950 --> 00:47:37,749 the bill communicate information that 1475 00:47:37,750 --> 00:47:39,489 could be understood by the general 1476 00:47:39,490 --> 00:47:41,559 public, not 1477 00:47:41,560 --> 00:47:43,509 necessarily educated? 1478 00:47:43,510 --> 00:47:45,399 If it were debated in parliament? 1479 00:47:47,630 --> 00:47:49,699 So I can you repeat the last point, so if 1480 00:47:49,700 --> 00:47:51,499 the bill was debated in parliament, would 1481 00:47:51,500 --> 00:47:52,940 that would that what 1482 00:47:54,230 --> 00:47:56,299 I do is I decide the question? 1483 00:47:56,300 --> 00:47:57,300 OK? 1484 00:47:58,100 --> 00:48:00,349 So does the privacy bill 1485 00:48:00,350 --> 00:48:02,179 that C.O.s has drafted to communicate 1486 00:48:02,180 --> 00:48:04,249 information that could be on a suit by 1487 00:48:04,250 --> 00:48:06,499 the common man if it were a debate 1488 00:48:06,500 --> 00:48:08,599 in parliament? So Kamerman not 1489 00:48:08,600 --> 00:48:10,789 necessarily having been educated. 1490 00:48:12,240 --> 00:48:14,069 Hopefully, yes, hopefully. 1491 00:48:14,070 --> 00:48:15,449 So essentially what this bill, I mean, I 1492 00:48:15,450 --> 00:48:16,919 haven't personally drafted this bill has 1493 00:48:16,920 --> 00:48:19,779 been drafted by my lawyer colleague. 1494 00:48:19,780 --> 00:48:21,269 This is what this bill does, is that it 1495 00:48:21,270 --> 00:48:23,459 regulates data protection so that 1496 00:48:23,460 --> 00:48:26,039 data protection covers all data collected 1497 00:48:26,040 --> 00:48:28,139 and stored through the interception of 1498 00:48:28,140 --> 00:48:30,299 communications or whatever 1499 00:48:30,300 --> 00:48:32,609 this. This involves basically that 1500 00:48:32,610 --> 00:48:33,599 data might be collected, you know, 1501 00:48:33,600 --> 00:48:35,759 through companies data which may be 1502 00:48:35,760 --> 00:48:37,589 collected through schemes and nearly all 1503 00:48:37,590 --> 00:48:39,110 types of data. So it regulates it. 1504 00:48:40,260 --> 00:48:41,969 And then on top of that, what does is 1505 00:48:41,970 --> 00:48:43,259 regulate surveillance. 1506 00:48:43,260 --> 00:48:45,329 So by regulating surveillance and by 1507 00:48:45,330 --> 00:48:46,979 regulating data protection, essentially 1508 00:48:46,980 --> 00:48:49,199 that way, it kind of tries to, 1509 00:48:49,200 --> 00:48:51,479 you know, protects data which, you know, 1510 00:48:51,480 --> 00:48:52,799 which is harvested by the government, 1511 00:48:52,800 --> 00:48:54,899 even data collected by 1512 00:48:54,900 --> 00:48:57,179 citizens who you know, 1513 00:48:57,180 --> 00:48:59,129 are the least affected by it or not. 1514 00:48:59,130 --> 00:49:02,069 So for example, like I mentioned before, 1515 00:49:02,070 --> 00:49:04,169 the u8e scheme mainly affects the poor in 1516 00:49:04,170 --> 00:49:06,089 India because they're the ones who are 1517 00:49:06,090 --> 00:49:08,159 the most likely to register because 1518 00:49:08,160 --> 00:49:09,509 they're the ones who have to get access 1519 00:49:09,510 --> 00:49:11,699 to BPL catch up programs, right? 1520 00:49:11,700 --> 00:49:14,039 So by doing so, their data is vulnerable. 1521 00:49:14,040 --> 00:49:15,629 But through this bill, where we aim to do 1522 00:49:15,630 --> 00:49:17,069 is protect. This type of data is 1523 00:49:17,070 --> 00:49:19,859 collected to ensure that in every case, 1524 00:49:19,860 --> 00:49:22,079 in every case, it's very clear legally 1525 00:49:22,080 --> 00:49:23,939 who has access to the data under what 1526 00:49:23,940 --> 00:49:26,039 conditions the data is 1527 00:49:26,040 --> 00:49:28,139 disclosed and if so, why and how and 1528 00:49:28,140 --> 00:49:30,869 so on who it is shared with, 1529 00:49:30,870 --> 00:49:32,579 how long it's retained for and all other 1530 00:49:32,580 --> 00:49:33,899 questions revolving around it. 1531 00:49:33,900 --> 00:49:36,029 So this bill is not very specific to 1532 00:49:36,030 --> 00:49:37,619 specific types of data, but it covers 1533 00:49:37,620 --> 00:49:39,179 data protection in general and it 1534 00:49:39,180 --> 00:49:40,979 regulates surveillance and the disruption 1535 00:49:40,980 --> 00:49:42,299 of communications in general. 1536 00:49:42,300 --> 00:49:43,919 And it also establishes a privacy 1537 00:49:43,920 --> 00:49:45,569 commission which is responsible for 1538 00:49:45,570 --> 00:49:47,250 ensuring that data actually is protected. 1539 00:49:48,480 --> 00:49:50,699 But yeah, sure, there obviously this 1540 00:49:50,700 --> 00:49:53,609 law, this bill, obviously as imperfect. 1541 00:49:53,610 --> 00:49:55,679 I'm sure you can find lots of space for 1542 00:49:55,680 --> 00:49:57,569 a lot of criticism, and I'm sure there 1543 00:49:57,570 --> 00:49:58,649 might be loopholes. 1544 00:49:58,650 --> 00:50:00,779 It's very hard to create a perfect 1545 00:50:00,780 --> 00:50:02,400 bill, especially because 1546 00:50:03,570 --> 00:50:05,279 the person we have is that we're we've 1547 00:50:05,280 --> 00:50:07,229 been discussing this bill in roundtable 1548 00:50:07,230 --> 00:50:08,939 meetings with multiple stakeholders. 1549 00:50:08,940 --> 00:50:10,529 So we've actually had a lot of people 1550 00:50:10,530 --> 00:50:12,839 from the industry attending these talks, 1551 00:50:12,840 --> 00:50:14,219 and they've really tried to influence our 1552 00:50:14,220 --> 00:50:16,229 bill in the sense that what they have 1553 00:50:16,230 --> 00:50:18,299 been arguing is that, hey, if 1554 00:50:18,300 --> 00:50:20,489 individuals choose to give up their data 1555 00:50:20,490 --> 00:50:22,889 to our services, that obviously 1556 00:50:22,890 --> 00:50:24,359 means, you know, that they trust us with 1557 00:50:24,360 --> 00:50:26,549 their data. So that way, you know, 1558 00:50:26,550 --> 00:50:27,929 we're obviously getting their consent so 1559 00:50:27,930 --> 00:50:29,399 we don't have to ask for their consent in 1560 00:50:29,400 --> 00:50:31,619 other way, which I say, no, that 1561 00:50:31,620 --> 00:50:33,359 should not be the case. You should always 1562 00:50:33,360 --> 00:50:35,669 gain individual consent prior to handling 1563 00:50:35,670 --> 00:50:37,979 their data in any in any way. 1564 00:50:37,980 --> 00:50:40,259 But it's difficult because the thing is, 1565 00:50:40,260 --> 00:50:42,299 in order to actually implement the bill, 1566 00:50:42,300 --> 00:50:44,609 we have to discuss it with 1567 00:50:44,610 --> 00:50:46,169 a lot of stakeholders from the industry, 1568 00:50:46,170 --> 00:50:47,579 from the government and so on, because we 1569 00:50:47,580 --> 00:50:48,839 need them to support the bill so that it 1570 00:50:48,840 --> 00:50:51,179 can be, you know, implemented at all, 1571 00:50:51,180 --> 00:50:52,709 ever, you know. 1572 00:50:52,710 --> 00:50:54,389 But at the same time, there are trying to 1573 00:50:54,390 --> 00:50:55,589 influence in a way which is not very 1574 00:50:55,590 --> 00:50:56,759 privacy friendly. 1575 00:50:56,760 --> 00:50:57,809 We're getting there. We're still 1576 00:50:57,810 --> 00:51:00,389 discussing the bill. And if you like, 1577 00:51:00,390 --> 00:51:02,009 I can email it to you and you can have a 1578 00:51:02,010 --> 00:51:03,749 look. I'm not sure if that covered your 1579 00:51:03,750 --> 00:51:04,750 question, though. 1580 00:51:05,700 --> 00:51:07,949 OK, yeah. I think we're out of time 1581 00:51:07,950 --> 00:51:10,049 right now. So if you still have any 1582 00:51:10,050 --> 00:51:11,879 questions, I see you standing there and 1583 00:51:11,880 --> 00:51:14,009 over there, I think you will be able 1584 00:51:14,010 --> 00:51:15,679 to answer them on stage. 1585 00:51:15,680 --> 00:51:17,039 Yeah, of course. If you have any other 1586 00:51:17,040 --> 00:51:18,299 questions, come find me. 1587 00:51:18,300 --> 00:51:20,519 I'm happy to answer and to discuss and 1588 00:51:20,520 --> 00:51:21,779 analyze anything you like. 1589 00:51:21,780 --> 00:51:22,889 Great. Thank you very much.