0 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:30,000 Dear viewer, these subtitles were generated by a machine via the service Trint and therefore are (very) buggy. If you are capable, please help us to create good quality subtitles: https://c3subtitles.de/talk/213 Thanks! 1 00:00:12,760 --> 00:00:14,709 Can you hear me OK? 2 00:00:14,710 --> 00:00:15,669 Cool. 3 00:00:15,670 --> 00:00:17,409 Such a lovely, sunny day outside, it's a 4 00:00:17,410 --> 00:00:18,519 shame you have to listen. 5 00:00:18,520 --> 00:00:20,739 Listen to me sitting in here, but 6 00:00:20,740 --> 00:00:22,539 thank you for coming. 7 00:00:22,540 --> 00:00:24,759 My name is Constable Srikkanth. 8 00:00:24,760 --> 00:00:26,979 Also sometimes referred to as Hound Me. 9 00:00:28,240 --> 00:00:29,529 I work for an organization called 10 00:00:29,530 --> 00:00:31,959 Tactical Tech and, 11 00:00:31,960 --> 00:00:33,069 among other things, 12 00:00:34,270 --> 00:00:35,799 Tactical Tech works 13 00:00:37,030 --> 00:00:39,579 in helping rights activists 14 00:00:39,580 --> 00:00:41,739 and journalists understand their security 15 00:00:41,740 --> 00:00:43,419 and privacy risks. 16 00:00:43,420 --> 00:00:45,009 We have a table outside of the noisy 17 00:00:45,010 --> 00:00:46,749 square. I encourage you to come talk to 18 00:00:46,750 --> 00:00:49,359 us and look at some of our resources, 19 00:00:49,360 --> 00:00:51,369 especially if you want to help your 20 00:00:51,370 --> 00:00:53,559 non-technical friends understand how 21 00:00:53,560 --> 00:00:55,719 they can protect their 22 00:00:55,720 --> 00:00:57,100 communications and data. 23 00:00:58,240 --> 00:01:00,219 Today, however, I'm not here to talk 24 00:01:00,220 --> 00:01:02,260 about my work at Tactical Tech, 25 00:01:03,310 --> 00:01:05,559 but talk to you about 26 00:01:05,560 --> 00:01:07,329 something I've been thinking about 27 00:01:07,330 --> 00:01:09,819 observing, analyzing 28 00:01:09,820 --> 00:01:11,289 and researching for the last little 29 00:01:11,290 --> 00:01:12,290 while. 30 00:01:13,540 --> 00:01:15,789 So the government of India over 31 00:01:15,790 --> 00:01:17,289 the last few years, the government of the 32 00:01:17,290 --> 00:01:19,449 country, I grew up in 33 00:01:19,450 --> 00:01:21,249 the government of the country I've spent 34 00:01:21,250 --> 00:01:23,559 most of my life in has made a series 35 00:01:23,560 --> 00:01:24,560 of decisions, 36 00:01:25,720 --> 00:01:27,700 a series of decisions which 37 00:01:29,290 --> 00:01:31,629 have taken a form of several databases 38 00:01:31,630 --> 00:01:34,329 and schemes they've implemented 39 00:01:34,330 --> 00:01:37,029 to collect, analyze, 40 00:01:37,030 --> 00:01:38,030 monitor 41 00:01:39,130 --> 00:01:41,379 and intercept 42 00:01:41,380 --> 00:01:42,970 our personal information. 43 00:01:44,830 --> 00:01:46,540 And I've been thinking about how 44 00:01:47,650 --> 00:01:50,589 this affects a democracy 45 00:01:50,590 --> 00:01:52,839 as large as India and what 46 00:01:52,840 --> 00:01:54,609 kind of implications this has on our 47 00:01:54,610 --> 00:01:55,749 personal liberties. 48 00:01:57,540 --> 00:01:59,669 So I'm going to share some of 49 00:01:59,670 --> 00:02:02,219 my observations with you today and 50 00:02:02,220 --> 00:02:04,769 some of the questions I have. 51 00:02:04,770 --> 00:02:07,319 And with a little bit of help, 52 00:02:07,320 --> 00:02:09,388 hopefully from you. 53 00:02:09,389 --> 00:02:12,719 Try and find answers to these questions. 54 00:02:12,720 --> 00:02:14,609 Before I continue, I have to. 55 00:02:14,610 --> 00:02:16,859 I should thank Maria from Center 56 00:02:16,860 --> 00:02:18,119 for Internet and Society, who did a 57 00:02:18,120 --> 00:02:20,579 brilliant talk yesterday 58 00:02:20,580 --> 00:02:22,739 about the state of surveillance in 59 00:02:22,740 --> 00:02:24,749 India at the moment. 60 00:02:24,750 --> 00:02:26,849 She's going to be a tough act to 61 00:02:26,850 --> 00:02:29,069 follow and but I hope to add 62 00:02:29,070 --> 00:02:31,319 some more value to the conversation 63 00:02:31,320 --> 00:02:32,339 she started yesterday. 64 00:02:34,930 --> 00:02:35,930 So there's this. 65 00:02:38,750 --> 00:02:41,599 There's a there's a lot of dialog around 66 00:02:41,600 --> 00:02:43,939 privacy that we all talk 67 00:02:43,940 --> 00:02:46,159 about all over the place today, 68 00:02:46,160 --> 00:02:48,769 and there's a specific dialog 69 00:02:48,770 --> 00:02:50,959 in India around the 70 00:02:50,960 --> 00:02:53,119 whole concept of privacy and what 71 00:02:53,120 --> 00:02:54,769 that means in the Indian context. 72 00:02:56,030 --> 00:02:58,909 There is also this 73 00:02:58,910 --> 00:03:01,039 notion that there is a lack 74 00:03:01,040 --> 00:03:03,259 of enthusiasm around privacy 75 00:03:03,260 --> 00:03:04,260 in India. 76 00:03:05,580 --> 00:03:07,529 And why is that? 77 00:03:07,530 --> 00:03:09,929 Is it because the the 78 00:03:09,930 --> 00:03:11,819 social values around privacy are 79 00:03:11,820 --> 00:03:14,429 different in a country like India 80 00:03:14,430 --> 00:03:15,930 when you compare it to the West? 81 00:03:17,580 --> 00:03:19,769 Or is it that Indians don't 82 00:03:19,770 --> 00:03:21,180 care about privacy at all? 83 00:03:22,900 --> 00:03:26,169 Also, the fact that there's 84 00:03:26,170 --> 00:03:29,739 a very large, very diverse population 85 00:03:29,740 --> 00:03:31,989 of about 1.2 billion people 86 00:03:31,990 --> 00:03:34,149 living in that country 87 00:03:34,150 --> 00:03:36,519 means the country has a 88 00:03:36,520 --> 00:03:37,959 very diverse set of problems. 89 00:03:39,010 --> 00:03:40,479 People say if we don't really need to 90 00:03:40,480 --> 00:03:42,279 care about privacy because we have larger 91 00:03:42,280 --> 00:03:44,920 problems such as poverty and corruption. 92 00:03:46,230 --> 00:03:48,389 That we need to solve, 93 00:03:48,390 --> 00:03:49,440 and therefore. 94 00:03:50,740 --> 00:03:52,929 A lot of schemes that 95 00:03:52,930 --> 00:03:55,929 have been implemented 96 00:03:55,930 --> 00:03:58,359 to either solve problems of corruption 97 00:03:58,360 --> 00:04:01,509 and poverty or combat terrorism 98 00:04:01,510 --> 00:04:02,559 are justified. 99 00:04:02,560 --> 00:04:04,479 That's what the Indian government has 100 00:04:04,480 --> 00:04:05,650 been saying for a little while. 101 00:04:08,800 --> 00:04:11,499 What I think about this is 102 00:04:11,500 --> 00:04:13,599 surveilling a large states such as 103 00:04:13,600 --> 00:04:15,699 this or surveilling any state and its 104 00:04:15,700 --> 00:04:16,700 citizens. 105 00:04:17,560 --> 00:04:20,018 Is it is 106 00:04:20,019 --> 00:04:21,019 an extremely. 107 00:04:23,220 --> 00:04:25,319 Totalitarian concept, 108 00:04:25,320 --> 00:04:27,809 it has led to totalitarian regimes 109 00:04:27,810 --> 00:04:30,389 in the past, and historically 110 00:04:30,390 --> 00:04:32,730 we know that. 111 00:04:35,840 --> 00:04:37,999 Well, building massive databases of 112 00:04:38,000 --> 00:04:40,219 citizens personal data 113 00:04:40,220 --> 00:04:42,589 has usually led to 114 00:04:42,590 --> 00:04:44,329 limiting our personal freedoms. 115 00:04:46,160 --> 00:04:47,160 So why is it? 116 00:04:49,020 --> 00:04:51,389 After we've debated this and 117 00:04:51,390 --> 00:04:54,059 spoken about this for so long now 118 00:04:54,060 --> 00:04:56,429 that one of the world's 119 00:04:56,430 --> 00:04:58,349 largest democracy when it comes to the 120 00:04:58,350 --> 00:04:59,759 number of people who live there, is 121 00:04:59,760 --> 00:05:01,589 adopting this totalitarian idea. 122 00:05:02,790 --> 00:05:04,859 And what is their justification to 123 00:05:04,860 --> 00:05:05,860 do this? 124 00:05:07,050 --> 00:05:09,149 This is an old argument, we all know 125 00:05:10,230 --> 00:05:12,359 the argument that a lot of 126 00:05:12,360 --> 00:05:15,089 states use around national security, 127 00:05:15,090 --> 00:05:16,859 like if you don't give up your personal 128 00:05:16,860 --> 00:05:18,989 information, the state is not going to be 129 00:05:18,990 --> 00:05:21,209 able to give you welfare 130 00:05:21,210 --> 00:05:22,230 or protect you. 131 00:05:24,910 --> 00:05:27,039 There's also this 132 00:05:27,040 --> 00:05:29,049 argument is flawed, because there just is 133 00:05:29,050 --> 00:05:30,759 we know historically there isn't enough 134 00:05:30,760 --> 00:05:32,979 evidence to actually prove 135 00:05:32,980 --> 00:05:34,029 that this works. 136 00:05:35,500 --> 00:05:36,549 This is not something I'm going to get 137 00:05:36,550 --> 00:05:37,449 into a lot. 138 00:05:37,450 --> 00:05:38,409 This is a conversation. 139 00:05:38,410 --> 00:05:40,689 We've had a lot over the last four 140 00:05:40,690 --> 00:05:42,819 days and there are there are people 141 00:05:42,820 --> 00:05:44,769 who can probably have this discussion 142 00:05:44,770 --> 00:05:46,599 better than I can. 143 00:05:46,600 --> 00:05:48,189 I'm going to talk about the Indian 144 00:05:48,190 --> 00:05:49,420 context a little more. 145 00:05:53,100 --> 00:05:54,599 About the notion that Indians don't care 146 00:05:54,600 --> 00:05:55,600 about privacy. 147 00:05:58,260 --> 00:06:00,599 Simon Davies said 148 00:06:00,600 --> 00:06:02,609 this a little while ago, says the Indian 149 00:06:02,610 --> 00:06:04,799 train syndrome in which total 150 00:06:04,800 --> 00:06:06,659 strangers will disclose their lives on a 151 00:06:06,660 --> 00:06:08,969 train to complete strangers. 152 00:06:08,970 --> 00:06:09,970 And this is true. 153 00:06:11,490 --> 00:06:13,649 It's very commonplace for me 154 00:06:13,650 --> 00:06:15,749 to be in a situation in 155 00:06:15,750 --> 00:06:17,999 and in many places and many 156 00:06:18,000 --> 00:06:20,249 environments in India, where I 157 00:06:20,250 --> 00:06:22,379 am asked very personal questions such 158 00:06:22,380 --> 00:06:23,380 as. 159 00:06:24,620 --> 00:06:26,779 How many children I have or how 160 00:06:26,780 --> 00:06:28,879 much money do I make, or if 161 00:06:28,880 --> 00:06:31,519 I am, if I don't have children by, 162 00:06:31,520 --> 00:06:33,229 when am I going to have them? 163 00:06:33,230 --> 00:06:35,299 And and I'm used to this question 164 00:06:35,300 --> 00:06:36,300 and sometimes I. 165 00:06:37,660 --> 00:06:39,819 Avoid answering them, sometimes I 166 00:06:39,820 --> 00:06:41,619 answer them and I get into a debate about 167 00:06:41,620 --> 00:06:43,149 them, but it is also very commonplace for 168 00:06:43,150 --> 00:06:44,469 people to actually give out this 169 00:06:44,470 --> 00:06:46,719 information very 170 00:06:46,720 --> 00:06:47,720 readily. 171 00:06:48,430 --> 00:06:50,289 But does that mean that people don't care 172 00:06:50,290 --> 00:06:52,509 about privacy in India now going back 173 00:06:52,510 --> 00:06:54,699 to this, the Indian 174 00:06:54,700 --> 00:06:56,769 train syndrome, when there is 175 00:06:56,770 --> 00:06:58,389 a lot of personal information exchanged 176 00:06:58,390 --> 00:07:00,459 very readily in a train, if 177 00:07:00,460 --> 00:07:02,619 you're traveling with a few strangers at 178 00:07:02,620 --> 00:07:04,719 the end of that exchange, if you're 179 00:07:04,720 --> 00:07:07,119 sending email addresses, people usually 180 00:07:07,120 --> 00:07:08,980 don't hand out their passwords also. 181 00:07:10,640 --> 00:07:12,439 So, yeah, there are things people think 182 00:07:12,440 --> 00:07:14,269 about when it comes to privacy, it's 183 00:07:14,270 --> 00:07:15,270 just. 184 00:07:16,030 --> 00:07:18,099 I think it's just sort of slightly 185 00:07:18,100 --> 00:07:20,709 differently considering 186 00:07:20,710 --> 00:07:22,449 how diverse the context is that. 187 00:07:24,390 --> 00:07:26,909 There is a study that department 188 00:07:26,910 --> 00:07:29,069 called recog at the in the Western 189 00:07:29,070 --> 00:07:30,719 seat of information technology in Delhi 190 00:07:30,720 --> 00:07:32,789 did. This is, of course, based on 191 00:07:32,790 --> 00:07:34,970 sample data. This is so 192 00:07:36,510 --> 00:07:37,589 yeah, keep that in mind. 193 00:07:37,590 --> 00:07:39,929 But what the research 194 00:07:39,930 --> 00:07:42,119 shows that about 46 percent of 195 00:07:42,120 --> 00:07:45,239 the people who participate in this survey 196 00:07:45,240 --> 00:07:47,309 read the privacy policies and 197 00:07:47,310 --> 00:07:49,109 the terms of conditions while signing up 198 00:07:49,110 --> 00:07:51,949 with services online. 199 00:07:51,950 --> 00:07:54,349 It also showed that about 63 percent 200 00:07:54,350 --> 00:07:56,509 of the participants when they 201 00:07:56,510 --> 00:07:58,249 get onto Facebook or another social 202 00:07:58,250 --> 00:08:00,409 network, change the default 203 00:08:00,410 --> 00:08:01,410 privacy settings. 204 00:08:03,540 --> 00:08:05,789 And 70, almost 72 percent people 205 00:08:05,790 --> 00:08:08,129 mentioned deleting their personal 206 00:08:08,130 --> 00:08:09,959 data from their cell phones before they 207 00:08:09,960 --> 00:08:10,960 sell it. 208 00:08:13,540 --> 00:08:15,489 So people are clearly thinking about 209 00:08:15,490 --> 00:08:17,559 privacy, especially when it comes to the 210 00:08:17,560 --> 00:08:19,749 digital, when it comes to how we interact 211 00:08:19,750 --> 00:08:21,849 with digital technology and how 212 00:08:21,850 --> 00:08:24,999 we share and access information 213 00:08:25,000 --> 00:08:26,000 online. 214 00:08:26,710 --> 00:08:28,089 So yes, I think we do care, 215 00:08:29,470 --> 00:08:31,839 especially when it comes to our digital 216 00:08:32,890 --> 00:08:33,890 privacy. 217 00:08:35,780 --> 00:08:37,129 Let's just quickly think what is this 218 00:08:37,130 --> 00:08:38,239 thing called privacy anyway? 219 00:08:38,240 --> 00:08:40,308 It's it's it's a it's a it's talked about 220 00:08:40,309 --> 00:08:41,389 differently in different ways. 221 00:08:41,390 --> 00:08:42,918 I'm just going to look at what kind of 222 00:08:42,919 --> 00:08:45,139 what kind of personal freedoms. 223 00:08:45,140 --> 00:08:47,209 Does the law give us 224 00:08:47,210 --> 00:08:48,210 or. 225 00:08:50,810 --> 00:08:52,879 And what 226 00:08:52,880 --> 00:08:56,029 that means to our personal 227 00:08:56,030 --> 00:08:58,340 civil liberties in the digital context. 228 00:08:59,540 --> 00:09:00,540 But to start with. 229 00:09:02,160 --> 00:09:04,469 The Black Clothes Dictionary says 230 00:09:04,470 --> 00:09:06,299 privacy is basically the right to be left 231 00:09:06,300 --> 00:09:08,069 alone, the right of a person to be free 232 00:09:08,070 --> 00:09:09,719 from unwanted publicity. 233 00:09:09,720 --> 00:09:11,369 The right to live without unwarranted 234 00:09:11,370 --> 00:09:13,379 interference by the public in matters 235 00:09:13,380 --> 00:09:15,269 with face. The public is not necessarily 236 00:09:15,270 --> 00:09:16,270 concerned. 237 00:09:17,760 --> 00:09:19,319 And do we have any rights that actually 238 00:09:19,320 --> 00:09:20,460 give us these liberties? 239 00:09:21,510 --> 00:09:23,189 This is what the Universal Declaration of 240 00:09:23,190 --> 00:09:24,899 Human Rights says no one shall be 241 00:09:24,900 --> 00:09:27,329 subjected to arbitrary interference with 242 00:09:27,330 --> 00:09:28,889 his privacy, family, home or 243 00:09:28,890 --> 00:09:31,259 correspondence, nor to attacks upon 244 00:09:31,260 --> 00:09:32,879 his honor and reputation. 245 00:09:32,880 --> 00:09:34,709 Everyone has the right to protection of 246 00:09:34,710 --> 00:09:36,749 the law against such interference or 247 00:09:36,750 --> 00:09:37,750 attacks. 248 00:09:39,080 --> 00:09:41,839 Now, back home in the Indian context, 249 00:09:41,840 --> 00:09:43,489 the Constitution of India, this is one of 250 00:09:43,490 --> 00:09:45,439 the most basic fundamental rights defined 251 00:09:45,440 --> 00:09:47,779 in the Constitution of India, where 252 00:09:47,780 --> 00:09:50,269 the Article 21 of the Constitution says 253 00:09:50,270 --> 00:09:52,609 no person, no person shall be deprived 254 00:09:52,610 --> 00:09:54,769 of his life or personal liberty, except 255 00:09:54,770 --> 00:09:56,359 according to procedure established by 256 00:09:56,360 --> 00:09:57,360 law. 257 00:09:58,670 --> 00:09:59,690 And what are the laws? 258 00:10:00,830 --> 00:10:03,019 Also, let's before we talk about 259 00:10:03,020 --> 00:10:05,239 the laws that govern telecommunications 260 00:10:05,240 --> 00:10:07,639 and digital freedoms in the country. 261 00:10:07,640 --> 00:10:08,999 Let's also look at one more thing which 262 00:10:09,000 --> 00:10:10,789 says no person accused of any offense 263 00:10:10,790 --> 00:10:12,379 shall be compelled to be a witness 264 00:10:12,380 --> 00:10:14,509 against himself, which 265 00:10:14,510 --> 00:10:17,059 means I have the right 266 00:10:17,060 --> 00:10:19,729 to not give away any information 267 00:10:19,730 --> 00:10:21,199 that is personal to me. 268 00:10:21,200 --> 00:10:23,149 Unless I have. 269 00:10:23,150 --> 00:10:25,159 I am being investigated for an offense 270 00:10:25,160 --> 00:10:26,719 that is the right to silence, which is 271 00:10:26,720 --> 00:10:28,879 again defined in the 272 00:10:28,880 --> 00:10:29,880 Constitution of India. 273 00:10:31,130 --> 00:10:32,959 The law that mandates a lot of 274 00:10:32,960 --> 00:10:34,969 telecommunications, how telecommunication 275 00:10:34,970 --> 00:10:36,709 and telecommunications are governed in 276 00:10:36,710 --> 00:10:38,839 the country is a very old article. 277 00:10:38,840 --> 00:10:39,959 The Indian Telegraph Act. 278 00:10:39,960 --> 00:10:42,559 It dates back to the date, back to 1885. 279 00:10:44,320 --> 00:10:46,419 What it says is that you can't 280 00:10:46,420 --> 00:10:48,999 actually intercepted communications 281 00:10:49,000 --> 00:10:51,309 unless it's a matter of public safety 282 00:10:51,310 --> 00:10:53,559 or public or if it's a public 283 00:10:53,560 --> 00:10:54,560 emergency. 284 00:10:56,520 --> 00:10:58,589 Let me take you back to the year 285 00:10:58,590 --> 00:11:00,479 2008 for a second. 286 00:11:00,480 --> 00:11:02,549 2008 was an extremely 287 00:11:02,550 --> 00:11:05,339 important year for a lot of us in India. 288 00:11:05,340 --> 00:11:07,230 There were two landmark events 289 00:11:08,280 --> 00:11:10,379 that really 290 00:11:10,380 --> 00:11:13,589 define how we think about or understand 291 00:11:13,590 --> 00:11:15,719 digital freedoms in the country and 292 00:11:15,720 --> 00:11:17,909 how the government has been making 293 00:11:17,910 --> 00:11:20,249 these decisions that impact 294 00:11:20,250 --> 00:11:21,450 these freedoms today. 295 00:11:23,500 --> 00:11:25,749 There was one event 296 00:11:25,750 --> 00:11:28,779 which was horrifying. 297 00:11:28,780 --> 00:11:31,659 It deeply shocked and saddened 298 00:11:31,660 --> 00:11:32,799 all of us. 299 00:11:32,800 --> 00:11:35,379 This was the terror attacks of the 26th 300 00:11:35,380 --> 00:11:38,379 of November, 25th of November 2008 301 00:11:38,380 --> 00:11:40,119 in the city of Mumbai. 302 00:11:40,120 --> 00:11:42,519 This attack is commonly also 303 00:11:42,520 --> 00:11:44,290 called India's 911. 304 00:11:45,760 --> 00:11:48,129 The second event 305 00:11:48,130 --> 00:11:50,499 that also saddens me personally 306 00:11:50,500 --> 00:11:52,719 and a lot of us is the fact that 307 00:11:52,720 --> 00:11:54,759 there was an amendment to the Information 308 00:11:54,760 --> 00:11:56,919 Technology Act called the Idi 309 00:11:56,920 --> 00:11:58,960 Amin Amendment Act of 2008. 310 00:12:00,470 --> 00:12:02,629 Which essentially now 311 00:12:02,630 --> 00:12:05,389 gives the government complete 312 00:12:05,390 --> 00:12:07,489 control over intercepting 313 00:12:07,490 --> 00:12:09,559 your communications without the need 314 00:12:09,560 --> 00:12:11,629 of a court order or a 315 00:12:11,630 --> 00:12:12,630 warrant. 316 00:12:14,140 --> 00:12:15,939 There's a couple of things that Typekit 317 00:12:15,940 --> 00:12:18,399 removed from what the Telegraph 318 00:12:18,400 --> 00:12:20,140 Act had. 319 00:12:22,190 --> 00:12:23,779 Now, the Indian government does not 320 00:12:25,070 --> 00:12:27,229 just intercept 321 00:12:27,230 --> 00:12:29,239 your communication if it's a matter of 322 00:12:29,240 --> 00:12:31,279 public safety or public emergency. 323 00:12:31,280 --> 00:12:32,570 They can come after you 324 00:12:35,060 --> 00:12:36,859 under the pretense of investigating any 325 00:12:36,860 --> 00:12:37,860 offense. 326 00:12:40,640 --> 00:12:41,949 I'm going to talk about some recent 327 00:12:41,950 --> 00:12:44,529 developments, some of the schemes 328 00:12:44,530 --> 00:12:45,530 and. 329 00:12:47,010 --> 00:12:49,289 Systems that I just started talking 330 00:12:49,290 --> 00:12:50,729 about, that the Indian government has 331 00:12:50,730 --> 00:12:51,730 been establishing. 332 00:12:53,570 --> 00:12:54,570 A few years ago, 333 00:12:56,690 --> 00:12:58,999 the government decided to build 334 00:12:59,000 --> 00:13:01,489 a massive database of 335 00:13:01,490 --> 00:13:02,900 citizens personal data. 336 00:13:04,840 --> 00:13:07,150 And store it centrally 337 00:13:08,890 --> 00:13:11,709 and set out on a low 338 00:13:11,710 --> 00:13:13,060 set out on collecting 339 00:13:14,890 --> 00:13:16,000 data about. 340 00:13:18,050 --> 00:13:20,209 A citizen, including their biometric 341 00:13:20,210 --> 00:13:22,249 information, they said of something 342 00:13:22,250 --> 00:13:24,499 called the National Population Register, 343 00:13:24,500 --> 00:13:26,989 which was 344 00:13:26,990 --> 00:13:29,629 supposed to be launched with the census. 345 00:13:29,630 --> 00:13:32,179 And what this was going to do is collect 346 00:13:32,180 --> 00:13:34,999 13 categories of demographic information 347 00:13:35,000 --> 00:13:37,249 of every Indian resident, 348 00:13:37,250 --> 00:13:39,439 every resident in India, and also 349 00:13:39,440 --> 00:13:41,089 three categories of biometric data 350 00:13:41,090 --> 00:13:43,489 collected collected from all residents 351 00:13:43,490 --> 00:13:45,710 aged over five in about. 352 00:13:46,770 --> 00:13:49,109 And the DNPR signing over the NPR 353 00:13:49,110 --> 00:13:51,299 was mandatory, so you had to give up 354 00:13:51,300 --> 00:13:52,620 this personal data. 355 00:13:54,110 --> 00:13:56,119 What they did not have anything in 356 00:13:56,120 --> 00:13:57,289 writing about was. 357 00:13:59,660 --> 00:14:01,159 But the collection of your biometric 358 00:14:01,160 --> 00:14:04,009 data, your fingerprints, your iris scans, 359 00:14:04,010 --> 00:14:05,209 they do not define this, but they went 360 00:14:05,210 --> 00:14:06,919 out and said they wanted to go ahead and 361 00:14:06,920 --> 00:14:08,059 start doing this anyway. 362 00:14:09,580 --> 00:14:11,289 The primary objective of the National 363 00:14:11,290 --> 00:14:13,209 Population Register was to assist in 364 00:14:13,210 --> 00:14:15,459 improving security by checking for 365 00:14:15,460 --> 00:14:17,919 illegal immigration, illegal migration. 366 00:14:19,150 --> 00:14:21,129 They also had a few secondary objectives. 367 00:14:21,130 --> 00:14:22,899 Now these are find extremely vague. 368 00:14:22,900 --> 00:14:24,489 They don't they don't really have any 369 00:14:24,490 --> 00:14:25,809 clear definitions. 370 00:14:25,810 --> 00:14:27,519 They say, Oh, we're going to provide 371 00:14:27,520 --> 00:14:29,799 services under several government 372 00:14:29,800 --> 00:14:32,079 schemes and programs using the NPI. 373 00:14:32,080 --> 00:14:33,669 This will also help us pay for identity 374 00:14:33,670 --> 00:14:35,469 fraud, and it'll help us improve 375 00:14:35,470 --> 00:14:36,470 planning. 376 00:14:37,780 --> 00:14:39,489 We don't know how they intend to do all 377 00:14:39,490 --> 00:14:41,049 of these things using that data, that 378 00:14:41,050 --> 00:14:43,359 isn't really not much information that 379 00:14:43,360 --> 00:14:45,489 has been disclosed about how this 380 00:14:45,490 --> 00:14:46,690 data is going to be used. 381 00:14:48,770 --> 00:14:51,349 Another interesting project, which 382 00:14:51,350 --> 00:14:53,659 has been the subject 383 00:14:53,660 --> 00:14:55,819 of much debate and controversy 384 00:14:55,820 --> 00:14:57,979 and a lot of conversations and dialog 385 00:14:57,980 --> 00:15:00,320 around is what 386 00:15:01,370 --> 00:15:03,169 the Indian government set up as a part of 387 00:15:03,170 --> 00:15:04,590 the Planning Commission 388 00:15:07,480 --> 00:15:09,559 and as a part 389 00:15:09,560 --> 00:15:10,969 of planning. The Planning Commission's 390 00:15:10,970 --> 00:15:13,039 initiative, called the UIDAI, which 391 00:15:13,040 --> 00:15:15,529 is the Unique Identification Authority 392 00:15:15,530 --> 00:15:17,569 of India, is something called a unique 393 00:15:17,570 --> 00:15:19,069 identification project. 394 00:15:19,070 --> 00:15:21,589 Also very commonly known as the ADHA 395 00:15:21,590 --> 00:15:22,590 project, 396 00:15:23,780 --> 00:15:26,029 what the UIDAI intends to do 397 00:15:26,030 --> 00:15:28,249 is provide every citizen in 398 00:15:28,250 --> 00:15:30,619 the country with a unique 12 digit 399 00:15:30,620 --> 00:15:31,620 number. 400 00:15:32,350 --> 00:15:35,199 They also say this is not mandatory. 401 00:15:35,200 --> 00:15:37,299 You only sign up for the UID if 402 00:15:37,300 --> 00:15:38,300 you wish to. 403 00:15:42,840 --> 00:15:45,029 This is the bit that I find extremely 404 00:15:45,030 --> 00:15:47,460 problematic about the unique ID 405 00:15:48,660 --> 00:15:49,660 project. 406 00:15:50,720 --> 00:15:53,089 The UIDAI 407 00:15:53,090 --> 00:15:54,949 has decided that it will collect all this 408 00:15:54,950 --> 00:15:57,169 data, build this massive database. 409 00:15:58,540 --> 00:16:00,159 And stored it all in a centralized 410 00:16:00,160 --> 00:16:01,160 location. 411 00:16:02,350 --> 00:16:04,479 This includes all our personally 412 00:16:04,480 --> 00:16:06,819 identifiable information, which is 413 00:16:06,820 --> 00:16:09,189 my name, my father's name, 414 00:16:09,190 --> 00:16:10,480 my religion, 415 00:16:11,740 --> 00:16:14,019 what I wear, where I live, what 416 00:16:14,020 --> 00:16:16,219 I do, and my fingerprints and 417 00:16:16,220 --> 00:16:18,609 iris scans, all of this stored in one 418 00:16:18,610 --> 00:16:20,019 massive centralized database. 419 00:16:22,510 --> 00:16:24,879 A volunteer of the USDA 420 00:16:24,880 --> 00:16:26,619 said this what is at heart, it's an 421 00:16:26,620 --> 00:16:28,779 unadulterated identity program that 422 00:16:28,780 --> 00:16:31,299 answers one question is the individual 423 00:16:31,300 --> 00:16:32,940 who he or she claims to be? 424 00:16:35,770 --> 00:16:38,109 Now, also remember I said 425 00:16:38,110 --> 00:16:40,059 you were enrollment in the uaed program 426 00:16:40,060 --> 00:16:41,469 is voluntary. 427 00:16:42,800 --> 00:16:43,800 Now, 428 00:16:44,930 --> 00:16:45,980 is that really true? 429 00:16:47,240 --> 00:16:49,459 Because I actually a few days 430 00:16:49,460 --> 00:16:51,559 ago, just before I came to Berlin, 431 00:16:51,560 --> 00:16:54,979 I was in Bangalore and I got an SMS, 432 00:16:54,980 --> 00:16:57,109 which said So we have something called 433 00:16:57,110 --> 00:16:58,250 the Direct Benefits 434 00:17:00,110 --> 00:17:02,299 Scheme in India, which 435 00:17:02,300 --> 00:17:04,249 gives us a lot of subsidies. 436 00:17:04,250 --> 00:17:06,020 And one of the subsidies I get as 437 00:17:07,369 --> 00:17:09,559 being an Indian citizen is subsidies on 438 00:17:09,560 --> 00:17:12,078 the cooking gas we use at home 439 00:17:12,079 --> 00:17:13,220 to cook food every day. 440 00:17:14,300 --> 00:17:16,368 So we we actually get to buy this at 441 00:17:16,369 --> 00:17:18,289 a subsidized rate from the government as 442 00:17:18,290 --> 00:17:20,088 long as we are buying it straight from a 443 00:17:20,089 --> 00:17:21,650 government authorized agency. 444 00:17:24,050 --> 00:17:25,189 So this is a must said. 445 00:17:27,480 --> 00:17:29,549 You have to register before 446 00:17:29,550 --> 00:17:31,829 the end of the year with your ID 447 00:17:31,830 --> 00:17:34,139 number, with the gas agency, otherwise 448 00:17:34,140 --> 00:17:35,579 we're not going to give you these subsidies. 449 00:17:37,660 --> 00:17:39,099 So there are other agencies that are 450 00:17:39,100 --> 00:17:41,199 being that are being 451 00:17:41,200 --> 00:17:43,479 bullied into, except only 452 00:17:43,480 --> 00:17:46,089 providing these services if 453 00:17:46,090 --> 00:17:47,769 a citizen has the U.S. 454 00:17:47,770 --> 00:17:50,379 has a USD number, even 455 00:17:50,380 --> 00:17:52,599 if the UIDAI actually says 456 00:17:52,600 --> 00:17:54,279 this is voluntary. 457 00:17:54,280 --> 00:17:56,319 A lot of other organizations, other 458 00:17:56,320 --> 00:17:57,999 institutions and government authorities 459 00:17:58,000 --> 00:18:00,039 are now making it mandatory for. 460 00:18:01,700 --> 00:18:03,889 A citizen interacting with that 461 00:18:03,890 --> 00:18:05,959 specific agency to provide 462 00:18:05,960 --> 00:18:08,089 a U80 number to avail these services. 463 00:18:09,210 --> 00:18:10,649 The Maharashtra government even said, Oh, 464 00:18:10,650 --> 00:18:11,729 you know, what are we not going to register 465 00:18:11,730 --> 00:18:13,409 any marriages in the country anymore 466 00:18:13,410 --> 00:18:14,640 unless you have a UAD number 467 00:18:15,690 --> 00:18:17,129 so you can actually get married unless 468 00:18:17,130 --> 00:18:19,229 you just have this voluntary number? 469 00:18:20,360 --> 00:18:21,360 And. 470 00:18:21,760 --> 00:18:24,069 And then go to the marriage bureau. 471 00:18:26,660 --> 00:18:28,399 Fortunately, the Supreme Court of India 472 00:18:28,400 --> 00:18:29,400 in September. 473 00:18:31,200 --> 00:18:33,629 Made a ruling which said 474 00:18:33,630 --> 00:18:36,209 that is actually not mandatory. 475 00:18:36,210 --> 00:18:38,430 Now we'll see how that plays out. 476 00:18:41,290 --> 00:18:43,449 So why did it either come into being 477 00:18:43,450 --> 00:18:44,349 anyway? 478 00:18:44,350 --> 00:18:46,939 Why is it that we need to 479 00:18:46,940 --> 00:18:47,949 meet the u8e? 480 00:18:47,950 --> 00:18:50,199 Why does everybody need this uad no. 481 00:18:50,200 --> 00:18:52,359 Why? Why is there the need for 482 00:18:52,360 --> 00:18:54,789 this database of people 483 00:18:54,790 --> 00:18:55,790 in the country? 484 00:18:57,080 --> 00:18:59,239 The government says India is 485 00:18:59,240 --> 00:19:01,399 there's a there's a very large migrant 486 00:19:01,400 --> 00:19:04,159 culture in India and there is no central 487 00:19:04,160 --> 00:19:06,599 identity that has been provided 488 00:19:06,600 --> 00:19:09,199 traditionally to an Indian citizen. 489 00:19:09,200 --> 00:19:10,909 There is something called the ration 490 00:19:10,910 --> 00:19:12,769 card, which I can get access to in the 491 00:19:12,770 --> 00:19:14,479 state I'm living in, which gives me 492 00:19:14,480 --> 00:19:16,279 certain benefits that I can access from 493 00:19:16,280 --> 00:19:18,169 the state. But if I decide to move to 494 00:19:18,170 --> 00:19:19,999 another state, the race card is not valid 495 00:19:20,000 --> 00:19:21,709 anymore, which means I don't have another 496 00:19:21,710 --> 00:19:24,169 ID document, 497 00:19:24,170 --> 00:19:26,299 which I can use to avail 498 00:19:26,300 --> 00:19:28,369 any services or benefits 499 00:19:28,370 --> 00:19:29,450 as a citizen of India. 500 00:19:30,620 --> 00:19:32,419 So they said it'll solve that problem. 501 00:19:32,420 --> 00:19:34,039 Everyone's going to have one central, 502 00:19:35,390 --> 00:19:37,429 centrally issued ID. 503 00:19:37,430 --> 00:19:39,529 They also want to use 504 00:19:39,530 --> 00:19:41,749 this program to give direct 505 00:19:41,750 --> 00:19:43,069 benefits to. 506 00:19:45,110 --> 00:19:47,899 The rural and the urban 507 00:19:47,900 --> 00:19:50,149 poor people who are under 508 00:19:50,150 --> 00:19:52,579 what we call the below poverty 509 00:19:52,580 --> 00:19:54,649 line, they 510 00:19:54,650 --> 00:19:56,629 have a program called Cash for Food, 511 00:19:56,630 --> 00:19:58,849 which intends to directly 512 00:19:58,850 --> 00:20:01,249 transfer money 513 00:20:01,250 --> 00:20:03,499 to citizens into 514 00:20:03,500 --> 00:20:05,929 their bank account as long as 515 00:20:05,930 --> 00:20:07,189 they have a bank account, which is linked 516 00:20:07,190 --> 00:20:08,380 to their UID number. 517 00:20:09,620 --> 00:20:11,059 They can get money straight into their 518 00:20:11,060 --> 00:20:12,919 bank accounts so they can actually buy 519 00:20:12,920 --> 00:20:13,920 food. 520 00:20:15,450 --> 00:20:17,549 So those 521 00:20:17,550 --> 00:20:19,859 are those were the primary 522 00:20:19,860 --> 00:20:22,889 two justifications that the government 523 00:20:22,890 --> 00:20:25,169 said is why we need 524 00:20:25,170 --> 00:20:26,190 the Aadhaar card. 525 00:20:28,310 --> 00:20:29,599 Now, there's a few other things that have 526 00:20:29,600 --> 00:20:31,669 been worrying me about 527 00:20:31,670 --> 00:20:33,079 the other card, which I want to talk 528 00:20:33,080 --> 00:20:34,440 about for the next few minutes. 529 00:20:36,580 --> 00:20:37,599 The USDA. 530 00:20:40,060 --> 00:20:43,389 Decided that the only way we can build 531 00:20:43,390 --> 00:20:46,149 a large, technical, 532 00:20:46,150 --> 00:20:48,309 secure system such as this 533 00:20:48,310 --> 00:20:50,229 is by actually working with private 534 00:20:50,230 --> 00:20:52,509 vendors who have the expertize that 535 00:20:52,510 --> 00:20:55,239 the government of India does not possess. 536 00:20:55,240 --> 00:20:57,609 They went out and bought 537 00:20:57,610 --> 00:21:00,219 and negotiated several partnerships 538 00:21:00,220 --> 00:21:02,469 with large enterprises 539 00:21:02,470 --> 00:21:04,629 and private contractors to 540 00:21:04,630 --> 00:21:06,760 make this whole system happen. 541 00:21:08,470 --> 00:21:10,149 So a lot of a big part of this is 542 00:21:10,150 --> 00:21:11,230 actually privatized. 543 00:21:12,280 --> 00:21:14,349 Now, there's a few companies 544 00:21:14,350 --> 00:21:16,149 that are involved, more than a dozen 545 00:21:16,150 --> 00:21:17,679 private companies that are involved in 546 00:21:17,680 --> 00:21:19,149 the USDA project. 547 00:21:19,150 --> 00:21:21,489 And as I was looking at the list 548 00:21:21,490 --> 00:21:23,289 and some of them and talking to some 549 00:21:23,290 --> 00:21:25,029 other people, there's some information 550 00:21:25,030 --> 00:21:26,619 that has been 551 00:21:27,820 --> 00:21:30,129 coming to surface, which actually worries 552 00:21:30,130 --> 00:21:32,439 us about how and why did 553 00:21:32,440 --> 00:21:34,809 the government make the decisions 554 00:21:34,810 --> 00:21:37,269 to conduct business 555 00:21:37,270 --> 00:21:39,609 with certain companies. 556 00:21:40,800 --> 00:21:42,509 One of the companies is an American 557 00:21:42,510 --> 00:21:43,589 company called L-1. 558 00:21:45,420 --> 00:21:47,519 Now L1 is a company 559 00:21:47,520 --> 00:21:49,949 that claims on their website 560 00:21:49,950 --> 00:21:51,719 that they provide highly specialized 561 00:21:51,720 --> 00:21:53,279 government consulting services that 562 00:21:53,280 --> 00:21:54,779 address the most important challenges 563 00:21:54,780 --> 00:21:57,959 facing U.S. defense and global security. 564 00:21:57,960 --> 00:21:59,699 They also claim that they have more than 565 00:21:59,700 --> 00:22:01,919 a thousand specialist, most holding 566 00:22:01,920 --> 00:22:03,269 top security clearance. 567 00:22:05,370 --> 00:22:06,509 There's another company. 568 00:22:07,990 --> 00:22:09,099 And yeah, this is the interesting bit 569 00:22:09,100 --> 00:22:10,100 about. 570 00:22:10,480 --> 00:22:11,480 So George Tenet, 571 00:22:12,580 --> 00:22:14,649 he's he's he's 572 00:22:14,650 --> 00:22:16,779 a former CIA chief, actually 573 00:22:16,780 --> 00:22:18,969 sits on the board 574 00:22:18,970 --> 00:22:21,430 of 11 of 11. 575 00:22:23,340 --> 00:22:24,539 Tim Shorrock was an investigative 576 00:22:24,540 --> 00:22:26,489 journalist, actually looked into this and 577 00:22:26,490 --> 00:22:28,319 actually uncovered these links between 578 00:22:28,320 --> 00:22:30,389 George Tenet and the CIA and 579 00:22:30,390 --> 00:22:32,849 L1 and also established 580 00:22:32,850 --> 00:22:34,379 that actually one of the biggest clients 581 00:22:34,380 --> 00:22:36,239 eleven have are the CIA. 582 00:22:38,770 --> 00:22:41,139 Accenture is a large global 583 00:22:41,140 --> 00:22:43,269 enterprise that I'm sure a lot of us 584 00:22:43,270 --> 00:22:44,270 have heard of them. 585 00:22:46,070 --> 00:22:48,229 They also have links of 586 00:22:48,230 --> 00:22:50,719 working with US intelligence 587 00:22:50,720 --> 00:22:53,299 agencies for several years now, in 2012. 588 00:22:53,300 --> 00:22:54,979 They were actually awarded a large 589 00:22:54,980 --> 00:22:57,109 contract to do 590 00:22:57,110 --> 00:22:58,789 bio surveillance by the Department of 591 00:22:58,790 --> 00:23:01,609 Homeland Security in the United States. 592 00:23:01,610 --> 00:23:03,169 This is another company that is doing a 593 00:23:03,170 --> 00:23:06,469 large part of the work for the USDA 594 00:23:06,470 --> 00:23:09,349 and making the Unity Project happen. 595 00:23:09,350 --> 00:23:10,550 And more recently. 596 00:23:12,600 --> 00:23:14,789 Max Shearson, who is 597 00:23:14,790 --> 00:23:17,249 the CEO of MongoDB, 598 00:23:17,250 --> 00:23:18,250 MongoDB is 599 00:23:19,440 --> 00:23:21,419 sure a lot of technologists here and 600 00:23:21,420 --> 00:23:23,069 maybe others are familiar with MongoDB. 601 00:23:23,070 --> 00:23:26,069 It's an open source database system, 602 00:23:26,070 --> 00:23:27,119 which is actually quite an amazing 603 00:23:27,120 --> 00:23:29,219 system, but it is a it 604 00:23:29,220 --> 00:23:30,929 is developed by a private company 605 00:23:31,980 --> 00:23:34,169 and the USDA started talking to MongoDB 606 00:23:34,170 --> 00:23:35,170 to. 607 00:23:37,250 --> 00:23:40,279 Try and use their technology 608 00:23:40,280 --> 00:23:42,559 and their services to captain and analyze 609 00:23:42,560 --> 00:23:45,019 data of over a billion citizens 610 00:23:45,020 --> 00:23:46,759 who are going to be registered with the 611 00:23:46,760 --> 00:23:47,760 UIDAI. 612 00:23:48,810 --> 00:23:51,329 Now, the MongoDB, interestingly, 613 00:23:51,330 --> 00:23:53,999 receives a chunk of its funding from 614 00:23:54,000 --> 00:23:56,099 a venture capital 615 00:23:56,100 --> 00:23:58,410 that is owned by the CIA called In-Q-Tel. 616 00:23:59,840 --> 00:24:01,639 It's actually quite commonplace for a lot 617 00:24:01,640 --> 00:24:03,469 of open source projects or other 618 00:24:03,470 --> 00:24:05,869 technology companies to receive 619 00:24:05,870 --> 00:24:08,599 funding from intelligence agencies. 620 00:24:08,600 --> 00:24:10,219 It's not the first time we've heard of 621 00:24:10,220 --> 00:24:12,529 it. And sometimes it's had great results. 622 00:24:12,530 --> 00:24:13,999 We've had some great software being 623 00:24:14,000 --> 00:24:15,799 written by money that has been spent by 624 00:24:15,800 --> 00:24:17,539 intelligence agencies. 625 00:24:17,540 --> 00:24:19,019 But that's not the problem here. 626 00:24:19,020 --> 00:24:21,169 It's like why the problem is why is 627 00:24:21,170 --> 00:24:23,359 it that the Indian 628 00:24:23,360 --> 00:24:26,569 government consistently has demonstrated 629 00:24:26,570 --> 00:24:28,999 that they are engaging with 630 00:24:29,000 --> 00:24:31,069 companies who clearly have links with 631 00:24:31,070 --> 00:24:33,349 intelligence agencies in other 632 00:24:33,350 --> 00:24:34,350 countries? 633 00:24:35,150 --> 00:24:37,279 What does that mean for my personal data 634 00:24:37,280 --> 00:24:38,839 as an Indian citizen? 635 00:24:38,840 --> 00:24:41,149 How can I actually trust 636 00:24:41,150 --> 00:24:43,339 my government to keep 637 00:24:43,340 --> 00:24:45,679 me secure when it's 638 00:24:45,680 --> 00:24:47,809 clearly showing me 639 00:24:47,810 --> 00:24:49,819 information about the fact that they are 640 00:24:49,820 --> 00:24:51,889 negotiating contracts with companies 641 00:24:51,890 --> 00:24:54,199 who actually very closely 642 00:24:54,200 --> 00:24:56,569 worked with the CIA and other 643 00:24:56,570 --> 00:24:57,570 US intelligence? 644 00:24:59,630 --> 00:25:02,239 We also have some other smaller problems 645 00:25:02,240 --> 00:25:04,369 in India with the whole roll out its 646 00:25:04,370 --> 00:25:06,979 program that has had to 647 00:25:06,980 --> 00:25:09,049 be launched to 1.2 billion people 648 00:25:09,050 --> 00:25:11,299 and we expect some problems, but 649 00:25:11,300 --> 00:25:12,980 what kind of problems have you had? 650 00:25:19,800 --> 00:25:22,289 This is not this is true. 651 00:25:22,290 --> 00:25:23,219 These are some of your I.D. 652 00:25:23,220 --> 00:25:25,649 cards phone where 653 00:25:25,650 --> 00:25:28,079 the picture was actually not the person, 654 00:25:28,080 --> 00:25:30,420 but sometimes a dog or a tree or a chair. 655 00:25:32,070 --> 00:25:34,199 The USDA accepted this and said, Oh 656 00:25:34,200 --> 00:25:35,579 yeah, we have some problems. 657 00:25:35,580 --> 00:25:36,809 It's the system that we're still 658 00:25:36,810 --> 00:25:37,810 perfecting. 659 00:25:38,700 --> 00:25:40,529 It'll all work eventually. 660 00:25:40,530 --> 00:25:42,059 They said there are enough safeguards to 661 00:25:42,060 --> 00:25:44,549 make sure that this is 662 00:25:44,550 --> 00:25:45,839 this cannot be misused. 663 00:25:49,230 --> 00:25:50,230 But. 664 00:25:51,800 --> 00:25:53,719 With all the independent contractors that 665 00:25:53,720 --> 00:25:55,429 they're working with, other worries such 666 00:25:55,430 --> 00:25:57,649 as somebody actually found 667 00:25:57,650 --> 00:25:59,749 about 2000, I've heard applications with 668 00:25:59,750 --> 00:26:02,779 personal information already 669 00:26:02,780 --> 00:26:04,969 in there on a road on 670 00:26:04,970 --> 00:26:07,189 the roadside, in a small town in 671 00:26:07,190 --> 00:26:08,809 the state of Caroline, South India. 672 00:26:10,040 --> 00:26:11,040 More recently. 673 00:26:12,620 --> 00:26:14,689 There was a fake I.D. 674 00:26:14,690 --> 00:26:16,969 card scam busted in the state 675 00:26:16,970 --> 00:26:19,579 of Gujarat in Senegal, Sudan. 676 00:26:19,580 --> 00:26:21,799 And they actually found equipment that 677 00:26:21,800 --> 00:26:23,869 is that is that have been 678 00:26:23,870 --> 00:26:26,539 authorized to be used only by the USDA, 679 00:26:26,540 --> 00:26:28,879 the eye, which was led by people 680 00:26:28,880 --> 00:26:30,949 who work for the USDA. 681 00:26:30,950 --> 00:26:33,139 Two people who were making 682 00:26:33,140 --> 00:26:34,339 these fake are that guides. 683 00:26:38,240 --> 00:26:40,439 Let's go back to that issue I have 684 00:26:40,440 --> 00:26:42,709 with centralized storage and access 685 00:26:42,710 --> 00:26:43,710 of this data. 686 00:26:45,550 --> 00:26:47,979 Now, this is somebody 687 00:26:47,980 --> 00:26:50,529 who is a researcher with 688 00:26:50,530 --> 00:26:52,449 MIT Geospatial Data Center said, which I 689 00:26:52,450 --> 00:26:53,529 really like. 690 00:26:53,530 --> 00:26:55,719 So I thought that quoted here says, What 691 00:26:55,720 --> 00:26:56,979 is personal information? Personal 692 00:26:56,980 --> 00:26:58,899 information is personal property. 693 00:26:58,900 --> 00:27:01,059 It belongs to the person unless 694 00:27:01,060 --> 00:27:02,799 it is put in the public domain. 695 00:27:02,800 --> 00:27:04,059 The ownership of that personal 696 00:27:04,060 --> 00:27:06,250 information remains with that person. 697 00:27:08,910 --> 00:27:11,099 Which means what? I am not I should 698 00:27:11,100 --> 00:27:13,319 not have to give away my 699 00:27:13,320 --> 00:27:15,479 data to anybody who wants to 700 00:27:15,480 --> 00:27:17,609 put it in a large, centralized 701 00:27:17,610 --> 00:27:18,610 database. 702 00:27:19,530 --> 00:27:21,899 Sunil Abraham, who's the director of 703 00:27:21,900 --> 00:27:24,719 the Center for Internet and Society in 704 00:27:24,720 --> 00:27:26,579 Bangalore, recently said this. 705 00:27:26,580 --> 00:27:28,709 He said what India needs is an evil 706 00:27:28,710 --> 00:27:29,819 Snowden. 707 00:27:29,820 --> 00:27:31,949 The problem with Snowden is 708 00:27:31,950 --> 00:27:33,360 that he has conscience. 709 00:27:35,260 --> 00:27:37,629 Everything that he's leaked so far, 710 00:27:37,630 --> 00:27:40,629 he's done it extremely responsibly 711 00:27:40,630 --> 00:27:42,549 and made sure that he's actually 712 00:27:42,550 --> 00:27:44,859 protecting innocent innocent citizens 713 00:27:44,860 --> 00:27:45,860 from any harm. 714 00:27:48,020 --> 00:27:49,910 Think about what implications. 715 00:27:51,640 --> 00:27:53,979 It would have if someone 716 00:27:53,980 --> 00:27:56,649 say a whistleblower who worked for UIDAI 717 00:27:56,650 --> 00:27:59,499 or someone with the wrong intentions 718 00:27:59,500 --> 00:28:01,089 decides. 719 00:28:01,090 --> 00:28:03,489 And has access to this day later decides 720 00:28:03,490 --> 00:28:05,469 to just take all of this data, put it out 721 00:28:05,470 --> 00:28:06,470 as a torrent. 722 00:28:07,700 --> 00:28:09,769 Online now, that's all I 723 00:28:09,770 --> 00:28:11,449 personally identifiable information 724 00:28:11,450 --> 00:28:13,129 available public to publicly to 725 00:28:13,130 --> 00:28:14,130 everybody. 726 00:28:15,350 --> 00:28:16,999 It is extremely dangerous, as you can 727 00:28:17,000 --> 00:28:19,429 imagine, and I would not advise anybody 728 00:28:19,430 --> 00:28:21,559 to do that, but this 729 00:28:21,560 --> 00:28:22,879 is a possibility that we have to 730 00:28:22,880 --> 00:28:25,729 consider. And that is why 731 00:28:25,730 --> 00:28:27,949 centralized storage of such data is 732 00:28:27,950 --> 00:28:30,109 harmful to society and 733 00:28:30,110 --> 00:28:32,120 is and has these vulnerabilities. 734 00:28:33,890 --> 00:28:36,199 Nandan Nilekani, who is the chief 735 00:28:36,200 --> 00:28:39,349 and chairman of the USDA, said 736 00:28:39,350 --> 00:28:41,539 when asked, what is it that the USDA 737 00:28:41,540 --> 00:28:43,879 can be used for by building 738 00:28:43,880 --> 00:28:46,009 this, he said 739 00:28:46,010 --> 00:28:47,389 We are providing an open architecture 740 00:28:47,390 --> 00:28:49,219 which allows people to build applications 741 00:28:49,220 --> 00:28:50,220 on top of it. 742 00:28:51,560 --> 00:28:53,659 He was asked a few of the questions which 743 00:28:53,660 --> 00:28:55,579 he came out with very similar vague 744 00:28:55,580 --> 00:28:56,580 answers to. 745 00:28:57,700 --> 00:28:59,769 So basically, kind of what this kind 746 00:28:59,770 --> 00:29:02,259 of implies is that the USDA 747 00:29:02,260 --> 00:29:03,219 and the government of India and the 748 00:29:03,220 --> 00:29:04,929 Planning Commission just got together and 749 00:29:04,930 --> 00:29:06,639 said, Let's just launch this system, 750 00:29:06,640 --> 00:29:08,409 let's get all this data and we'll figure 751 00:29:08,410 --> 00:29:09,760 out what to do with it later. 752 00:29:11,400 --> 00:29:13,260 What's important is that we need to 753 00:29:14,490 --> 00:29:15,659 get all this data in there. 754 00:29:17,620 --> 00:29:19,569 Now, clearly what is not about looks like 755 00:29:19,570 --> 00:29:21,729 to me, it means 756 00:29:21,730 --> 00:29:23,529 OK. That is clearly about establishing 757 00:29:23,530 --> 00:29:24,670 control. That is about. 758 00:29:27,290 --> 00:29:28,339 That is about 759 00:29:30,080 --> 00:29:32,359 what I was talking about earlier, 760 00:29:32,360 --> 00:29:34,819 the fact that the state wants to know 761 00:29:34,820 --> 00:29:37,279 what you are and where you are and 762 00:29:37,280 --> 00:29:38,540 who you are at all times. 763 00:29:39,830 --> 00:29:40,830 And 764 00:29:41,900 --> 00:29:42,900 it's 765 00:29:44,000 --> 00:29:46,429 not the first time that the 766 00:29:46,430 --> 00:29:48,919 centralized databases like 767 00:29:48,920 --> 00:29:50,119 like that have been built, and in the 768 00:29:50,120 --> 00:29:51,829 past, we know they have been misused 769 00:29:53,000 --> 00:29:55,099 and let 770 00:29:55,100 --> 00:29:56,569 our biometrics for a second. 771 00:29:58,610 --> 00:30:00,709 No, the u8e project 772 00:30:00,710 --> 00:30:02,509 is collecting my fingerprints. 773 00:30:04,510 --> 00:30:06,669 And they intend to use 774 00:30:06,670 --> 00:30:08,979 this as authentication. 775 00:30:10,530 --> 00:30:12,569 There's a problem with that. 776 00:30:12,570 --> 00:30:14,879 The fact that my fingerprints are users 777 00:30:14,880 --> 00:30:17,399 authentication have several problems, 778 00:30:17,400 --> 00:30:19,289 and the primary one is that biometrics 779 00:30:19,290 --> 00:30:20,849 are not infallible. 780 00:30:22,330 --> 00:30:24,099 If they compromised, my fingerprint is 781 00:30:24,100 --> 00:30:26,020 compromised, I cannot go get a new one. 782 00:30:28,310 --> 00:30:29,310 And. 783 00:30:31,370 --> 00:30:33,589 They cannot be secured, unlike 784 00:30:34,760 --> 00:30:38,419 other digital forms of authentication, 785 00:30:38,420 --> 00:30:40,640 which I can actually revoke and 786 00:30:41,810 --> 00:30:43,879 create a new one if 787 00:30:43,880 --> 00:30:45,410 necessary, if they are compromised. 788 00:30:49,920 --> 00:30:52,349 And digital signatures also, 789 00:30:52,350 --> 00:30:54,629 like we all know, all these other digital 790 00:30:54,630 --> 00:30:56,249 encryption methods don't require 791 00:30:56,250 --> 00:30:58,889 centralized storage, and 792 00:30:58,890 --> 00:31:00,869 they're definitely more resilient in 793 00:31:00,870 --> 00:31:02,279 terms of security that way because, for 794 00:31:02,280 --> 00:31:04,349 example, my Ethereum pin, I can 795 00:31:04,350 --> 00:31:05,669 revoke it if I need. 796 00:31:05,670 --> 00:31:07,919 If I lose my, 797 00:31:07,920 --> 00:31:10,139 if I lose my card, I can or. 798 00:31:10,140 --> 00:31:11,519 Well, basically, if someone actually 799 00:31:11,520 --> 00:31:13,079 forgets my pin and I can revoke it, I 800 00:31:13,080 --> 00:31:14,279 cannot do that with my fingerprint. 801 00:31:15,450 --> 00:31:17,609 And then in in in in such 802 00:31:17,610 --> 00:31:18,929 a large context when you actually trying 803 00:31:18,930 --> 00:31:21,689 to use bio biometrics. 804 00:31:21,690 --> 00:31:23,549 But biometrics are not infallible 805 00:31:25,380 --> 00:31:27,359 when, especially when you're using it in 806 00:31:27,360 --> 00:31:29,579 a population of 1.2 billion people 807 00:31:29,580 --> 00:31:31,679 that are in inaccuracies that can arise 808 00:31:31,680 --> 00:31:34,049 from variations in 809 00:31:34,050 --> 00:31:36,179 individual attributes and inaccuracies 810 00:31:36,180 --> 00:31:37,180 in the technology. 811 00:31:38,640 --> 00:31:39,959 They can also change. 812 00:31:41,950 --> 00:31:44,019 In response to a number of things, a 813 00:31:44,020 --> 00:31:45,909 number of factors which like the 814 00:31:45,910 --> 00:31:48,219 environmental stress, activity, illness 815 00:31:48,220 --> 00:31:51,219 and AIDS, this is something that 816 00:31:51,220 --> 00:31:52,239 there is a lot of 817 00:31:53,320 --> 00:31:55,690 proof about and. 818 00:31:58,720 --> 00:32:00,489 There is a whole possibility of error 819 00:32:00,490 --> 00:32:02,919 when you're doing this with 1.2 820 00:32:02,920 --> 00:32:03,920 billion people. 821 00:32:05,320 --> 00:32:06,320 And then 822 00:32:07,450 --> 00:32:08,969 let's talk about technology for a bit 823 00:32:08,970 --> 00:32:11,109 like it really depends on the accuracy 824 00:32:11,110 --> 00:32:12,249 of the technology like this. 825 00:32:12,250 --> 00:32:13,809 There's many aspects in biometric 826 00:32:13,810 --> 00:32:15,069 technology that can affect this. 827 00:32:15,070 --> 00:32:17,649 There's calibration sensors, algorithms 828 00:32:17,650 --> 00:32:18,650 and. 829 00:32:19,570 --> 00:32:21,189 You don't go about piloting a system like 830 00:32:21,190 --> 00:32:23,289 this on the whole country without 831 00:32:23,290 --> 00:32:25,449 thinking about these issues are testing 832 00:32:25,450 --> 00:32:26,450 them. 833 00:32:27,960 --> 00:32:31,079 And it is possible to fake fingerprints. 834 00:32:31,080 --> 00:32:33,149 We know that the Chaos Computer Club 835 00:32:33,150 --> 00:32:35,219 in the past has shown us how 836 00:32:35,220 --> 00:32:36,779 to do that. There's a lot of other people 837 00:32:36,780 --> 00:32:37,889 who've shown us how to do that. 838 00:32:37,890 --> 00:32:39,209 A quick Google search for fake 839 00:32:39,210 --> 00:32:41,129 fingerprints will give you a lot of 840 00:32:41,130 --> 00:32:42,779 information about how you can actually do 841 00:32:42,780 --> 00:32:43,780 that. 842 00:32:44,910 --> 00:32:46,979 Also, in the Indian context, there is 843 00:32:46,980 --> 00:32:49,679 a lot of there is 844 00:32:49,680 --> 00:32:51,809 a lot of commercial motivation for 845 00:32:51,810 --> 00:32:54,239 people to create 846 00:32:54,240 --> 00:32:56,999 fake or spoof identities, 847 00:32:57,000 --> 00:32:59,039 which has happened a lot. 848 00:32:59,040 --> 00:33:01,289 So for example, we've 849 00:33:01,290 --> 00:33:03,809 known of bank managers 850 00:33:03,810 --> 00:33:05,999 to achieve their targets, creating 851 00:33:06,000 --> 00:33:08,289 what we call benami accounts 852 00:33:08,290 --> 00:33:10,529 for. These mean people 853 00:33:10,530 --> 00:33:12,179 who, well, these are basically the ghost 854 00:33:12,180 --> 00:33:13,619 identities. 855 00:33:13,620 --> 00:33:16,019 People who don't actually exist have 856 00:33:16,020 --> 00:33:18,389 bank accounts because they want because 857 00:33:18,390 --> 00:33:20,609 there are certain targets that banks have 858 00:33:20,610 --> 00:33:22,140 to achieve. 859 00:33:25,440 --> 00:33:27,539 There's also been reports of. 860 00:33:29,240 --> 00:33:31,399 How biometric systems have been misused, 861 00:33:31,400 --> 00:33:33,320 where you can actually use the. 862 00:33:38,180 --> 00:33:40,249 Well, image manipulation software to 863 00:33:40,250 --> 00:33:43,039 create, create fake biometrics, 864 00:33:43,040 --> 00:33:45,139 create unique fake 865 00:33:45,140 --> 00:33:47,420 fingerprints and. 866 00:33:48,880 --> 00:33:50,409 If there's nothing stopping you from 867 00:33:50,410 --> 00:33:52,029 actually buying a bunch of finger prints 868 00:33:52,030 --> 00:33:53,950 from another country, which 869 00:33:55,450 --> 00:33:58,149 has which is what has been done before, 870 00:33:58,150 --> 00:34:00,549 a not at this scale and it can 871 00:34:00,550 --> 00:34:02,499 actually be done and it's going in. 872 00:34:02,500 --> 00:34:03,879 All this gives let you create these 873 00:34:03,880 --> 00:34:05,559 unique identities and create these ghost 874 00:34:05,560 --> 00:34:07,659 identities, which to you, which makes 875 00:34:07,660 --> 00:34:09,698 the u8e system will accept as long as it 876 00:34:09,699 --> 00:34:10,699 is unique. 877 00:34:19,540 --> 00:34:20,599 So this is 878 00:34:21,639 --> 00:34:23,619 a 23 page biometrics report that the 879 00:34:23,620 --> 00:34:25,629 UIDAI put out a little while ago, which 880 00:34:25,630 --> 00:34:27,759 said biometric data by 881 00:34:27,760 --> 00:34:29,888 them is collected by software provided by 882 00:34:29,889 --> 00:34:32,439 the UIDAI, which immediately encrypts 883 00:34:32,440 --> 00:34:33,850 and applies a digital signature. 884 00:34:35,100 --> 00:34:37,169 So if not, encryption and applying a 885 00:34:37,170 --> 00:34:39,209 digital signature works for the USDA, 886 00:34:39,210 --> 00:34:40,769 clearly it should work for citizens. 887 00:34:40,770 --> 00:34:42,839 Why do we need biometrics to protect 888 00:34:42,840 --> 00:34:43,840 us when? 889 00:34:46,520 --> 00:34:47,888 Those are the issues that and those are 890 00:34:47,889 --> 00:34:50,079 the questions I ask about the 891 00:34:50,080 --> 00:34:52,449 whole other project a lot 892 00:34:53,500 --> 00:34:54,500 and this is. 893 00:34:56,449 --> 00:34:58,189 Something that has been talked about a 894 00:34:58,190 --> 00:35:00,229 lot to that, that project itself is 895 00:35:00,230 --> 00:35:01,879 completely unconstitutional. 896 00:35:01,880 --> 00:35:04,399 Actually, there is no legal framework 897 00:35:04,400 --> 00:35:05,780 in the Constitution that 898 00:35:07,310 --> 00:35:08,310 that actually 899 00:35:10,160 --> 00:35:12,440 makes that actually 900 00:35:13,850 --> 00:35:15,349 brings this make makes this 901 00:35:15,350 --> 00:35:16,399 constitutional. 902 00:35:16,400 --> 00:35:18,499 And it's it's just an 903 00:35:18,500 --> 00:35:19,939 executive committee decision which has 904 00:35:19,940 --> 00:35:21,019 actually not been passed by the 905 00:35:21,020 --> 00:35:22,699 parliament. It has no parliamentary 906 00:35:22,700 --> 00:35:24,079 oversight. 907 00:35:24,080 --> 00:35:26,209 So as far as 908 00:35:26,210 --> 00:35:28,099 I'm concerned, as a citizen of India 909 00:35:28,100 --> 00:35:30,289 going by the Constitution of India, I see 910 00:35:30,290 --> 00:35:31,849 there is no accountability or transport 911 00:35:31,850 --> 00:35:33,229 transparency in this project. 912 00:35:35,860 --> 00:35:37,839 Like I said earlier, the Supreme Court 913 00:35:37,840 --> 00:35:40,839 ruled that numbers were not mandatory, 914 00:35:40,840 --> 00:35:42,939 which is, yeah, we'll see what 915 00:35:42,940 --> 00:35:44,199 happens with that. 916 00:35:44,200 --> 00:35:45,200 Let's talk about. 917 00:35:47,830 --> 00:35:49,989 Some other things that worry 918 00:35:49,990 --> 00:35:52,809 me and some, some others at the moment, 919 00:35:52,810 --> 00:35:54,129 the steps that the government has been 920 00:35:54,130 --> 00:35:56,199 taking in surveilling us, 921 00:35:56,200 --> 00:35:58,809 intercepting our communications 922 00:35:58,810 --> 00:35:59,810 and. 923 00:36:01,280 --> 00:36:02,989 How that played out over the last few 924 00:36:02,990 --> 00:36:03,990 years. 925 00:36:05,950 --> 00:36:07,509 I'll give you a little bit of context, a 926 00:36:07,510 --> 00:36:08,650 little bit of history. 927 00:36:10,930 --> 00:36:13,239 In 2011, there were 928 00:36:13,240 --> 00:36:14,739 the government of India put out something 929 00:36:14,740 --> 00:36:16,839 called IP Rules 2011, which basically 930 00:36:16,840 --> 00:36:18,639 prohibits websites and service providers 931 00:36:18,640 --> 00:36:20,079 from hosting information that could be 932 00:36:20,080 --> 00:36:22,179 regarded as harmful, blasphemous, 933 00:36:22,180 --> 00:36:23,679 insulting to India. 934 00:36:24,850 --> 00:36:26,949 They also mandated that 935 00:36:26,950 --> 00:36:29,409 all internet cafes were now required 936 00:36:29,410 --> 00:36:31,569 to install surveillance cameras in their 937 00:36:31,570 --> 00:36:32,570 premises. 938 00:36:34,260 --> 00:36:36,329 And for a while, the 939 00:36:36,330 --> 00:36:38,489 numb and the it was also now 940 00:36:38,490 --> 00:36:40,949 say this required anybody 941 00:36:40,950 --> 00:36:43,409 who uses a cyber cafe in India 942 00:36:43,410 --> 00:36:45,599 to hand out that ID card to the person 943 00:36:45,600 --> 00:36:48,090 who runs it who has to keep a record off. 944 00:36:54,190 --> 00:36:56,079 Sorry. Clearly, that at Miami computer is 945 00:36:56,080 --> 00:36:57,080 not happy with this. 946 00:37:00,350 --> 00:37:02,389 So I have to go on my personal ID every 947 00:37:02,390 --> 00:37:04,609 time I want to use internet in a public 948 00:37:04,610 --> 00:37:05,690 space in India. 949 00:37:06,850 --> 00:37:08,439 And at the same time, there's a camera 950 00:37:08,440 --> 00:37:10,449 watching me and looking behind my 951 00:37:10,450 --> 00:37:11,829 shoulder to see what I'm doing. 952 00:37:13,000 --> 00:37:14,919 India also has a history of being a 953 00:37:14,920 --> 00:37:17,019 country that has been 954 00:37:17,020 --> 00:37:19,149 asking service providers to give 955 00:37:19,150 --> 00:37:20,559 out a lot of user data. 956 00:37:20,560 --> 00:37:22,419 They actually send the second highest 957 00:37:22,420 --> 00:37:25,029 number of requests after the US in 2012 958 00:37:25,030 --> 00:37:27,429 to Google asking for user data. 959 00:37:30,530 --> 00:37:32,659 There's also an act in the Eity 960 00:37:32,660 --> 00:37:34,759 Amendment Act of a section in 961 00:37:34,760 --> 00:37:36,979 the ID Amendment Act of 2008, which 962 00:37:36,980 --> 00:37:39,109 is called Section 66 A. 963 00:37:41,180 --> 00:37:42,709 What this is is you can actually be 964 00:37:42,710 --> 00:37:45,709 imprisoned for up to three years 965 00:37:45,710 --> 00:37:47,839 for sending an email or another or 966 00:37:47,840 --> 00:37:49,939 any other electronic message that causes 967 00:37:49,940 --> 00:37:52,010 annoyance or inconvenience. 968 00:37:55,600 --> 00:37:57,699 Now what in the face of it, what this 969 00:37:57,700 --> 00:37:59,979 section is supposed to do is protect 970 00:37:59,980 --> 00:38:02,199 innocent citizens from online 971 00:38:02,200 --> 00:38:03,200 harassment. 972 00:38:04,280 --> 00:38:06,829 But there's been several instances 973 00:38:06,830 --> 00:38:08,809 in the recent past, but it's been 974 00:38:08,810 --> 00:38:09,810 misused. 975 00:38:10,670 --> 00:38:12,739 In fact, there's misuse by 976 00:38:12,740 --> 00:38:14,090 political leaders who've. 977 00:38:15,620 --> 00:38:17,300 Got people arrested for. 978 00:38:18,570 --> 00:38:20,459 Causing annoyance or inconvenience to 979 00:38:20,460 --> 00:38:21,460 them. 980 00:38:23,870 --> 00:38:26,209 In October this year, a resident 981 00:38:26,210 --> 00:38:28,879 of Chennai, the city 982 00:38:28,880 --> 00:38:31,489 in the city in south India 983 00:38:31,490 --> 00:38:33,379 posted a tweet. 984 00:38:33,380 --> 00:38:35,689 He had 16 followers on Twitter one six. 985 00:38:35,690 --> 00:38:36,690 He posted a tweet 986 00:38:38,240 --> 00:38:39,679 does his 16 followers 987 00:38:41,240 --> 00:38:44,239 claiming that he knew that 988 00:38:44,240 --> 00:38:46,399 a certain politician in South India 989 00:38:46,400 --> 00:38:48,829 who happens to also have also happens 990 00:38:48,830 --> 00:38:50,929 to be a member of 991 00:38:50,930 --> 00:38:53,119 the ruling, the current central ruling 992 00:38:53,120 --> 00:38:55,459 party the politician. 993 00:38:55,460 --> 00:38:56,570 This case, the name is 994 00:38:59,160 --> 00:39:01,279 Kadry Chidambaram, who also 995 00:39:01,280 --> 00:39:03,289 happens to be the son of the present 996 00:39:03,290 --> 00:39:05,389 finance minister of the of the 997 00:39:05,390 --> 00:39:07,459 Government of India, he 998 00:39:07,460 --> 00:39:09,409 tweeted, saying to them buldum had 999 00:39:09,410 --> 00:39:11,269 amassed more wealth than 1000 00:39:12,290 --> 00:39:14,359 this other person who is the son in 1001 00:39:14,360 --> 00:39:16,579 law off the top of the Congress party, 1002 00:39:16,580 --> 00:39:18,649 who are the ruling party in the 1003 00:39:18,650 --> 00:39:19,789 country. 1004 00:39:19,790 --> 00:39:21,979 His tweet basically had a few words says 1005 00:39:21,980 --> 00:39:24,249 to them Chidambaram seems to have 1006 00:39:24,250 --> 00:39:26,329 amassed more wealth than 1007 00:39:26,330 --> 00:39:27,330 Robert Vadra. 1008 00:39:29,780 --> 00:39:31,519 That's basically all he said. 1009 00:39:31,520 --> 00:39:32,520 He was arrested. 1010 00:39:34,780 --> 00:39:35,780 And. 1011 00:39:40,840 --> 00:39:42,969 Well, because Chidambaram filed 1012 00:39:42,970 --> 00:39:45,219 a police complaint a few days after 1013 00:39:45,220 --> 00:39:47,079 he thought after he saw this tweet, 1014 00:39:48,280 --> 00:39:50,589 a university professor in West Bengal 1015 00:39:50,590 --> 00:39:52,809 last year was 1016 00:39:52,810 --> 00:39:54,879 arrested after 1017 00:39:54,880 --> 00:39:56,349 being assaulted by 1018 00:39:57,460 --> 00:39:59,259 the party in power. 1019 00:39:59,260 --> 00:40:00,699 Some members of the party in power there 1020 00:40:00,700 --> 00:40:02,799 was arrested and jailed because 1021 00:40:02,800 --> 00:40:05,439 he emailed a spoof, 1022 00:40:05,440 --> 00:40:07,599 got a cartoon of 1023 00:40:07,600 --> 00:40:09,519 Mamata Banerjee, who is the chief 1024 00:40:09,520 --> 00:40:10,719 minister of that state, 1025 00:40:12,340 --> 00:40:13,340 and. 1026 00:40:15,690 --> 00:40:17,129 Well, more recently, 1027 00:40:18,720 --> 00:40:20,999 India actually lost 1028 00:40:21,000 --> 00:40:23,219 one of its more most powerful 1029 00:40:23,220 --> 00:40:24,300 political leaders 1030 00:40:25,440 --> 00:40:26,559 earlier this year. 1031 00:40:26,560 --> 00:40:28,859 Bob Parker, who led 1032 00:40:28,860 --> 00:40:31,019 despite right wing political party, 1033 00:40:31,020 --> 00:40:33,059 called the Shiv Sena and was a very 1034 00:40:33,060 --> 00:40:34,529 powerful politician, especially in the 1035 00:40:34,530 --> 00:40:36,809 state of Maharashtra, where Mumbai is. 1036 00:40:38,370 --> 00:40:39,930 And when he died, 1037 00:40:41,670 --> 00:40:43,379 the government decided out of respect to 1038 00:40:43,380 --> 00:40:44,960 shut down the city of Mumbai. 1039 00:40:46,500 --> 00:40:48,239 Now about her career, interestingly, 1040 00:40:48,240 --> 00:40:50,639 although he wasn't extremely powerful 1041 00:40:50,640 --> 00:40:52,739 political leader, never held any 1042 00:40:52,740 --> 00:40:53,969 kind of position of power in the 1043 00:40:53,970 --> 00:40:54,929 government, he was never the chief 1044 00:40:54,930 --> 00:40:56,879 minister or any other minister in any 1045 00:40:56,880 --> 00:40:57,880 government. 1046 00:40:58,620 --> 00:41:00,119 So when the government decided to shut 1047 00:41:00,120 --> 00:41:02,309 down the city of Bombay, a lot 1048 00:41:02,310 --> 00:41:03,319 of people were Mumbai. 1049 00:41:03,320 --> 00:41:05,669 A lot of people thought, Oh, well, 1050 00:41:05,670 --> 00:41:06,960 but he's not really. 1051 00:41:07,980 --> 00:41:09,059 No, he's not really 1052 00:41:11,440 --> 00:41:13,459 a political leader who's ever held and 1053 00:41:13,460 --> 00:41:15,519 held an office away to go 1054 00:41:15,520 --> 00:41:17,399 actually were arrested because they 1055 00:41:17,400 --> 00:41:20,099 posted questioning the shutdown 1056 00:41:20,100 --> 00:41:21,330 in the city on Facebook. 1057 00:41:22,950 --> 00:41:24,839 So, yeah, those are examples of how the 1058 00:41:24,840 --> 00:41:27,039 66 year has been misused by 1059 00:41:27,040 --> 00:41:29,309 the by political leaders. 1060 00:41:29,310 --> 00:41:31,349 And this is a section which actually is 1061 00:41:31,350 --> 00:41:33,779 supposed to prevent me from harassment. 1062 00:41:33,780 --> 00:41:35,310 But yeah. 1063 00:41:36,690 --> 00:41:38,279 And they also launch something called the 1064 00:41:38,280 --> 00:41:39,869 telephone call interception system in 1065 00:41:39,870 --> 00:41:40,870 2011. 1066 00:41:42,210 --> 00:41:43,979 And what the DCI is let the government 1067 00:41:43,980 --> 00:41:44,980 do. 1068 00:41:45,790 --> 00:41:47,949 Is monitor in 1069 00:41:47,950 --> 00:41:50,199 real time, 900 million landlines 1070 00:41:50,200 --> 00:41:52,569 and mobiles in the country, 1071 00:41:52,570 --> 00:41:54,909 and all this snooping is invisible. 1072 00:41:54,910 --> 00:41:56,919 You don't know if you're being monitored. 1073 00:41:56,920 --> 00:41:59,559 It's completely transparent and seamless. 1074 00:41:59,560 --> 00:42:01,900 It not just monitors you, but also. 1075 00:42:03,300 --> 00:42:05,219 Does voice recognition and pattern 1076 00:42:05,220 --> 00:42:07,559 matching based on other sample data 1077 00:42:07,560 --> 00:42:09,749 that exist in the system to determine if 1078 00:42:09,750 --> 00:42:11,879 you are a terrorist or 1079 00:42:11,880 --> 00:42:12,880 not? 1080 00:42:15,110 --> 00:42:16,159 More recently, 1081 00:42:17,510 --> 00:42:19,070 while actually in 1082 00:42:20,960 --> 00:42:22,969 earlier in the year when we were all 1083 00:42:22,970 --> 00:42:25,849 shocked and where 1084 00:42:25,850 --> 00:42:28,639 and the global dialog started around 1085 00:42:28,640 --> 00:42:31,039 Snowden leaks, India quietly started 1086 00:42:32,240 --> 00:42:33,799 launching this system called the Central 1087 00:42:33,800 --> 00:42:35,269 Monitoring System, which was 1088 00:42:35,270 --> 00:42:37,339 conceptualized after the attacks 1089 00:42:37,340 --> 00:42:38,690 in Mumbai in 2008. 1090 00:42:40,470 --> 00:42:41,470 And. 1091 00:42:43,370 --> 00:42:45,439 The CMC will also integrate with what 1092 00:42:45,440 --> 00:42:46,339 I mentioned earlier, which is the 1093 00:42:46,340 --> 00:42:48,050 telephone call interception system. 1094 00:42:49,400 --> 00:42:51,499 And this claims to be the they claim 1095 00:42:51,500 --> 00:42:53,119 that it'll be rolled out to a dozen 1096 00:42:53,120 --> 00:42:55,010 states by 2014. 1097 00:42:58,820 --> 00:43:00,619 So what does the MAX does is basically 1098 00:43:00,620 --> 00:43:03,439 bypasses what bypasses your ISP 1099 00:43:03,440 --> 00:43:05,150 and plugs straight into. 1100 00:43:07,000 --> 00:43:09,579 Eat into 1101 00:43:09,580 --> 00:43:12,089 its the the 1102 00:43:12,090 --> 00:43:13,570 the Indian government can then 1103 00:43:16,180 --> 00:43:18,489 will monitor and 1104 00:43:18,490 --> 00:43:20,649 intercept all communications 1105 00:43:20,650 --> 00:43:22,269 that are digital in real time. 1106 00:43:23,690 --> 00:43:25,819 It can be used to monitor your social 1107 00:43:25,820 --> 00:43:26,899 media activity. 1108 00:43:26,900 --> 00:43:28,279 It can be monitored, too. 1109 00:43:28,280 --> 00:43:29,869 It can be used to monitor your e-mail 1110 00:43:29,870 --> 00:43:31,969 activity, your telephone calls and your 1111 00:43:31,970 --> 00:43:33,379 mobile calls. 1112 00:43:33,380 --> 00:43:34,609 And it also 1113 00:43:36,500 --> 00:43:37,500 claims to do. 1114 00:43:40,400 --> 00:43:42,289 Real time monitoring of your location 1115 00:43:42,290 --> 00:43:43,290 using GPS. 1116 00:43:45,180 --> 00:43:47,309 No, who is it that 1117 00:43:47,310 --> 00:43:50,519 authorizes or decides on the selection 1118 00:43:50,520 --> 00:43:52,979 of targets that 1119 00:43:52,980 --> 00:43:55,049 can be targeted through this 1120 00:43:55,050 --> 00:43:56,050 surveillance? 1121 00:43:57,000 --> 00:43:58,469 Now the agencies that actually have 1122 00:43:58,470 --> 00:44:00,719 access to this data are not 1123 00:44:00,720 --> 00:44:02,789 required to seek a court order 1124 00:44:02,790 --> 00:44:04,319 to do any surveillance anymore. 1125 00:44:04,320 --> 00:44:06,029 They don't need to as a service provider 1126 00:44:06,030 --> 00:44:07,379 anymore for data. 1127 00:44:07,380 --> 00:44:09,149 They can just get it because they have 1128 00:44:09,150 --> 00:44:11,099 access to the central system. 1129 00:44:12,500 --> 00:44:15,739 These are this is these are the agencies 1130 00:44:15,740 --> 00:44:18,259 and authorities that have access 1131 00:44:18,260 --> 00:44:21,349 to data, that's a that's a lot of 1132 00:44:21,350 --> 00:44:22,819 agencies. 1133 00:44:22,820 --> 00:44:24,229 And I was looking at this list and I 1134 00:44:24,230 --> 00:44:26,479 suddenly went, Hey, why 1135 00:44:26,480 --> 00:44:29,449 is the Central Board of Direct Taxes 1136 00:44:29,450 --> 00:44:31,669 direct access surveilling me? 1137 00:44:31,670 --> 00:44:32,809 Why is it that 1138 00:44:34,490 --> 00:44:36,559 the tax office 1139 00:44:36,560 --> 00:44:37,909 needs to have Real-Time? 1140 00:44:39,500 --> 00:44:41,119 Capabilities to intercept my 1141 00:44:41,120 --> 00:44:42,120 communications. 1142 00:44:43,200 --> 00:44:45,389 When did suspicion of tax 1143 00:44:45,390 --> 00:44:47,639 evasion legally justify 1144 00:44:47,640 --> 00:44:48,640 a wiretap? 1145 00:44:49,700 --> 00:44:50,959 And why is it that 1146 00:44:52,070 --> 00:44:54,349 someone who forgot to pay their tax 1147 00:44:54,350 --> 00:44:56,029 avoiding that tax is now suddenly a 1148 00:44:56,030 --> 00:44:58,189 terrorist, which is what 1149 00:44:58,190 --> 00:44:59,419 these systems are supposed to fight, 1150 00:44:59,420 --> 00:45:00,499 right? That isn't. 1151 00:45:01,560 --> 00:45:03,389 The cabinet secretary of India actually 1152 00:45:03,390 --> 00:45:05,729 in 2011 said economic offenses 1153 00:45:05,730 --> 00:45:07,679 are not public emergencies. 1154 00:45:08,970 --> 00:45:10,769 I don't think we even needed someone to 1155 00:45:10,770 --> 00:45:11,790 make a statement like that. 1156 00:45:15,550 --> 00:45:17,739 The teams will monitor 1157 00:45:17,740 --> 00:45:20,589 160 million internet users, 1158 00:45:20,590 --> 00:45:22,629 and since it ties in to the diseases 1159 00:45:22,630 --> 00:45:24,729 which I spoke about earlier, will monitor 1160 00:45:24,730 --> 00:45:27,039 900 million mobiles and landlines and 1161 00:45:27,040 --> 00:45:29,129 will do location based monitoring using 1162 00:45:29,130 --> 00:45:30,130 GPUs. 1163 00:45:31,430 --> 00:45:33,679 The late Bruce Niles said they're doing 1164 00:45:33,680 --> 00:45:35,809 all this monitoring to look for 1165 00:45:35,810 --> 00:45:37,639 people who might be terrorists. 1166 00:45:37,640 --> 00:45:38,959 He says searching for the terrorist 1167 00:45:38,960 --> 00:45:40,639 through data mining is like looking for a 1168 00:45:40,640 --> 00:45:41,869 needle in a haystack. 1169 00:45:43,080 --> 00:45:45,149 To use, imagine 1170 00:45:45,150 --> 00:45:47,219 a slightly more real 1171 00:45:47,220 --> 00:45:49,559 life example, it's almost 1172 00:45:49,560 --> 00:45:50,560 like going 1173 00:45:51,900 --> 00:45:54,389 the only way we can actually protect, 1174 00:45:54,390 --> 00:45:56,759 say, the city of Hamburg is 1175 00:45:56,760 --> 00:45:59,069 if we collect everybody's 1176 00:45:59,070 --> 00:46:01,199 keys for their private properties 1177 00:46:01,200 --> 00:46:03,539 and deposit them with the police. 1178 00:46:03,540 --> 00:46:04,739 And that's the only way we can actually 1179 00:46:04,740 --> 00:46:06,749 protect them. So we need all the data, 1180 00:46:06,750 --> 00:46:08,909 all everybody's 1181 00:46:08,910 --> 00:46:10,080 data. So we can actually. 1182 00:46:12,090 --> 00:46:14,459 Then figured out who 1183 00:46:14,460 --> 00:46:15,929 among all these people by looking at 1184 00:46:15,930 --> 00:46:17,970 their keys is a terrorist. 1185 00:46:19,370 --> 00:46:21,499 And they also set up a system called 1186 00:46:21,500 --> 00:46:23,089 the National Intelligence Grid, which is 1187 00:46:23,090 --> 00:46:26,659 a it is this integrated intelligence 1188 00:46:26,660 --> 00:46:28,819 network where 1189 00:46:28,820 --> 00:46:30,919 a lot of databases that are owned 1190 00:46:30,920 --> 00:46:32,809 by several departments in the government 1191 00:46:32,810 --> 00:46:35,389 are now being linked together. 1192 00:46:35,390 --> 00:46:37,909 This was again proposed after the 2008 1193 00:46:37,910 --> 00:46:40,399 attacks and recently 1194 00:46:40,400 --> 00:46:42,469 a few days ago. I read a report 1195 00:46:42,470 --> 00:46:44,209 saying that actually now starting to 1196 00:46:44,210 --> 00:46:46,369 launch this and it's 1197 00:46:46,370 --> 00:46:48,170 supposedly going to be active 1198 00:46:49,220 --> 00:46:51,439 by the end of this year or 1199 00:46:51,440 --> 00:46:52,440 early next year. 1200 00:46:53,430 --> 00:46:55,589 Natalie, it again links 1201 00:46:55,590 --> 00:46:57,419 several different different departments 1202 00:46:57,420 --> 00:46:58,860 of the Indian government. 1203 00:47:00,820 --> 00:47:03,249 And once again, does 1204 00:47:03,250 --> 00:47:05,770 it include the tax department, 1205 00:47:07,090 --> 00:47:09,069 which I think I missed in the slide, but 1206 00:47:09,070 --> 00:47:10,809 no, it is the Central Board of Direct 1207 00:47:10,810 --> 00:47:11,810 Access. 1208 00:47:13,200 --> 00:47:14,909 So what does all this mean for? 1209 00:47:20,080 --> 00:47:21,489 One thing the one thing, one thing to 1210 00:47:21,490 --> 00:47:23,379 note with all this happening in the 1211 00:47:23,380 --> 00:47:25,779 country is that India actually doesn't 1212 00:47:25,780 --> 00:47:27,459 have a dedicated privacy law. 1213 00:47:28,520 --> 00:47:31,339 Also, the kind of protections 1214 00:47:31,340 --> 00:47:34,309 we have around data 1215 00:47:34,310 --> 00:47:35,900 are not really governed by 1216 00:47:38,200 --> 00:47:39,919 by a dedicated data protection law. 1217 00:47:41,240 --> 00:47:42,889 So where does that leave us and what are 1218 00:47:42,890 --> 00:47:45,049 the steps we are taking or we can 1219 00:47:45,050 --> 00:47:46,050 take? 1220 00:47:46,760 --> 00:47:49,249 To actually exercise 1221 00:47:49,250 --> 00:47:51,380 the rights that we have as citizens. 1222 00:47:53,290 --> 00:47:54,729 The Center for Internet and Society, 1223 00:47:54,730 --> 00:47:57,099 where Maria, who I mentioned earlier 1224 00:47:57,100 --> 00:47:59,709 works, is actually drafting 1225 00:47:59,710 --> 00:48:02,589 new privacy protection bill. 1226 00:48:02,590 --> 00:48:04,839 It's and they've done it in 1227 00:48:04,840 --> 00:48:07,119 an extremely collaborative manner where 1228 00:48:07,120 --> 00:48:08,120 they've invited 1229 00:48:09,550 --> 00:48:11,739 members of the general 1230 00:48:11,740 --> 00:48:15,099 public, policymakers, lawmakers, 1231 00:48:15,100 --> 00:48:17,440 activists and 1232 00:48:19,000 --> 00:48:22,119 private enterprise 1233 00:48:22,120 --> 00:48:24,279 folks to come together and work 1234 00:48:24,280 --> 00:48:26,589 on this series of about 1235 00:48:26,590 --> 00:48:28,149 seven roundtables, if I remember 1236 00:48:28,150 --> 00:48:30,639 correctly. So that's happening that 1237 00:48:30,640 --> 00:48:32,079 now the reason that the 1238 00:48:33,220 --> 00:48:35,049 organization that is not the government 1239 00:48:35,050 --> 00:48:37,029 is doing this is because the Indian 1240 00:48:37,030 --> 00:48:38,449 government has not done this. 1241 00:48:38,450 --> 00:48:39,909 So there is someone else, a bunch of 1242 00:48:39,910 --> 00:48:41,199 people actually sitting together and 1243 00:48:41,200 --> 00:48:42,969 going, Oh, OK, let's let's let's build a 1244 00:48:42,970 --> 00:48:45,039 privacy bill and see if we can 1245 00:48:45,040 --> 00:48:46,059 protect our privacy. 1246 00:48:47,950 --> 00:48:50,049 They're not things one can do as a 1247 00:48:50,050 --> 00:48:52,209 technologist, and this is what I think a 1248 00:48:52,210 --> 00:48:53,560 lot of us can do is. 1249 00:48:54,670 --> 00:48:57,099 But let's use strong crypto, 1250 00:48:57,100 --> 00:48:59,409 which actually helps us protect our data 1251 00:48:59,410 --> 00:49:01,659 ourselves, like communications ourselves 1252 00:49:01,660 --> 00:49:04,179 and not rely on other agencies 1253 00:49:04,180 --> 00:49:06,339 or governments to give us this 1254 00:49:06,340 --> 00:49:07,340 protection 1255 00:49:08,530 --> 00:49:10,179 as technologists. 1256 00:49:10,180 --> 00:49:11,199 A lot of people 1257 00:49:13,090 --> 00:49:15,279 I know have been running, 1258 00:49:15,280 --> 00:49:16,629 running a lot of trainings, including 1259 00:49:16,630 --> 00:49:18,249 Tactical Tech, where I work with and the 1260 00:49:18,250 --> 00:49:20,229 crypto body movement when teaching other 1261 00:49:20,230 --> 00:49:22,269 people how to use crypto and make this 1262 00:49:22,270 --> 00:49:24,309 make this make all this technology 1263 00:49:24,310 --> 00:49:26,529 accessible to 1264 00:49:26,530 --> 00:49:27,530 people who 1265 00:49:29,350 --> 00:49:31,149 don't don't have the technical knowledge 1266 00:49:31,150 --> 00:49:33,369 to protect themselves from 1267 00:49:33,370 --> 00:49:34,480 being snooped online. 1268 00:49:35,500 --> 00:49:37,479 And of course, I think all of us should 1269 00:49:37,480 --> 00:49:39,249 be thinking a little more about changing 1270 00:49:39,250 --> 00:49:41,709 our online behavior, our digital 1271 00:49:41,710 --> 00:49:42,710 habits. 1272 00:49:43,210 --> 00:49:45,279 It's really the only very little thing 1273 00:49:45,280 --> 00:49:46,809 like this very small little things one 1274 00:49:46,810 --> 00:49:49,089 can do to actually protecting us, 1275 00:49:49,090 --> 00:49:51,309 including using good crypto and reading 1276 00:49:51,310 --> 00:49:52,899 privacy policies or changing up over 1277 00:49:52,900 --> 00:49:54,279 privacy settings to make sure we're not 1278 00:49:54,280 --> 00:49:56,440 giving up more data than 1279 00:49:57,760 --> 00:49:58,760 we should. 1280 00:50:00,080 --> 00:50:01,909 And of course, there's a lot of 1281 00:50:01,910 --> 00:50:03,169 information that the government of India 1282 00:50:03,170 --> 00:50:05,419 has not made available to us, and one 1283 00:50:05,420 --> 00:50:07,519 thing that many activists and 1284 00:50:10,760 --> 00:50:13,279 others are doing is filing 1285 00:50:13,280 --> 00:50:15,889 right to information petitions or 1286 00:50:15,890 --> 00:50:18,139 signing online petitions and 1287 00:50:18,140 --> 00:50:19,939 actually asking for this information from 1288 00:50:19,940 --> 00:50:21,439 the government by writing to them through 1289 00:50:21,440 --> 00:50:22,969 various means. And that, I think should 1290 00:50:22,970 --> 00:50:25,009 continue in every context, and that is 1291 00:50:25,010 --> 00:50:27,259 something we intend to continue doing. 1292 00:50:27,260 --> 00:50:28,260 And 1293 00:50:30,050 --> 00:50:31,969 I am of the strong belief, and I was 1294 00:50:31,970 --> 00:50:33,709 actually talking to a colleague yesterday 1295 00:50:33,710 --> 00:50:36,349 and we kind of agreed on this, that 1296 00:50:36,350 --> 00:50:38,509 this doesn't happen unless 1297 00:50:38,510 --> 00:50:40,669 a bunch of people actually go 1298 00:50:40,670 --> 00:50:42,849 out onto the streets and ask for it. 1299 00:50:44,800 --> 00:50:46,689 There's a good example of that right now 1300 00:50:46,690 --> 00:50:48,129 in India. 1301 00:50:48,130 --> 00:50:50,709 Yesterday, the 1302 00:50:50,710 --> 00:50:52,149 state of New Delhi, which is also the 1303 00:50:52,150 --> 00:50:53,230 capital of India. 1304 00:50:54,390 --> 00:50:56,229 The new chief minister, who was sworn in 1305 00:50:56,230 --> 00:50:58,269 yesterday and he comes from a party 1306 00:50:58,270 --> 00:51:01,149 called the Aam Aadmi Party, 1307 00:51:01,150 --> 00:51:03,459 which translates to loosely 1308 00:51:03,460 --> 00:51:05,380 translates to Common People's Party. 1309 00:51:06,790 --> 00:51:08,859 Now why this party came 1310 00:51:08,860 --> 00:51:11,109 into being is because 1311 00:51:11,110 --> 00:51:12,609 a lot of people in India, a lot of 1312 00:51:12,610 --> 00:51:15,189 activists who were not politicians 1313 00:51:17,500 --> 00:51:19,659 launched a large campaign against 1314 00:51:19,660 --> 00:51:22,089 corruption, which 1315 00:51:22,090 --> 00:51:24,219 in which they motivated millions of 1316 00:51:24,220 --> 00:51:25,809 people to come out onto the streets in 1317 00:51:25,810 --> 00:51:27,879 protest against this. 1318 00:51:27,880 --> 00:51:30,009 And we actually are seeing 1319 00:51:30,010 --> 00:51:30,999 change from that. 1320 00:51:31,000 --> 00:51:31,969 We'll see how that plays out. 1321 00:51:31,970 --> 00:51:34,389 We don't know. But but the fact that 1322 00:51:34,390 --> 00:51:35,619 less than a year ago, 1323 00:51:37,000 --> 00:51:38,739 this party did not exist and today it's 1324 00:51:38,740 --> 00:51:41,109 actually in power in 1325 00:51:41,110 --> 00:51:43,179 a national capital means that 1326 00:51:43,180 --> 00:51:44,679 people going out in the streets and 1327 00:51:44,680 --> 00:51:46,869 protesting can actually change things. 1328 00:51:46,870 --> 00:51:48,969 So it's really important for us 1329 00:51:48,970 --> 00:51:52,149 to encourage people to 1330 00:51:52,150 --> 00:51:54,819 go out onto the streets. 1331 00:51:54,820 --> 00:51:57,549 I was in Berlin a few months ago and 1332 00:51:57,550 --> 00:51:59,769 I felt really liberated when I marched 1333 00:51:59,770 --> 00:52:02,739 in the Freedom Not Fear protest, 1334 00:52:02,740 --> 00:52:04,869 where 12000 people in the city 1335 00:52:04,870 --> 00:52:06,579 of Berlin were out in the streets. 1336 00:52:08,170 --> 00:52:11,019 Trying to reclaim that digital freedoms 1337 00:52:11,020 --> 00:52:13,119 and telling the state, no, you 1338 00:52:13,120 --> 00:52:15,459 cannot spy on us, you cannot scan 1339 00:52:15,460 --> 00:52:17,589 us. And I think 1340 00:52:17,590 --> 00:52:19,389 it's important for us right now to try 1341 00:52:19,390 --> 00:52:20,390 and 1342 00:52:21,580 --> 00:52:23,739 motivate people in India to try 1343 00:52:23,740 --> 00:52:24,910 and do something similar. 1344 00:52:28,750 --> 00:52:30,939 So, yeah, I'll just leave you 1345 00:52:30,940 --> 00:52:31,940 with that, and 1346 00:52:33,040 --> 00:52:34,040 I think. 1347 00:52:39,730 --> 00:52:41,859 Just to go back to that notion of privacy 1348 00:52:41,860 --> 00:52:44,049 that I started with, there's 1349 00:52:44,050 --> 00:52:46,119 a lot of people thinking about this in 1350 00:52:46,120 --> 00:52:48,429 India and the fact that the question 1351 00:52:48,430 --> 00:52:50,169 that keeps being asked is its privacy 1352 00:52:50,170 --> 00:52:52,299 that does privacy even exist in 1353 00:52:52,300 --> 00:52:54,069 the Indian context? 1354 00:52:54,070 --> 00:52:56,259 I just think it's probably 1355 00:52:56,260 --> 00:52:58,269 differently configured in the Indian 1356 00:52:58,270 --> 00:52:59,529 society. 1357 00:52:59,530 --> 00:53:01,659 But it's yeah, it's definitely 1358 00:53:01,660 --> 00:53:02,739 not dead. And 1359 00:53:03,910 --> 00:53:05,769 fortunately for us, there's a lot of 1360 00:53:05,770 --> 00:53:07,479 amazing people, organizations, 1361 00:53:07,480 --> 00:53:09,459 individuals and 1362 00:53:11,500 --> 00:53:14,139 other institutions and activists who 1363 00:53:14,140 --> 00:53:16,449 think the same and are 1364 00:53:16,450 --> 00:53:18,159 actually making calls in different ways 1365 00:53:18,160 --> 00:53:20,229 to protect this important 1366 00:53:20,230 --> 00:53:21,799 human right. 1367 00:53:21,800 --> 00:53:23,139 Well, I leave you with that. 1368 00:53:23,140 --> 00:53:25,269 I'm happy to talk more about what's 1369 00:53:25,270 --> 00:53:27,609 going on in India and 1370 00:53:27,610 --> 00:53:29,979 and actually brainstorm some ideas 1371 00:53:29,980 --> 00:53:32,079 about what else we should think 1372 00:53:32,080 --> 00:53:33,549 about and what we can do. 1373 00:53:33,550 --> 00:53:35,899 But yeah, thank you very much. 1374 00:53:35,900 --> 00:53:36,900 Yeah. 1375 00:53:43,790 --> 00:53:44,959 All right. 1376 00:53:44,960 --> 00:53:47,569 We still have some time left for Q&A. 1377 00:53:47,570 --> 00:53:48,739 Are there any questions? 1378 00:53:48,740 --> 00:53:51,139 Please go to the mikes over there and 1379 00:53:51,140 --> 00:53:52,140 over there. 1380 00:53:53,860 --> 00:53:56,289 Do we have questions from the internet, 1381 00:53:56,290 --> 00:53:58,359 no questions from the internet 1382 00:53:58,360 --> 00:53:59,360 over there. 1383 00:54:01,370 --> 00:54:04,189 Thanks, Mike. Yeah, thanks for the 1384 00:54:04,190 --> 00:54:06,029 very insightful speech. 1385 00:54:06,030 --> 00:54:07,009 Interesting. 1386 00:54:07,010 --> 00:54:08,159 It's a bit scary, actually. 1387 00:54:08,160 --> 00:54:10,219 And so I got a couple of questions, 1388 00:54:10,220 --> 00:54:11,719 took a couple of notes. 1389 00:54:11,720 --> 00:54:13,819 The first one is how long did it take 1390 00:54:13,820 --> 00:54:15,859 overall? I mean, the situation is kind of 1391 00:54:15,860 --> 00:54:16,939 scary. 1392 00:54:16,940 --> 00:54:19,609 And so how long in the world did it take 1393 00:54:19,610 --> 00:54:21,689 to the country to 1394 00:54:21,690 --> 00:54:24,320 like, get into this kind of massive? 1395 00:54:25,740 --> 00:54:27,809 Private data collection, civilians 1396 00:54:27,810 --> 00:54:29,909 of everything, how how many years 1397 00:54:29,910 --> 00:54:30,910 did it take? 1398 00:54:31,680 --> 00:54:33,629 So a lot of the actual schemes I spoke 1399 00:54:33,630 --> 00:54:34,630 about today 1400 00:54:36,720 --> 00:54:39,899 were conceptualized after 1401 00:54:39,900 --> 00:54:43,109 the attacks in 2011 1402 00:54:43,110 --> 00:54:45,030 in Mumbai, which was 1403 00:54:46,650 --> 00:54:49,409 very critical, very large 1404 00:54:49,410 --> 00:54:51,629 landmark event in India. 1405 00:54:51,630 --> 00:54:53,849 And a lot 1406 00:54:53,850 --> 00:54:55,859 of this actually is still being piloted 1407 00:54:55,860 --> 00:54:57,749 and has not been implemented. 1408 00:54:57,750 --> 00:54:59,399 So this is actually a good time when we 1409 00:54:59,400 --> 00:55:00,929 are trying to get more information from 1410 00:55:00,930 --> 00:55:02,099 the government to understand how these 1411 00:55:02,100 --> 00:55:04,169 systems work, to protest against 1412 00:55:04,170 --> 00:55:06,509 this and see if we can actually 1413 00:55:06,510 --> 00:55:08,879 get them to change their mind slightly 1414 00:55:08,880 --> 00:55:11,459 and think about these things differently. 1415 00:55:11,460 --> 00:55:13,679 But over the last five years, 1416 00:55:13,680 --> 00:55:15,509 when is when most of these systems have 1417 00:55:15,510 --> 00:55:16,929 been conceptualized? 1418 00:55:16,930 --> 00:55:19,230 OK, so a couple of more questions. 1419 00:55:20,970 --> 00:55:22,949 So do you think I mean, we've seen the 1420 00:55:22,950 --> 00:55:24,059 links between 1421 00:55:25,500 --> 00:55:27,479 some private companies that are obviously 1422 00:55:27,480 --> 00:55:28,680 linked to the CIA 1423 00:55:29,910 --> 00:55:32,519 for the database 1424 00:55:32,520 --> 00:55:33,509 making? 1425 00:55:33,510 --> 00:55:35,669 Um, do you think or 1426 00:55:35,670 --> 00:55:37,949 do you have any piece of evidence that 1427 00:55:37,950 --> 00:55:40,529 would let you think 1428 00:55:40,530 --> 00:55:42,569 that there was some U.S. 1429 00:55:42,570 --> 00:55:45,479 pressure to build such systems? 1430 00:55:45,480 --> 00:55:47,339 No, there isn't any evidence, but it does 1431 00:55:47,340 --> 00:55:48,479 raise questions, right? 1432 00:55:48,480 --> 00:55:50,699 It's like, why is it that 1433 00:55:50,700 --> 00:55:51,700 they have? 1434 00:55:53,130 --> 00:55:55,529 Consistently going and negotiated 1435 00:55:55,530 --> 00:55:57,149 these contracts and put them in place 1436 00:55:57,150 --> 00:55:58,150 with. 1437 00:56:00,110 --> 00:56:02,239 And with companies that have 1438 00:56:02,240 --> 00:56:04,369 clear links that have been exposed 1439 00:56:04,370 --> 00:56:06,439 to intelligence agencies, it 1440 00:56:06,440 --> 00:56:09,199 just doesn't make me feel safe as 1441 00:56:09,200 --> 00:56:11,659 an as a citizen of a country 1442 00:56:11,660 --> 00:56:13,219 where the government is negotiating deals 1443 00:56:13,220 --> 00:56:15,379 with someone 1444 00:56:15,380 --> 00:56:17,539 who might be linked 1445 00:56:17,540 --> 00:56:19,759 and might be compromising 1446 00:56:19,760 --> 00:56:21,919 my personal information to 1447 00:56:21,920 --> 00:56:23,179 appeal to an intelligence agent, a 1448 00:56:23,180 --> 00:56:24,440 foreign intelligence agency. 1449 00:56:25,970 --> 00:56:28,069 Okay. And last one, what can non-Indian 1450 00:56:28,070 --> 00:56:29,070 people do to help? 1451 00:56:30,040 --> 00:56:32,569 What? What can non-Indian people 1452 00:56:32,570 --> 00:56:34,789 do if they want to help somehow? 1453 00:56:36,100 --> 00:56:38,919 So it's 1454 00:56:38,920 --> 00:56:41,589 OK, so there is a it's obviously a global 1455 00:56:41,590 --> 00:56:43,779 dialog and discourse that's that's 1456 00:56:43,780 --> 00:56:46,179 very important right now. 1457 00:56:46,180 --> 00:56:47,439 And one of the things that 1458 00:56:49,030 --> 00:56:51,399 that is true, which I didn't mention 1459 00:56:51,400 --> 00:56:52,959 earlier, is that it doesn't really just 1460 00:56:52,960 --> 00:56:54,519 affect Indian citizens. 1461 00:56:54,520 --> 00:56:55,899 It affects a lot of other people. 1462 00:56:55,900 --> 00:56:57,489 Considering the fact that there are no 1463 00:56:57,490 --> 00:56:59,739 privacy bills and no data protection 1464 00:56:59,740 --> 00:57:01,869 laws and the amount of data that 1465 00:57:01,870 --> 00:57:04,479 is being invested into India 1466 00:57:04,480 --> 00:57:06,639 from other 1467 00:57:06,640 --> 00:57:09,489 countries, including 1468 00:57:09,490 --> 00:57:11,229 all the business that is being outsourced 1469 00:57:11,230 --> 00:57:13,509 into India, should be a cause of worry to 1470 00:57:13,510 --> 00:57:15,429 a lot of other people who are not in 1471 00:57:15,430 --> 00:57:17,540 India. So we obviously need 1472 00:57:18,550 --> 00:57:19,550 global pressure 1473 00:57:21,070 --> 00:57:23,049 and people to actually understand what's 1474 00:57:23,050 --> 00:57:24,969 happening in India, which is, I think, 1475 00:57:24,970 --> 00:57:27,099 what we've been doing reporting 1476 00:57:27,100 --> 00:57:28,929 on current events of what's happening and 1477 00:57:28,930 --> 00:57:31,239 what and what 1478 00:57:31,240 --> 00:57:33,679 that means in the larger global context. 1479 00:57:33,680 --> 00:57:34,680 So 1480 00:57:36,070 --> 00:57:37,749 there's a lot of things one can think 1481 00:57:37,750 --> 00:57:39,820 about doing, including just starting to. 1482 00:57:42,460 --> 00:57:44,339 Ask these questions about, OK, if my data 1483 00:57:44,340 --> 00:57:46,349 is living in India, is it safe? 1484 00:57:46,350 --> 00:57:47,969 And what does that mean to me if I'm not 1485 00:57:47,970 --> 00:57:48,989 there? 1486 00:57:48,990 --> 00:57:51,119 And as these questions not 1487 00:57:51,120 --> 00:57:53,399 just to the Indian government, but 1488 00:57:53,400 --> 00:57:55,499 to your two 1489 00:57:55,500 --> 00:57:57,059 people who are actually dealing with your 1490 00:57:57,060 --> 00:57:58,060 data, 1491 00:57:59,500 --> 00:58:01,319 you know where you are. 1492 00:58:01,320 --> 00:58:02,320 Thank you. 1493 00:58:03,790 --> 00:58:05,770 All right. We have a question at one. 1494 00:58:07,750 --> 00:58:10,059 OK. At first I were thank 1495 00:58:10,060 --> 00:58:11,860 you two for your good, 1496 00:58:12,970 --> 00:58:15,099 if you will, to give us a view 1497 00:58:15,100 --> 00:58:17,169 of on this 1498 00:58:17,170 --> 00:58:19,469 faraway subcontinent. 1499 00:58:19,470 --> 00:58:21,999 India and 1500 00:58:22,000 --> 00:58:24,369 we work 1501 00:58:24,370 --> 00:58:26,679 in Germany as a watchdog 1502 00:58:26,680 --> 00:58:29,259 group to monitor 1503 00:58:29,260 --> 00:58:31,209 big enterprises. 1504 00:58:31,210 --> 00:58:33,789 And you mentioned two of them, Accenture 1505 00:58:33,790 --> 00:58:35,889 and A1 A1. 1506 00:58:35,890 --> 00:58:37,510 I never heard of them. 1507 00:58:40,150 --> 00:58:42,629 We work almost on 1508 00:58:42,630 --> 00:58:45,279 German enterprise batsmen, 1509 00:58:45,280 --> 00:58:47,649 but it's men who are 1510 00:58:47,650 --> 00:58:49,959 holding a big 1511 00:58:49,960 --> 00:58:52,689 personal database on 1512 00:58:52,690 --> 00:58:55,030 the Germans and European people. 1513 00:58:57,580 --> 00:58:58,580 I think 1514 00:59:00,250 --> 00:59:01,480 our view is 1515 00:59:03,010 --> 00:59:05,109 shaped, exclude the media in 1516 00:59:05,110 --> 00:59:07,179 this. And as a scandal, the 1517 00:59:07,180 --> 00:59:10,059 big enterprise prizes are 1518 00:59:10,060 --> 00:59:12,939 showed us as the poor guys 1519 00:59:12,940 --> 00:59:15,219 who are blackmailed from the secret 1520 00:59:15,220 --> 00:59:18,219 services, CIA, NSA and so on. 1521 00:59:18,220 --> 00:59:20,679 But from our view as a watchdog 1522 00:59:20,680 --> 00:59:23,049 group, the enterprises 1523 00:59:23,050 --> 00:59:25,179 have very strong own 1524 00:59:25,180 --> 00:59:26,469 interests. And 1525 00:59:27,490 --> 00:59:29,649 you mentioned at the end of 1526 00:59:29,650 --> 00:59:31,989 your presentation 1527 00:59:31,990 --> 00:59:34,779 that fight against corruption 1528 00:59:34,780 --> 00:59:36,849 may be a good idea 1529 00:59:36,850 --> 00:59:37,850 to 1530 00:59:39,130 --> 00:59:42,249 go into this connection between 1531 00:59:42,250 --> 00:59:44,319 government secret services and 1532 00:59:44,320 --> 00:59:45,999 the enterprises. 1533 00:59:46,000 --> 00:59:48,249 And maybe Accenture. 1534 00:59:48,250 --> 00:59:50,530 Accenture is 1535 00:59:53,560 --> 00:59:55,809 changed the name of this 1536 00:59:55,810 --> 00:59:58,389 enterprise several years ago 1537 00:59:58,390 --> 01:00:00,519 because they are linked with one of the 1538 01:00:00,520 --> 01:00:02,739 biggest corruption scandals 1539 01:00:02,740 --> 01:00:03,909 of the Western world. 1540 01:00:03,910 --> 01:00:05,199 It was the Enron 1541 01:00:06,760 --> 01:00:08,920 scandal, and so we can see 1542 01:00:10,420 --> 01:00:12,819 where the fight 1543 01:00:12,820 --> 01:00:14,619 against corruption and the fight for more 1544 01:00:14,620 --> 01:00:17,019 privacy linked together. 1545 01:00:20,210 --> 01:00:22,669 And my question 1546 01:00:22,670 --> 01:00:24,859 is, can you tell 1547 01:00:24,860 --> 01:00:27,049 me more about a one, 1548 01:00:27,050 --> 01:00:28,050 perhaps? 1549 01:00:28,950 --> 01:00:29,950 So. 1550 01:00:30,970 --> 01:00:33,309 Well, there's actually very little 1551 01:00:33,310 --> 01:00:35,409 information that we have in this 1552 01:00:35,410 --> 01:00:38,349 specific context, about 11, 1553 01:00:38,350 --> 01:00:40,879 but they've basically been building 1554 01:00:40,880 --> 01:00:43,119 a well, 1555 01:00:43,120 --> 01:00:44,229 they've been basically doing a lot of 1556 01:00:44,230 --> 01:00:46,329 consulting and offering 1557 01:00:46,330 --> 01:00:48,399 a lot of consulting services 1558 01:00:48,400 --> 01:00:50,589 to defense and global security, 1559 01:00:50,590 --> 01:00:51,670 like I said earlier. And 1560 01:00:52,870 --> 01:00:55,299 they they would also 1561 01:00:55,300 --> 01:00:56,300 actually 1562 01:00:57,640 --> 01:00:59,889 they're actually a major supplier of 1563 01:00:59,890 --> 01:01:02,679 biometric identification software 1564 01:01:02,680 --> 01:01:04,899 and which is used by the U.S. 1565 01:01:04,900 --> 01:01:07,629 to monitor terrorists and insurgents 1566 01:01:07,630 --> 01:01:09,849 in Iraq and Afghanistan. 1567 01:01:09,850 --> 01:01:12,039 And they're very closely 1568 01:01:12,040 --> 01:01:13,659 linked to the CIA and. 1569 01:01:15,420 --> 01:01:18,509 And one of the things, if I now 1570 01:01:18,510 --> 01:01:20,579 remember correctly is 1571 01:01:20,580 --> 01:01:22,019 that they've been. 1572 01:01:23,950 --> 01:01:26,349 They were recently employed by 1573 01:01:27,970 --> 01:01:30,339 the Department of Homeland Security, and 1574 01:01:30,340 --> 01:01:32,379 I'm just trying to see if I can find some 1575 01:01:32,380 --> 01:01:35,019 notes I have here, which has which I can 1576 01:01:35,020 --> 01:01:37,479 give you more specific information about 1577 01:01:37,480 --> 01:01:39,669 without having to break my memory 1578 01:01:39,670 --> 01:01:40,670 for this part. 1579 01:01:43,570 --> 01:01:45,819 Maybe you could handle that off 1580 01:01:45,820 --> 01:01:46,479 later. 1581 01:01:46,480 --> 01:01:48,579 Maybe. Yeah, maybe I have. 1582 01:01:48,580 --> 01:01:50,649 I have more details about L1, which 1583 01:01:50,650 --> 01:01:52,599 I am happy to share. 1584 01:01:52,600 --> 01:01:54,849 If we talk in the halls, maybe 1585 01:01:54,850 --> 01:01:57,189 OK, how big is this, 1586 01:01:57,190 --> 01:01:58,329 everyone? 1587 01:01:58,330 --> 01:01:59,330 If you. 1588 01:02:00,360 --> 01:02:02,459 Well, they some statistics, the 1589 01:02:02,460 --> 01:02:04,229 public information on their website says 1590 01:02:04,230 --> 01:02:06,449 they have over 2000 specialists 1591 01:02:06,450 --> 01:02:08,699 who have and a lot of them have top 1592 01:02:08,700 --> 01:02:10,019 security clearances. 1593 01:02:10,020 --> 01:02:11,429 This is quite big. 1594 01:02:11,430 --> 01:02:12,810 OK, thank you. 1595 01:02:13,880 --> 01:02:15,919 All right, then I'd say thank you very 1596 01:02:15,920 --> 01:02:18,409 much for this great talk 1597 01:02:18,410 --> 01:02:20,479 and another round of warm 1598 01:02:20,480 --> 01:02:21,480 applause, please.